2023. szeptember 22., péntek

The Education-Training-Work Continuums: Pathways to Socio-Professional Inclusion for Youth and Adults

 

The Education-Training-Work Continuums: Pathways to Socio-Professional Inclusion for Youth and Adults



"This Special Issue by NORRAG in collaboration with the International Labour Organization explores the gaps that exist between education, training, and decent work that perpetuate exclusion and inequality for marginalized groups. By considering these three elements as an interconnected continuum, this collection of 28 contributions from 25 countries across 5 continents offers perspectives and solutions to enhance the socio-professional inclusion of disadvantaged youth and adults." 

Child labour in Kosovo: An enquiry into the causes and impact of child labour

 

Child labour in Kosovo: An enquiry into the causes and impact of child labour


"This report provides a descriptive overview of the prevalence, determinants and effects of child labour based on descriptive and regression analysis of Kosovo’s 2019-2020 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS). "


2022. április 14., csütörtök

SZEGREGÁCIÓ A ROMA TANULÓK ÁLTALÁNOS ISKOLAI OKTATÁSÁBAN (2005)- Havas Gábor – Liskó Ilona

 SZEGREGÁCIÓ A ROMA TANULÓK ÁLTALÁNOS ISKOLAI OKTATÁSÁBAN - Havas Gábor – Liskó Ilona 



Bevezető 

Jelenlegi kutatásunk előzménye az volt, hogy 2000-ben ugyancsak az OM megbízásából szociológiai kutatást folytattunk a roma gyerekek általános iskolai oktatásának körülményeiről.1 2000-es kutatásunk során kiderült, hogy az általános iskolák igen nagy hányadában tartósan elkülönített (szegregált) formában oktatják a roma tanulókat, az átlagosnál rosszabb személyi és tárgyi feltételek mellett, olyan oktatási programok és pedagógiai módszerek felhasználásával, amelyektől nem remélhető sikeres felzárkóztatásuk, tanulmányi teljesítményük javulása, és társadalmi beilleszkedésük eredményessége. 

Részben a kutatás során elemzett adatok győzték meg az oktatási kormányzatot arról, hogy változtassanak a roma tanulók oktatására szánt kiegészítő támogatások elosztási elvein, vagyis kiegészítő támogatást csak olyan iskolák kaphassanak, amelyek hajlandók az elkülönített oktatást felszámolni, és a jövőben a roma tanulók integrált oktatásának gyakorlatát követni. 

Jelenlegi kutatásunkkal ennek az intézkedésnek az eredményességéhez kívántunk hozzájárulni olymódon, hogy egy szociológiai vizsgálat során feltárjuk, hogy melyek azok az általános iskolák, amelyek jelenleg is elkülönített formában, és alacsony hatékonysággal oktatják a roma tanulókat, vagyis melyek azok az intézmények, ahol sürgős kormányzati beavatkozásra ill. változásokra lenne szükség a jelenlegi gyakorlat átalakítása érdekében. A kutatás másik célja az volt, hogy kiderítsük, hogyan fogadták az iskolák a roma tanulók integrált oktatására vonatkozó kormányzati törekvéseket, és milyen módon használják fel azt a támogatást, amelyet a költségvetés a roma tanulók integrációja céljából juttat el hozzájuk. 

A kutatást a Felsőoktatási Kutatóintézetben folytattuk2 2004 tavaszán 624 olyan normál általános iskolában, ahova az eddigi adatok szerint annyi roma tanuló jár, hogy lehetőség nyílik elkülönített oktatásukra. A kutatás iskolamintájába az alábbi iskolák kerültek be: 

Azok az iskolák, ahol a 2002/2003-as tanévben igényeltek roma kisebbségi oktatási normatívát. 
• Azok az iskolák, ahol 1992-ben a roma tanulók aránya meghaladta a 20 százalékot.
• Azok az iskolák, ahol 1992-ben a roma tanulók száma elérte a 80 főt. 
• Azok az eltérő tantervű tagozatokat működtető iskolák, amelyek az első három pontban meghatározott halmazokba nem kerültek be, mert a roma tanulók aránya alacsony, de bizonyos adatok (a roma tanulók aránya az eltérő tantervű tagozaton, a normál és eltérő tagozaton tanuló roma gyerekek egymáshoz viszonyított aránya) valószínűsítik, hogy az eltérő tantervű tagozat léte elsősorban a szegregációt szolgálja.

....

2022. március 24., csütörtök

National Plan for Roma Inclusion 2021–2027

National Plan for Roma Inclusion 2021–2027

Publisher Office for Human Rights and Rights of National Minorities of the Government of the Republic of Croatia 




"The efforts invested so far to equalize the position of members of the Roma national minority have resulted in considerable progress. Since the establishment of the Republic of Croatia, the number of Roma officially registered by the census has increased constantly, which speaks in favor of a reduced “ethnic mimicry” and shows that changes, although slowly, continuously lead to a reduction in the reasons underlying “ethnic mimicry”. The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia recognizes the Roma as a national minority, the legislative framework provides them with representatives in the Croatian Parliament as well as at the regional and local government level. Also, Roma NGOs are organized noticeably better and participate in public and political life much more actively.

Progress has also been made in other aspects of life in the Roma community, particularly education. Pre-school attendance rates as well as primary school attendance and completion rates among children belonging to the Roma national minority have significantly increased, and we are witnessing serious efforts to provide adequate support to as many children belonging to the Roma national minority as possible from an early age.

Specific progress, mostly of a regional character, can be noticed in the field of employment and housing, but still – in most key areas of life no progress has been achieved that would equalize the living conditions of the Roma population with the rest of the Croatian population.

Given the abundant amount of data, both at the EU and national level, that can be used to monitor the effects of previous public policies, it can be concluded that they have certainly contributed to halting negative trends, even in times of severe economic crises, but still failed to make headway a significant reduction or complete elimination of inequality between the Roma and other Croatian citizens.

The objective of the National Plan for Roma Inclusion 2021 – 2027 is to significantly reduce the differences between the general population of the Republic of Croatia and the Roma in the Republic of Croatia, but also to reduce differences within the Roma population compared to the Roma.

In addition to growing investments from the state budget and the budgets of regional and local self-government units, European funds can significantly contribute to meeting the objectives of the National Plan for Roma Inclusion 2021 – 2027 and thus contribute to equalizing the living conditions of all our citizens, and to meeting the goals of the National Development Strategy of the Republic of Croatia."

...
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/ukljucivanje-roma_publikacija_web_en.pdf 

Poverty and employment: the situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States Roma survey – Data in focus

 Poverty and employment: the situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States Roma survey–Data in focus
FRA


"Roma make up Europe’s largest ethnic minority and have for centuries formed an integral part of European society. But despite efforts at national, European and international level to improve the protection of their fundamental rights and advance their social inclusion, many Roma still face severe poverty, profound social exclusion, discrimination and barriers to exercising their fundamental rights.

Equal and full access to employment is key to furthering social inclusion and combating poverty. Employment is not only a source of income that determines material well-being, it also builds human capital and shapes survival strategies, relationships between groups and across societies. Just as poverty is not only about money, employment is not only about jobs. This is why the Europe 2020 strategy so prominently reflects both poverty and employment. 

In this report, FRA presents the results of the 2011 FRA Roma survey on poverty and employment. About 90 % of Roma in the survey have an income below the national poverty threshold; about 40 % of the children live in households struggling with malnutrition or hunger. More than half of the Roma in the survey live in segregated areas, in housing that falls far below minimum housing standards. Persistent prejudice and discrimination undermine Roma employment prospects. Only about a third of those surveyed has paid work, which is often precarious and informal.

Despite widespread discrimination, most Roma are actively seeking work. But concerted efforts are necessary to break through this cycle of disadvantage, improving employment opportunities as well as reducing poverty and hardship. In times of economic crisis, the most vulnerable groups are affected first, putting at risk the modest progress achieved in implementing the EU Framework and national Roma integration strategies. Currently, 58 % of young Roma people in the 11 countries surveyed are neither in employment nor in training or education, compared to 13 % on average in the EU. While there appears to be some reduction in the employment gap between young Roma and non-Roma, this is not due to increased employment opportunities for Roma, but rather to deterioration in the employment prospects of young non-Roma. Genuine Roma inclusion is about bringing the opportunities enjoyed by Roma to the level of those of non-Roma – not the other way around. 

The problems faced by Roma are complex and therefore require an integrated approach – low educational attainment, labour market barriers, segregation and deprived living conditions must all be addressed through coordinated, mutually reinforcing interventions. The EU has an important role to play in implementing such change, by improving legislation against discrimination, coordinating policy, setting common integration goals and allocating funding. But national, regional and, especially local governments bear the core responsibility for engaging Roma communities and making change happen.

Achieving a tangible improvement in Roma people’s lives and providing their children with equal opportunities requires political will – courage and determination to act. However, political will alone is not enough. It must be matched by the knowledge of what works and what does not and by reliable monitoring tools capable of capturing the results achieved and their determinants. Otherwise, the funding devoted to improving employment opportunities and decreasing discrimination in the labour market may be wasted. 

FRA’s contribution to the process of Roma inclusion is providing evidence on all its facets. By gathering data, assisting the design of progress indicators and testing novel approaches involving Roma communities at local level, FRA makes Roma inclusion efforts more targeted and inclusive. The current publication is one element of this comprehensive endeavour.

Morten Kjaerum
 Director

...

2022. március 20., vasárnap

Az iskolai szegregációtól a különbségvak és/vagy a különbségtudatos politikáig / Vidra Zsuzsanna – Feischmidt Margit

 Az iskolai szegregációtól a különbségvak és/vagy a különbségtudatos  politikáig

Vidra Zsuzsanna – Feischmidt Margit


Elmélet és gyakorlat az USA-ban

"Tanulmányunkban arra teszünk kísérletet, hogy megvizsgáljuk milyen fő elméleti felvetések
mentén alakultak a deszegregációról folyó viták elsősorban az Amerikai Egyesült Államokban,
és ahhoz milyen, az évtizedes tapasztalatokra alapuló empirikus megfigyelések és
következtetések kapcsolódtak. Elsősorban a „színtudatos” és a „színvak” koncepciókat és a
körülöttük kialakult vitákat érintjük. Ezután, a magyarországi iskolai szegregációról és
integrációs politikákról szólunk, majd egy nemzetközi kutatás keretében végzett kvalitatív
módszerekre alapuló vizsgálat eredményei közül mutatunk be néhányat, melyek reményeink
szerint részben megvilágítják, részben pedig kontextualizálják a „színtudatos” és a „színvak”
politikáról szóló elméleti és gyakorlati kérdéseket. Írásunkban a „színtudatos” és „színvak”
helyett a „különbségtudatos” és „különbségvak” kifejezéseket használjuk, legalábbis a magyar
tapasztalatok és példák esetében, érzékeltetve a problematika észak-amerikai és hazai
közegében fennálló különbséget."

........... 
http://ap.elte.hu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/APA_2010_1_2_VIDRA_FEISCHMIDT.pdf


Public School Desegregation in United States 1968-1980 / Gary Orfield

 Public School Desegregation in United States 1968-1980 / Gary Orfield 




2019. október 18., péntek

A SZEGÉNYSÉG, A TÁRSADALMI KIREKESZTÉS ÉS A MEGKÜLÖNBÖZTETÉS ELLENI KÜZDELEM

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/hu/FTU_2.3.9.pdf

A SZEGÉNYSÉG, A TÁRSADALMI KIREKESZTÉS ÉS A MEGKÜLÖNBÖZTETÉS ELLENI KÜZDELEM


A szegénység, a társadalmi kirekesztés és a megkülönböztetés elleni küzdelem terén a tagállamoknak nyújtott támogatás révén az Európai Unió az európai társadalom befogadó jellegét és kohézióját szándékozik erősíteni, és lehetővé kívánja tenni minden polgár számára a rendelkezésre álló lehetőségekhez és erőforrásokhoz való egyenlő hozzáférést.

JOGALAP 
Az Európai Unió működéséről szóló szerződés (EUMSZ) 19., 145–150., valamint 151– 161. cikke. 

CÉLKITŰZÉSEK 
A szegénység és a társadalmi kirekesztés elleni küzdelem az EU és a tagállamok egyik kifejezett célja a szociálpolitika terén. Az EUMSZ 153. cikkével összhangban a társadalmi integrációt kizárólag nem jogalkotási együttműködés keretében – a nyitott koordinációs módszerrel (OMC) – lehet elérni, az EUMSZ 19. cikke azonban lehetővé teszi az EU számára a megkülönböztetés elleni küzdelemre irányuló fellépést olyan formában, hogy a potenciális áldozatok számára jogi védelmet kínál, és ösztönző intézkedéseket dolgoz ki.

EREDMÉNYEK 
A. A szegénység és a társadalmi kirekesztés elleni küzdelem 1975 és 1994 között az Európai Gazdasági Közösség számos kísérleti projektet és programot hajtott végre a szegénység és a kirekesztés leküzdésére. Megfelelő jogalap hiányában azonban az e téren folytatott közösségi tevékenységet folyamatosan vitatták. 

Megváltozott a helyzet az Amszterdami Szerződés 1999. évi hatálybalépésével, mivel az a társadalmi kirekesztés felszámolását a közösségi szociálpolitikai célok egyikeként határozta meg. Amint azt az EUMSZ 160. cikke is előírja, 2000-ben létrehoztak egy szociális védelemmel foglalkozó bizottságot a tagállamok közötti, illetve a Bizottsággal való együttműködés előmozdítására. 

A 2000-ben elindult lisszaboni stratégia létrehozott egy figyelemmel kísérési és koordinációs mechanizmust, amelynek része a célkitűzések megállapítása, a szegénység mérése mutatókon és referenciaértékeken alapulva, iránymutatások a tagállamok részére, valamint nemzeti cselekvési tervek a szegénység ellen. Más szociális védelmi ágazatok gyakorlatával összhangban a nyitott koordinációs módszert is alkalmazták.

2006-ban létrehozták a szociális védelem és a társadalmi befogadás területén alkalmazott nyitott koordinációs módszer új szakpolitikai keretét, amely három külön területen – a társadalmi befogadás, az egészségügy és a tartós ápolás-gondozás, valamint a nyugdíjak – alkalmazott nyitott koordinációs módszert csoportosított és integrált. . A szociális területen alkalmazott nyitott koordinációs módszer átfogó céljai között szerepelnek: a férfiak és nők közötti egyenlőség és egyenlő esélyek mindenkinek hatékony szociális védelmi rendszerek révén; kölcsönös, hatékony kölcsönhatás a növekedés, a munkahely teremtés és a társadalmi kohézió lisszaboni célkitűzései között; jó kormányzás; valamint az érdekeltek bevonása.  

A munkaerőpiacról kiszorultak aktív befogadásának elősegítéséről szóló, 2008. októberi ajánlásával a Bizottság aktualizálta a Tanács 92/441/EGK ajánlását, és javasolta a tagállamoknak „a munkaerőpiacról kiszorultak aktív [befogadását] olyan átfogó stratégia kialakításával és végrehajtásával, amely integrálja a megfelelő jövedelemtámogatást, a befogadó munkaerőpiacokat és a minőségi szolgáltatásokhoz való hozzáférést”.

Az intelligens, fenntartható és inkluzív növekedést célzó, 2010-ben elfogadott Európa 2020 stratégia egyik fontos újítása, hogy új közös célt tűzött ki a szegénység és a társadalmi kirekesztés elleni küzdelemben: az országos szegénységi küszöbök alatt élő európaiak arányát 25%-kal csökkenteni kell, és több mint 20 millió embert ki kell emelni a szegénységből. A szegénység és a kirekesztés kockázatának kitett emberek száma azonban továbbra is magas, csak 2017-ben csökkent először jelentős mértékben (2016-hoz képest 5,1 millióval (Eurostat)).

E célkitűzés elérése érdekében a Bizottság 2010 decemberében elindította a szegénység és társadalmi kirekesztés elleni küzdelem európai platformját, egy sor kulcsfontosságú kezdeményezéssel együtt, mint például az aktív befogadást célzó stratégiák nemzeti szintű értékelése és a nyugdíjakról szóló fehér könyv (COM(2012) 0055). 2011 óta a platform éves gyűlésén találkoznak a politikai döntéshozók, a legfontosabb érdekelt felek, valamint a szegénységet átélt emberek.

Mivel a válságnak köszönhetően egyre több ember van kitéve a szegénység kockázatának Európában, a Bizottság további két kezdeményezést fogadott el 2013- ban.

A „Szociális beruházás a növekedés és a kohézió érdekében – szociális beruházási csomag” című, 2013. februári közleményében a Bizottság az emberekbe való szociális beruházás előtérbe helyezésére sürgette a tagállamokat, hogy a gyermekek érdekében való beruházással megtörjék a hátrányos helyzet ördögi körét.

Emellett 2013 októberében a Bizottság javaslatot nyújtott be a Gazdasági és Monetáris Unió szociális dimenziójának megerősítésére, válaszolva az Európai Tanács felhívásaira. Ennek kulcsfontosságú összetevője a szociális eredménytábla, amely a szorosabb megfigyelést igénylő, Unió-szerte kialakuló fejlemények felkutatására szolgáló elemzőeszköz. Öt alapvető mutatóból áll: munkanélküliség; ifjúsági munkanélküliség és a nem foglalkoztatott, oktatásban és képzésben nem részesülő (NEET-) fiatalok aránya; a háztartások rendelkezésére álló jövedelem; a szegénységi arány; valamint a jövedelmek közötti egyenlőtlenségek. A 2014. évi európai szemeszter óta az eredménytábla része az éves növekedési jelentéshez csatolt közös foglalkoztatási jelentésnek, amely stratégiai politikai prioritásokat határoz meg. Emellett 2015-ben három foglalkoztatási mutatót (munkaerőpiaci részvétel, tartós munkanélküliségi ráta és ifjúsági munkanélküliségi ráta) adtak hozzá a makrogazdasági egyensúlyhiány kezelésére szolgáló eljárásnak a riasztási mechanizmus keretében készült jelentéséhez, ezeket azonban nem követik további lépések, mivel a Bizottság feltételezése szerint önmagukban nem súlyosbítják a makrogazdasági pénzügyi kockázatokat. A Parlament számos állásfoglalásban szólított fel további mutatók bevonására, mint amilyen például a gyermekszegénység és a hajléktalanság aránya (lásd a 2015. március 11-i és a 2014. november 25-i állásfoglalásait).

2017 áprilisában az egyre rugalmasabb munkaerőpiacokon a jobb élet- és munkakörülmények felé való elmozdulás támogatása érdekében a Bizottság elindította a szociális jogok európai pillérét. 2017 novemberében a három fő uniós intézmény közösen nyilvánította ki a pillér iránti elkötelezettségét. A pillér három fő területének egyike a szociális védelem és a társadalmi befogadás (2.3.1. Szociális és foglalkoztatáspolitika: általános elvek).

A szociális jogok európai pillérét számos jogalkotási és szakpolitikai kezdeményezés elindítására használták fel, mint például az átlátható és kiszámítható munkafeltételekről szóló európai parlamenti és tanácsi irányelvre irányuló javaslat, valamint a szociális méltányossági csomag (Európai Munkaügyi Hatóság, A szociális védelemhez való hozzáférés).

B. A hátrányos megkülönböztetés elleni jogszabályok 1997 fordulópontnak tekinthető, mivel egy új cikk – a 13. cikk – került be az Európai Közösséget létrehozó szerződésbe – amely ma az EUMSZ 19. cikke –, amely felhatalmazta a Tanácsot arra, hogy számos új területen is intézkedéseket hozzon a megkülönböztetés leküzdésére, többek között a faji vagy etnikai származáson, valláson vagy meggyőződésen, életkoron, fogyatékosságon vagy szexuális irányultságon alapuló megkülönböztetés eseteiben. 2003-ban ezt a cikket módosította a Nizzai Szerződés, bevezetve az ösztönző intézkedések lehetőségét.

Ezt követően számos irányelvet fogadtak el: 
— a faji egyenlőségről szóló irányelvet (2000/43/EK); (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HU/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32000L0043

 — a foglalkoztatási egyenlőségről szóló irányelvet (2000/78/EK); (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HU/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32000L0078)

valamint a férfiak és nők közötti esélyegyenlőséget célzó számos korábbi irányelvet összevonó, az egyenlő bánásmódról szóló irányelvet (2006/54/EK).  (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HU/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32006L0054

A megkülönböztetés tilalmáról szóló európai jogszabályok összehasonlító elemzése (2017) kiemeli, hogy ezen irányelvek óriási mértékben erősítették a megkülönböztetés elleni jogi védelmet Európa-szerte, az átültetés során néhány tagállamban keletkezett kisebb hiányosságok ellenére.

További két, az egyenlőséget erősítő irányelvre irányuló bizottsági javaslat tekintetében nem sikerült megállapodást elérni a Tanácson belül: az egyik a vállalatok vezetőtestületeiben a nemek közötti egyensúlyról szóló irányelv (2012), a másik a személyekközötti egyenlő bánásmód elvének alkalmazásáról szóló irányelv a foglalkoztatás területén kívül (2008). Egy másik, a Parlament által is támogatott, a szülési szabadságról szóló irányelvet (2008, egy 1992. évi irányelv módosítása) a Tanácson belüli kétéves patthelyzet után 2015 júliusában visszavontak. Helyette 2017 áprilisában a Bizottság irányelvre irányuló javaslatot nyújtott be a szülők és gondozók munkája és magánélete közötti egyensúly megteremtéséről mint a szociális jogok európai pillére egyik elérendő céljáról (2.3.1. Szociális és foglalkoztatáspolitika: általános elvek). Ez szélesebb látókörben helyezi el a gondozási feladatok nők és férfiak közötti megosztását.

C. Uniós finanszírozás 2007-ben – a Progress program elfogadásával – a foglalkoztatás és szociális ügyek terén meglévő valamennyi közösségi finanszírozású programot egyetlen keretbe vonták össze. Az adminisztráció további észszerűsítése érdekében a Progress program beolvadt a foglalkoztatás és a szociális innováció 2014–2020-as időszakra vonatkozó jelenlegi programjába (EaSI) (2.3.2. Európai Szociális Alap). 

2014 márciusában a Parlament és a Tanács elfogadta a leginkább rászoruló személyeket támogató európai segítségnyújtási alapról szóló 223/2014/EU rendeletet. Az alap a tagállamok anyagi segítséget nyújtó, a társadalmi befogadást célzó intézkedésekkel párhuzamos fellépéseit támogatja a leginkább rászorulók részére. A 2014–2020 közötti időszakra előirányzott költségvetés reálértéken 3,8 milliárd EUR, emellett a nemzeti programjaiknak megfelelően a tagállamok további 15% nemzeti társfinanszírozást adnak hozzá.  

A legfontosabb támogatási eszköz az Európai Szociális Alap (ESZA), amely a megkülönböztetés elleni fellépést és a leginkább hátrányos helyzetben levők munkaerőpiaci hozzáférésének támogatását célzó cselekvések társfinanszírozásához is rendelkezésre bocsát uniós pénzeszközöket. 2018 májusában a Bizottság közzétette az ESZA+ alapról szóló javaslatát, amely egybeolvasztja majd az ESZA-t, a leginkább rászoruló személyeket támogató európai segítségnyújtási alapot és más programokat.

D. Meghatározott csoportokra vonatkozó uniós stratégiák 

2010 novemberében a Bizottság elfogadta a 2010–2020-ra szóló európai fogyatékosságügyi stratégiát (COM(2010) 0636), ( https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HU/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52010DC0636) amely a 2004–2010 közötti fogyatékosságügyi cselekvési tervre épül, és amely az európai fogyatékossági igazolvány kísérleti projektjét és olyan jogalkotási intézkedéseket eredményezett, mint például a weblap-akadálymentesítési (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HU/TXT/?qid=1555428476619&uri=CELEX%3A32016L2102) jogszabály ((EU) 2016/2102 irányelv) és az európai akadálymentesítési irányelv. Ami a nemek közötti egyenlőséget illeti, az új program, a Stratégiai szerepvállalás a nemek közötti egyenlőségért (2016– 2019) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HU/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52010DC0491)  lépett a fő prioritásokat meghatározó, a nők és férfiak közötti egyenlőségről szóló, 2010–2015 közötti időszakra vonatkozó bizottsági stratégia helyébe. A munkanélküli fiatalok magas számára való tekintettel a Bizottság ifjúsági foglalkoztatási csomagra tett javaslatot 2012-ben, amelyet az ifjúsági garancia követett 2013- ban. Emellett 2016 februárjában a Tanács a Bizottság javaslatára ajánlást fogadott el a tartósan munkanélküli személyek munkaerőpiaci integrációjáról. A Bizottság 2016 decemberében továbbá elindította az Európai Szolidaritási Testületet, új lehetőségeket teremtve a fiatalok számára (2.3.3. Foglalkoztatáspolitika).

AZ EURÓPAI PARLAMENT SZEREPE

A Lisszaboni Szerződés az EUMSZ 19. cikkének (1) bekezdése alapján egyetértési hatáskörrel ruházta fel a Parlamentet a megkülönböztetésmentességgel foglalkozó jogszabályok elfogadása terén. A Parlament aktívan részt vett abban a vitában, amely e cikknek a szerződésbe történő beépítését eredményezte, és gyakran felszólította a Bizottságot és a tagállamokat, hogy biztosítsák a kapcsolódó irányelvek hiánytalan és kellő időben történő végrehajtását. A Parlament több alkalommal is állásfoglalást fogadott el azzal a céllal, hogy megerősítse a hátrányos szociális helyzetű személyek körülményeinek és kilátásainak javítására, valamint a szegénység csökkentésére irányuló uniós fellépéseket (pl. az éves növekedési jelentés foglalkoztatási és szociális vonatkozásairól szóló, 2018. március 14-i állásfoglalása). A Parlament mindig is hangsúlyozta, hogy ki kell állni az egyenlőtlenségek elleni küzdelem mellett a munkahelyteremtés és a növekedés serkentése érdekében, figyelembe véve a nemek közötti egyenlőtlenségeket. A Parlament felszólított a nemek közötti egyenlőség érvényesítésére a költségvetésben és a szakpolitikákban, és hogy bármely új szakpolitika kialakításakor végezzenek nemi szempontú hatásvizsgálatot. Az állásfoglalások a szegénység nemi dimenziója és a nemek közötti nyugdíjszakadék miatti aggodalmat is kifejezték (pl. a 2017. június 14-i és november 17-i állásfoglalások). A 2018. április 17-i állásfoglalása a nők és lányok szerepvállalásának a digitális ágazaton keresztül történő növelésére vonatkozik.

A szociális jogok európai pilléréről szóló, 2017. január 19-én elfogadott állásfoglalásában a Parlament számos kezdeményezést javasolt a szociális dimenzió megerősítésére, ilyen például:

egy valamennyi foglalkoztatási formára vonatkozó, tisztességes munkakörülményekről szóló keretirányelv; 
— a nemzeti minimálbérek európai koordinációja és minőségi teljesítményértékelése;
— minimáljövedelmet biztosító nemzeti rendszerek (lásd a 2010. október 20-i állásfoglalását);
— gyermekgarancia; 
— a középiskola kötelező elvégzése; 
— az európai gazdasági kormányzás erősebb szociális célok révén történő kiegyensúlyozása.  

A témával kapcsolatos európai parlamenti állásfoglalásokra reagálva a Bizottság jelenleg vizsgálja a gyermekgaranciával kapcsolatos fellépés megvalósíthatóságát.


2019. október 17., csütörtök

Roma Identity and Ethnic Mobilisation in Central European Politics


https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/bc37f19f-a31e-4c91-b155-d382d1bd2043.pdf

Roma Identity and Ethnic Mobilisation in Central European Politics 
Paper prepared for the workshop on identity politics ECPR joint sessions Grenoble, 6-11 April 2001


Introduction

To what extent does the process of political mobilisation have an impact upon a minority’s conceptions of ethnic identity? In many descriptions of ethnic politics and ethnic conflict authors tend to apply the term ‘ethnic identity’ as a stable and ‘natural’ source of political identification. They tend to treat the ethnic group as an unchanging entity and perceive ethnic identity as a group characteristic that pre-exists political action. In particular with regard to the developments in central and eastern Europe since the end of the 1980s ‘ethnicity’ has increasingly come to serve as a way of explaining political conflict (Taylor 1996 : 889). But the question of how conceptions of ethnic identity are actually produced and contested within an ethnic movement and to what extent they are subject to constraint and facilitation rarely reaches the research agenda. 

This seems somewhat at odds with social constructivist approaches to identity in contemporary social movement research (e.g. Calhoun 1991). There it has been emphasised that identity should be regarded as the changing product of a social process through which membership criteria are constantly re-elaborated. Group identity, it is argued there, is produced and continuously re-defined by the process of collective action itself (della Porta and Diani 1999 : 87). Likewise, in social anthropology the notion of ethnic identity has been problematised. A widely discussed text by Barth (1969), for example, defined ethnic identity in terms of social boundary: the ethnic group is produced through social interaction by a practice of self and hetero-ascription and is not an entity with permanent cultural characteristics (see also Roosens 1998; Jenkins 1997). Moreover, in a more recent article Barth (1994) has suggested that the creation of ethnicity not only takes place on the interpersonal level, but is also deeply influenced by collective action (median level) and state policies (macro level). 

In this paper I intend to examine the construction of a specific ethnic identity (‘Roma’ identity) within the context of political mobilisation in central Europe (CE). In order to do this I will focus on discourses of Roma identity, i.e. on the way in which various political actors have attributed meaning to the idea of Roma identity. By centring on the formulations of ethnic identity, this research avoids the question ‘what is ethnic (Roma) identity’ but rather focuses on the process of how this ethnic identity functions as a cognitive frame for political mobilisation in a given political context. 

For a number of reasons the Roma minority in CE provides an interesting case. First of all, through the activities of ethnically-based interest organisations the Roma have since 1989 engaged in a process of political mobilisation against oppression and marginalisation. This has been a remarkable development, because it is now for the first time that on such a wide geographical scale a variety of stigmatised communities apply the concept of ‘Roma identity’, seeking to capture the attention of both domestic and international politicians and media. Their case offers thus the opportunity to look at a recently emerged ethnic movement in a specific political situation (post-communism). Furthermore, among Roma activists and in scholarly literature about Roma and comparable groups, the definition or even the idea of Roma identity is intensely debated (e.g. Fraser 2000; Gheorghe 1997; Lucassen et al 1998). These discussions may theoretically offer movement actors various possibilities to perceive or shape their ‘project identities’. Moreover, the Roma offer an interesting perspective into the way in which international context has affected domestic identity formation in CE. Specifically in the framework of the EU enlargement process, this case provides us with the opportunity to compare the impact of international attention across different countries.

This paper consists of three parts. The first part describes the historical background of the emergence of Roma political activism in the 1990s in post-communist CE, concretely in the Czech and Slovak Republics. The overview also includes a brief explanation of why exactly these two countries were selected for my field research. In the second part of the paper the concept of ‘framing processes’ (e.g. Benford and Snow 2000) is introduced as an analytical tool to interpret the various descriptions of Roma identity in the sources. The data which form the basis of the research consist mainly of summaries and transcripts of interviews with representatives of the Czech and Slovak ‘Roma elite’ (31) conducted during three months of field research in 2000. The data also include policy documents about the Roma produced by governmental bodies and a collection of statements and speeches by politicians in power. Third, the paper explores similarities and differences in the various actors’ descriptions of Roma identity as a mobilising or countermobilising frame. It will specifically focus on whether competing formulations of Roma identity by Roma actors can be linked to the political opportunities that are presented by the political environment. To conclude, the paper shortly dwells on the question of which consequences crucial framing disputes within the movement and counterframings by agencies in power may have for the resonance of Roma identity as a successful basis for collective action.

The Roma Movement in the Czech and Slovak republics

Although far from being exclusively a post-1989 phenomenon, the Roma movement has known a rapid and spectacular development after the fall of communism in CE. Since the beginning of the 1990s the number of Roma associations and Roma political parties continuously increased.1 But not only the impressive organisational growth is indicative. During the last decade Roma activists and emerging Roma political elites across several European countries more clearly than ever before attempted to promote new ideas about Roma ethnicity. They also tried to enhance the political participation of their constituencies and aspired to influence national policy making on minorities. Gheorghe and Mirga (1998) call it an ‘ethnic awakening’ and a rise of ‘Roma ethnonationalism’, which they describe as a ‘transition [of a social group] toward an ethnically mobilised group, having a common stance and interest’. 

Puxon (2000: 94) argues that with the end of communism ‘[the] shocking increase in anti-Gypsy violence and racial intolerance, evident throughout Europe, has begun to politicise and unite a new generation to a degree not seen before.’ It is no doubt true that deteriorating social conditions and the increase of anti-Roma behaviour in post-communist societies have coincided with the increase of Roma movement activities. But reality is perhaps too much reduced when anti-Roma violence is perceived as the only factor leading to the emergence of the Roma movement. 

Another part of the explanation presumably lies in the circumstances of the post-1989 period which offered Roma individuals unprecedented opportunities to establish interest organisations. First of all, being able to build alliances with dissident organisations they gained support from the new elite. In Czechoslovakia, for example, Roma played an active part in the anticommunist movement and joined the coalition parties that overwhelmingly won the first democratic elections2 . Later, their ethnic claims received symbolic support from international and domestic human rights organisations.3 Central European states were particularly sensitive to the discourse of human rights norms because they realised this was becoming a key issue pertaining to their standing in the international community (especially vis-à-vis the EU). Furthermore, the new political environment of post-communism, which saw the emergence of ethnically more homogeneous states, apparently functioned as a breeding ground for ethnopolitical mobilisation in general. Ethnic cleavages gave rise to political party formation and mainstream political parties started in some cases to voice certain claims in ethnic-particularistic terms to buttress a general process of nation-building. Consequently, it is not surprising that ethnic minorities such as the Roma, many of them being losers of the political and economic transition, began to emphasise a sense of collective political identity. They started to lodge complaints explicitly in the name of the ethnic group and urged upon their governments the need for new policy initiatives to tackle the socio-economic marginalisation of their communities and to eradicate anti-Roma racism. 

One of the striking aspects, however, is that the term ‘Roma’ has been constructed and promoted to encompass a variety of communal based identities across different countries. In the Czech and Slovak Republics, for example, descriptions suggest that there are various self-designations in use (e.g. Servika, Romungro, Vlach, Sinti) on the basis of markers like language or traditions. The semantic relationship between such labels is complex (Hübschmannová 1999). In sum, the word ‘Roma’ (meaning ‘human being’ in Romanes) is certainly not a generalising self-appellation (as the word ‘gypsy’ is a generalising external appellation – a so-called exonym). 

The usage of the word ‘Roma’ as a political overarching name was first advocated by interest organisations in Western Europe at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. Activists from different countries started to adjust their claims to each other and agreed in 1971 on a common platform called the World Roma Congress (WRC) that was aimed inter alia at changing dominant thinking about the people these activists wanted to represent. The first WRC later served as a direct inspiration for the goal orientation of international mobilising structures like the International Roma Union (IRU) and the Roma National Congress (RNC). One of the ideas which was kept from the 1970s was the replacement of negative sounding terms like ‘gypsies’ or ‘tsiganes’ with ‘Roma’. The dissemination of the ‘new’ ethnic label (and the eradication of ‘old’ social designations) was considered especially necessary with regard to the pragmatics of the words for ‘gypsy’ in the central European languages (e.g. ‘cikán’ in Czech, ‘cygan’ in Slovak and ‘cigány’ in Hungarian): unlike the English word ‘gypsy’ or the Dutch word ‘zigeuner’ these names were invariably used in a derogatory way (Leudar and Nekvapil 2000: 489; Stewart 1997: 113)4 . Focusing on this aspect, one could say that as of the 1970s Roma movement organisations have been actively engaged in triggering a process of ‘ethnogenesis’ – a process which has gained momentum after the fall of communism.

The Czech Republic and Slovakia serve as two very instructive cases. Both countries witnessed the rapid emergence of a Roma movement within a post-communist setting. The movement consisted of informal elements, like communal-based protests or personal networks among activists. But from the early 1990s onwards there was also an upsurge of various sorts of formal movement elements. These included not only organisations that directly mobilised their constituency for collective action, but also a broad assortment of supportive organisations (like human rights organisations), ‘self-help’ organisations that addressed certain direct needs of the constituency, and even Roma political parties. A number of Roma politicians also tried to achieve political representation through their involvement in mainstream political parties.

However, throughout the 1990s the Roma movement has continuously struggled with obstacles hindering mass mobilisation. Especially in the isolated settlements in Eastern Slovakia, but also in other areas it proved difficult to find movement supporters and ethnic voters. After the elections of 1992, when the anticommunist alliance had splintered, Roma political representation on national level disappeared almost completely5 . Roma elites became increasingly articulate, but the gap between them and their constituencies in many cases proved to be unbridgeable. The elites were simply not known among local communities or their legitimacy as representatives was severely contested.  

The Czech and Slovak Roma elites have also grappled with the reluctance of many Roma to identify themselves as Roma in the public sphere. This is well illustrated by the discussion surrounding the 1991 census. The official 1991 census figure for the Roma population was 80,627 (1.5 per cent) in the Slovak and 32,903 (0.3 per cent) in the Czech part – this being the result of the first census in which the Roma of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic (ČSFR) obtained the right to proclaim themselves as a distinct national minority. However, both the Czech and Slovak government have admitted that the actual rate of people who identify themselves as Roma in daily life must be substantially higher (Vláda ČR 1999a; Slovak Government 1999). Independent researchers and Roma organisations claim that the Roma in fact account for around 7 to 8 per cent (up to 500,000) of the Slovak citizens and around 3 per cent (up to 250,000) of the Czech citizens (Liégeois 1994: 34; Druker 1997: 22-23; Kenrick 1998: 187). 

Low official rates of Roma identification do not necessarily indicate, as some authors have suggested, a ‘low level of ethnic awareness’ among Roma (Plichtová 1993:17). Other authors for example, have explained this by referring to bureaucratic irregularities during the official registration (Druker 1998) or the lack of will on the part of the Roma to register as ‘Roma’ in fear of some kind of reprisal (Clarck 1998). Guy (1998: 35) has also pointed out the possible impact of historical experience. Administrators in communist times were prone to describe the Roma as a social rather than an ethnic group as this gave them a freer hand with implementing policies of assimilation. As a consequence of the historical tendency of the authorities to avoid the word ‘gypsy’ and to deny Roma nationality, it is plausible that administrators during the first census implicitly discouraged people to identify themselves officially as Roma. Although it is difficult to establish the definitive influence of all these factors, the discussion at least points to a potential problem surrounding the public ‘image’ of Roma identity. 

In the context of these phenomena, both countries provide interesting cases for studying the formation of Roma identity in relation to the political environment. One wonders, for instance, how the Roma elite has reacted to the problem of public identification and what effects their reaction has had for the formation of Roma identity. Furthermore, a comparison of the two countries will allow to explore differences of political context that could account for identity differentiation within the group.

Ethnic identity and collective mobilisation: a conceptual bridge

Before embarking on a more detailed exploration of Roma identity politics in the Czech and Slovak Republics, it is no doubt necessary to consider some conceptual underpinnings of this study. When examining Roma identity formation from a constructivist angle, one may assume a correspondence between the production of Roma ethnic identity and the current political mobilisation of the Roma. How can this correspondence be described? 

In general, the close relationship between identity and collective mobilisation has been discussed by many scholars engaged in social movement research. Della Porta and Diani, for example, state that ‘[c]ollective action cannot occur in the absence of a ‘we’ characterized by common traits and a specific solidarity’ (della Porta and Diani 1999: 87). Many scholars agree that there is a two-way relationship between social identification and collective action. Identity construction not simply precedes collective action. The formation of identity is a process that is shaped through collective action. Della Porta and Diani (1999: 87-91) describe three important mechanisms through which this happens: collective action defines and redefines the boundaries between actors in a conflict, it engenders networks of relationships of trust, and it offers a continuing sense of belonging. Similar considerations can easily apply to the production ethnic identity. Even in the case where there are seemingly ‘objective’ historical and cultural foundations of identity, as is the case with ethnic identity, the boundaries of this identity are continuously reconstituted in the light of the present circumstances. An ethnic minority is thus not simply a group of people differing from the rest of society in terms of language and tradition, but rather the result of a process in which such differences are perceived as socially and politically meaningful. 

When studying the mutual relationship between ethnic identity formation and collective mobilisation, it will be useful to concentrate on the following three aspects of this relationship. First, it is useful to see ethnic mobilisation as a form of cognitive praxis. The latter term has been used by Eyerman and Jamison (1991) to describe the creative process of knowledge production in which any social movement is engaged. The authors contend that precisely the cognitive aspect of collective action defines the identity of a social movement. This also applies to ethnic movements: they produce and promote new understandings and interpretations of perceived reality (in casu markers of ethnic difference). In other words: ethnic movement actors are ‘signifying agents’ (Benford and Snow 2000: 613) who attempt to promote new understandings and interpretations of their ethnic identity. Precisely these understandings and interpretations are crucial to the study of ethnic identity formation.

Second, ethnic identity can be seen as a semantic category that is realised through articulation. Thus, not the ethnic group as an entity is central to my understanding of the phenomenon of ethnic politics, but the way ethnic identity is constructed in language. This discourse approach is based on the view that ‘language events’ are in fact the symbolic constructs that we use to understand and actualise reality (Donati 1992 : 138). This means that in this research I will concentrate on the discursive aspect of ethnic mobilisation: the way movement actors describe Roma identity in their public discourse. Ethnic identity, in this sense, serves as a semantic category that is constantly subjected to the manoeuvres of actors who are trying to persuade others to see their identity as they understand it is.

Third, the construction of identity is not merely the result of a ‘rhetoric’ promulgated by ethnic movement actors. It is also a process that is conditioned by factors belonging to the historical and political environment. In other words, one can assume that the presence, salience and meaning of ethnic identity is affected by a number of factors that are not deliberately crafted by movement actors in their strategic action. These are less controllable factors resulting from the context, such as the way ‘common knowledge’ or ‘traditional knowledge’ about ethnic identity is treated and reproduced in media and politics. In the this paper the area of political discourse is considered of great interest. This can be seen as an expression of the structure of power relations surrounding the movement. 

A concept suited to examine the production of ethnic identity which pays attention to cognitive, strategic and contextual aspects, is offered in contemporary social movement research in the notion of ‘framing’. Framing has been described by Benford and Snow (2000: 626) as the generation and diffusion by movement actors of mobilising and countermobilising ideas and meanings. The concept of framing, however, also recognises that this process is not taking place in a vacuum. It is sensitive to the fact that it is to a certain degree shaped by the complex, multi-organisational, multi-institutional arenas in which it takes place. It is acknowledged that the resonance of framing is affected by the cultural and political environment, ‘including the framing/counterframings of the institutional elites’.

One way of researching the signifying struggle in which Roma actors are involved would be to look at the media (as a mirror of public opinion). Media has no doubt a profound influence on the resonance of the collective action frames of the Roma movement. But the study of media framing does not offer us a view on how Roma activists themselves attempt to conceptualise their movement identity. For this reason, this research will concentrate on framing processes triggered by the elite. I will prefer to concentrate on formulations of Roma ethnic identity by the actors themselves and how they are developing in relation to conceptions of Roma identity constructed by agencies in power. These aspects are interesting because they have not been frequently studied. Such an approach may also offer us a better understanding of how factors of power and domination have influenced this process.

I concentrate on the political elite because I assume that it has an important role to play in shaping the categorisation of ethnic groups. Conover and Hicks (1998: 25) have argued that political elites can produce either a more destructive and a more constructive social and political environment by ‘substantially altering the understanding and saliency of these groups’. The process of social construction of ethnicity takes place in various informal and formal contexts of which that of politics is no doubt a very important one. Politics provides a platform for the mass mobilisation of ethnicity and can directly influence public rhetoric, legislative and administrative acts or the distribution of resources. For this reason, this research focuses on the framing of Roma identity by the Roma elite and on the framing of Roma identity by the policy makers. 

Roma identity and frame alignment in Roma activist discourse

Scholarship about itinerant populations, gypsies, Roma and other comparable groups has produced a dubious legacy. In many cases both academic and non-academic attempts to define these groups have produced and stimulated popular stereotypical thinking about them as deviants, outcasts or romantic outsiders. These studies more than once contributed to the categorisation and subsequently the stigmatisation of ‘gypsies’ as a stable and inherently inferior group. Lucassen, Willems and Cottaar (1998) recognise two dominant paradigms in the literature – one which defines these groups in terms of social status (criminality, marginality and poverty), and one which views them as a group with a common exotic, non-European origin. The latter categorisation seems to be in many ways the result of an ethnographic tradition of examining ‘gypsies’ (while at the same time defining and constructing the very category of ‘gypsies’). Willems (1995; 1998) argues that authoritative popular scientific texts in various time periods have created the dominant essentialist understanding of the ‘gypsies’ as a stable entity that is foreign to European culture and societies.

Since 1989 a growing body of descriptions of the way Roma were treated in the new democracies of CE became available to the regional specialist. The question of the production of Roma identity itself was rarely addressed. However, these descriptions contained different assumptions about what constitutes Roma identity. Often the Roma in CE were conceptualised as somewhere between an ‘immigrant minority’ and a ‘national minority’, but neither of the two types exactly, because it was observed that only a limited number of them had migrated in recent times and that they did not have a connection to an external homeland. In the large majority of the descriptions the alleged Indian origin served as a main source for identifying them.

Given the wide range of conceptualisations of the ‘Roma’ that scholars have come up with, it is perhaps not at all surprising that activists too have different ways in which they think about the group they aspire to represent. Exploration of the interviews with Roma activists in the Czech and Slovak republics and texts produced by Roma interest organisations led to the observation that in both countries mainly three types of Roma identity frames are used to describe and warrant Roma collective action and Roma-based claims-making. These frames can be regarded as the conscious efforts of people who regard themselves as ‘leaders’ or ‘representatives’ to enhance a certain view on Roma identity in order to mobilise protest against unequal treatment or to buttress their demands on the government for protection of their own culture. They can be described as more or less bounded sets of arguments that represent a certain perspective on the position of the Roma and the meaning of Roma-based political action.

A non-territorial European nation

A first frame which was encountered in activists’ accounts describes the Roma as a non-territorial European nation. The Roma activists who applied this perspective to talk about their collective identity emphasised that the Roma all over Europe posses a common history and, especially, a common origin. They argued that all Roma communities are somehow connected, not through territory but through blood ties. The apparent fragmentation in terms of language or culture is in their view related to time periods of aggressive assimilation and repressive policies implemented by non-Roma authorities. The argument is very much in keeping with the ideas formulated by Roma linguist and representative of the International Roma Union (IRU) Ian Hancock:

I have been among the most vocal in insisting that Roma are a people who originated in Asia. I take the position of the sociolinguist, who sees language as the vehicle of culture. And we indeed speak a language and maintain a culture whose core of direct retention is directly traceable to India. The acknowledgement of that position is essential, because the alternative is to create a fictitious history and to have, again, our identity in the hands of non-Romani policy-makers and scholars. (Hancock 1997)

Roma activists in the Czech and Slovak Republic who advocated this view also firmly contended that the position of the Roma should be perceived not simply as that of an Indian diaspora, but as that of a nation that is deeply rooted in Europe. The problems facing the Roma were in this perspective attributed mainly to a lack of serious Roma representation in public bodies on domestic and international levels. In other words, they lobby for special forms of Roma representation. This frame is dissimilar from many other national liberation movements because it explicitly excludes territorial ‘liberation’ as a goal. In a radical version of this argument, Hancock explains that support for their claims can be found in the existence of a symbolic external homeland:

The arguments for stressing the “Indian connection” seem clear. In these times, when Europe is divided into nation-states, being identified with an actual homeland brings legitimacy and a measure of security. Furthermore, it is the Indian factors-linguistic, genetic, and cultural-that different Romani populations share; it is the more recently acquired non-Indian factors that divide us. If I want to speak in Romani to a speaker of a dialect different from my own, it is the European words we must each avoid, not the Indian ones. (Hancock 1997)

The Roma activists who relied on argumentation within this frame emphasised the importance of transnational networks as mobilising structures. Not unsurprisingly, the Roma activists who use this frame usually maintained connections to the International Roma Union (IRU) or the Roma National Congress (RNC).7 It is also comes as no surprise that this frame represents a useful bridge between activists in the domestic arena and the international political environment. Direct lobbying toward international organisations like the Council of Europe and the OSCE has proven its worth: both organisations have established special institutions to raise the level of awareness concerning the problems facing the Roma within the respective member states. Indirectly this strategy has contributed to higher levels of external pressure and scrutiny on both the Czech and Slovak Republic. For this reason Roma activists have formulated their criticism often in a language referring to international moral standards like human rights. One could perhaps argue that this strategy to some extent reflects the experience of what Soysal (1996) has called ‘postnational citizenship’, a practice of citizenship that is increasingly defined according to entitlements emerging from the transnational discourse and the practice of international human rights protection. Arguably, the growing attention during the last decade of human rights organisations for the position of the Roma in both countries has stimulated the development of this strategy. Dimitrina Petrova, director of one of the most articulate human rights organisations focusing on Roma, the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), wrote recently in one of the organisations newsletters:

(...) for the Roma of Europe, Human Rights seems to be a uniting principle, a universally acknowledged tool for positive change. Contrary to this, in our day-to-day work, we are often confronted by Roma who are not happy about ERRC having chosen to work with certain other Roma, on the vague but bitter grounds that they are not legitimate as Roma. I personally believe that the Roma struggle is often weakened by the abysmal question, ‘Who is real Rom?’ The struggle over identity at this stage does not unite the Roma in Europe. (Petrova 1999) 

This immediately demonstrates that the frame ‘Roma as a non-territorial European nation’ brings a number of problems with it and was consequently criticised by many of the interviewed activists. The essence of their criticism was that Indian origin and transborder co-operation are very academic notions and thus poor tools for effective mobilisation in both the Czech and Slovak context. The frame was in many cases seen as purely symbolic. As one Czech Roma activist stated: 

We are a national minority. If you want to call it a nation… okay… but that doesn’t change much. The fact that the Roma are a world-wide and a European nation is only important to stress towards other countries where the Roma are not yet acknowledged as a national minority

Furthermore, the idea of being a ‘transborder nation’ only seems to become concrete when activists have the opportunity to take part in international Roma conferences. International organisations, however, have become increasingly interested in these meetings. Thus they appear regularly, attract more participants and have opened up new opportunities for finding financial support. 

..... 

2019. október 16., szerda

The decline of infant and child mortality among Spanish Gitanos or Calé (1871−2005): A microdemographic study in Andalusia

https://www.demographic-research.org/volumes/vol36/33/36-33.pdf



The decline of infant and child mortality among Spanish Gitanos or Calé (1871−2005): A microdemographic study in Andalusia


Juan F. Gamella1 
Elisa Martín Carrasco-Muñoz2 

Abstract

 BACKGROUND 

Most Romani groups in Europe have experienced a decline in childhood mortality during recent decades. These crucial transformations are rarely addressed in research or public policy.

OBJECTIVE This paper analyzes the timing and structure of the decline of childhood mortality among the Gitano people of Spain.

METHODS The paper is based on the family and genealogy reconstitution of the Gitano population of 22 contiguous localities in Southern Spain. Registry data from over 19,100 people and 3,501 reconstituted families was included in a dense genealogical grid ranging over 150 years. From this database we produced annual time series of infant and child mortality and of the registered causes of death from 1871 to 2005.

RESULTS The analyzed data shows a rapid decline in infant and child mortality from about 1949 to 1970. The onset of the definitive decline occurred in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Child mortality was higher in the pre-transitional period and started to decline earlier, although it took longer to converge with majority rates. The mortality transition in the Gitano minority paralleled that of the dominant majority, but with important delays and higher mortality rates. The causes of death show the deprivation suffered by Gitano people.

CONCLUSIONS The childhood mortality decline facilitated the most important changes experienced recently by the Gitano minority, including its fertility transition and the transformation of Gitanos’ gender and family systems.

CONTRIBUTION This is one of the first historical reconstructions of the mortality transition of a Romani population.

1. Introduction 

The Gitanos or Calé of Spain are an ethnic minority related to the other Romani groups in Europe and America. Notwithstanding their common remote origin, Romani groups have adapted to the surrounding societies in all the regions where they have lived and present considerable sociocultural heterogeneity (Matras 2015; Piasere 2004; Fraser 1992). The Gitanos seem to descend from the first migratory waves of Romani groups into Western Europe, which were documented in the 15th century (Pym 2007; Leblon 1985). Their customs and life patterns are the product of a long coexistence with local Spanish populations, often marked by persecution, forced assimilation, and discrimination, but also by cooperation, hybridization, and by their creative appropriation of majority customs (Gómez Alfaro 1993, 1999; Leblon 2003; Gamella, Gómez Alfaro, and Pérez 2014).

 In the democratic and decentralized regime developed after the end of Franco’s dictatorship, Gitanos have gained access to free and universal health care, public education, pensions, and housing benefits. This has induced a remarkable process of social integration and cultural convergence with their Payo (non-Gitano) neighbors. Nevertheless, most Gitano groups have preserved a vibrant sense of themselves as a distinct cultural group, and have developed new forms of reaffirmation, resistance, and mobilization in cultural, religious, and political realms (San Román 1997; Gay Blasco 1999; Cantón et al. 2004; Mirga 2014; Gamella, Fernández, and Adiego 2015). 

Arguably, the most far-reaching transformation experienced by the Gitano people of Spain in the 20th century was the dramatic fall in their infant and child mortality patterns. Almost all newborn Gitano children survive today, whereas in 1950 about 200 per 1,000 died before their fifth birthday.3 The change is even more pronounced compared to previous decades: in the mid-1920s the risk of a Gitano child dying in childhood was about sixty times greater than in the early years of the 21st century (see Tables 1 and 2 below, and Gamella, Martín, and Quesada 20144 ). The improvements in child survival induced an unprecedented population growth that multiplied the size of the Calé population. In turn, this demographic expansion led to an intense Gitano migration from Andalusia and Extremadura to other more prosperous and industrialized regions of Spain and, later, to other European countries. These movements and resettlements altered the geographic distribution of Gitanos and therefore affected the identity of the new generations of Calé. Moreover, the drop in childhood mortality facilitated a decline in fertility that became generalized from the late 1980s. The intentional control and reduction of fertility is completing the distinct demographic transition of this minority. This process has enormous consequences for the entire Gitano community, including consequences that are rarely considered in reviews of the demographic transition (Lee and Reher 2011): convergence with the majority population and an increase in intermarriage.

Ultimately, as the burden of reproduction falls disproportionately on women, widespread child survival has had crucial long-term effects on the lives of Gitano women and on the gender arrangements within the group.

1.1 The death of Gitano children

For centuries the recurrent death of children was a common experience in the homes of Gitano people. This tragic reality often emerges both in the discourse of Calé women themselves (Gamella 2000, 2011) and in any cursory view of the corresponding civil and parish records. Infant and child mortality was also common among the majority population in Spain, but the higher fertility rates of Gitano women resulted in more early deaths per mother. In our records there are many instances of Gitano women that suffered the loss of a very high number of children. 

For instance, Salvadora B. was a Gitano woman born in the city of Guadix in 1852. In our review of the civil registries of Guadix and neighboring towns we found records of 11 children born to Salvadora in the 21-year period between 1871 and 1892. Eight of these children died before their third birthday. Surprisingly, when Salvadora’s husband, Juan, died at 48, his death certificate stated that he “was single, although for many years had lived as a married couple with Salvadora B. … [the] union of which resulted in three surviving children”.5 In the winter of 1924 Salvadora died from exposure. She was 72 and lived in a cave in miserable conditions. The civil and parish records contain traces of the dramatic life of this woman, whose common law marriage was not officially recognized and who was listed as castellana nueva (the official euphemism for Gitanos) in several entries. Therefore, the registered side of Salvadora’s biography reflects the bureaucratic ideology that stressed the separate ethnic identity of Gitanos while at the same time ignoring their own cultural definitions of marriage and relatedness. In the following decades Salvadora’s three surviving children registered 28 children themselves, of whom 15 died in childhood or adolescence. Hence, of Salvadora’s 39 children and grandchildren, only 41% lived long enough to marry and reproduce. Nevertheless, in our genealogical reconstitution we found 576 direct descendants of Salvadora, most of them alive today. Hence, the lives of Salvadora and her descendants show how the loss of many children was a common experience for Gitano women until fairly recently, but also how successful their reproductive strategies have been despite this loss. 

Even if it goes unnoticed by the world at large, the death of a child usually deals a terrible emotional and physical blow to the mourning parents. Today many Gitano women still cry when they remember the death of a child that occurred decades ago, and they still clearly remember the circumstances, symptoms, and events as they unfolded to their tragic end. Many women can also tell the stories of the deaths of their infant siblings based on their own or their relatives’ recollections. These narratives offer important sources of either confirmation or rebuttal of the archival data we gathered. Given the omnipresence of this crucial issue in the consciousness of Gitano women, it is surprising it has not received more scholarly attention and scrutiny.

1.2 Objectives

In this paper we will assess the structural dynamics of the decline in infant (under 1 year of age) and child (under 5 years of age) mortality of the Gitano people of 22 contiguous communities in the province of Granada in Southern Spain. We will use mostly records kept by the Civil Registry since its inception in 1871, but our analysis will concentrate on the period beginning in 1920 when the available data becomes more reliable.

This paper will provide a model of the infant and early childhood mortality transition in the Gitano community, including the timing of the onset of definitive decline, the intensity of change, the main phases of the process, and the relative growth in neonatal deaths. We will also compare our results to data reflecting both the entire province and the Spanish population at large.

Our model also includes data on the causes of child deaths as they were recorded in the researched archives, and tracks the changes in these diagnoses over time. The causes of death offer key insights into the underlying social determinants that affected the survival of children from the most underprivileged families. 

This study aims to situate the mortality transition of Spanish Gitanos in its social, political, and epidemiological context, and hence facilitate the analysis of the main “factors responsible for this ‘secular’ and seemingly irreversible decline” (Corsini and Viazzo 1997: xiii).

1.3 A gap in Romani studies

This study contributes to filling a gap in Romani Studies. The dominant representations of Romani groups have ignored the evolution of childhood mortality, as well as other key demographic transformations. This is especially remarkable considering that demographic differences are among the most salient aspects of the ethno-cultural contrast between Romani populations and mainstream majorities everywhere.

Particularly, in the best ethnographic monographs available, little or no attention is paid to the issue of the death of children, even when the experience, celebration, and commemoration of death is a crucial topic in these works (Sutherland 1975; Okely 1983; Williams 1993; Stewart 1997; Engebrigtsen 2007).

Nevertheless, the decline in infant and child mortality also seems to have occurred in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, such as Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, which have large and varied Romani populations (see Ladányi and Szlényi 2006; Scheffel 2005; Kohler and Preston 2011; Burlea 2012). However, we do not know much about it, or how these processes have diverged from those occurring among neighboring majority populations.

References to infant and child mortality are scattered throughout publications concerning health status and access to health care, or surveys on living conditions and official demographic data (Cook et al. 2013; Ringold, Orentstein, and Wilkens 2005; Kalibová 1993, 2000; Costarelli 1993). Most of the studies are cross-sectional. For instance, some studies compare mortality rates across a particular country and recurrently find much higher rates of infant mortality in the regions where Roma populations are concentrated (Rychtaříková and Dzúrová 1992: 630) and in urban neighborhoods with a high proportion of Roma residents (Rosicova et al. 2011: 526−528). Recently, Kohler and Preston (2011) made an important analysis of differential mortality patterns among religious and ethnic groups in Bulgaria, using nominal data in 1990s’ censuses. However, their analyses “were restricted to the noninstitutionalized adult population aged 20 and over” and thus they “avoided potential problems in measuring mortality of children in the census-based data set” (Kohler and Preston 2011: 93).

In the rapidly increasing literature on Romani groups, very few publications are devoted to childhood mortality, much less from a historical perspective. Childhood mortality is rarely treated as a key variable in other epidemiological, social, and economic transformations. Even in important papers on the anthropological demography of Romani groups there are no references to infant mortality (Durst 2010, 2002). One important exception can be found in the work of Ladányi and Szlényi, who studied the transformation of a village in northeastern Hungary from a multiethnic peasant village into a segregated Roma ghetto, and were able to collect demographic data of considerable quality and detail for 1857 to 2000. They also were able to follow the long-term evolution of infant mortality and its major shifts, concluding “the dramatic decline in infant mortality between 1951−1988 was one of the most spectacular achievements of socialist policy. The success of these policies places the blame for high rates of Gypsy infant mortality squarely on the shoulders of pre-war public health authorities” (Ladányi and Szlényi 2006: 67). This study proves that local registry data often includes Romani people and can provide extraordinary results if studied patiently and in an integrated form. However, historical studies such as this are rare.

In sum, the literature on the demographic history of Romani peoples is very limited in scale and content and demographic concepts and models have been ignored by most historical or cultural studies of these groups. Their potential, however, is obvious, both in terms of theory construction and in the analysis and design of public policy. 

2. Methods and data sources

The study of the history of infant and child mortality presents severe technical difficulties and data problems even for larger and better-known populations (Corsini and Viazzo 1997; Schofield, Reher, and Bideau 1991). Regarding Spanish Gitanos, some historical developments compound the task. First, a Royal Order in 1783 prohibited references to the ethnic identity of Gitano people in Spanish public records.

This interdiction was followed, albeit irregularly,6 and for the last two centuries there is no aggregated official data that can be used for the demographic study of this minority.

ggregated official data that can be used for the demographic study of this minority. Secondly, the relatively small Gitano population has been dispersed in numerous localities in all regions where they have lived. For instance, in 1785 the last available census of the whole Gitano population gathered data on about 12,500 persons living in over 650 localities in almost all Spanish regions (Gamella, Gómez Alfaro, and Pérez 2014). Today the roughly half a million Gitanos live in more than 1,000 villages, towns, and cities all over Spain (Fundación Secretariado Gitano 2008).

Thirdly, most experts have assumed that Gitano families did not register the births or deaths of their dear ones until very recently (see, for instance, San Román 1997; Ramírez Heredia 2005). This assumption was in line with the popular misrepresentation of Romani groups as essential nomads; that is, people who maintained weak and uncertain links with their places of birth and residence. Contrary to this assumption, we have found that Gitano families have been registering their births, deaths, and official marriages in the parish registers of Andalusia since the beginning of the 18th century, and often before.7 This practice was reinforced by the establishment of the Civil Registry in 1871, and became commonplace in the 20th century. Some underregistration, however, was common in the first decades of the functioning of the Civil Registry. Under-registration of infant deaths among the Gitano people may have been important at least until the second decade of the 20th century. On the other hand, common law marriages by ‘Gitano law’ were obviously not registered until they were sanctioned by Catholic and civil authorities, a process that increased during the 20th Century (Martín and Gamella 2005).

In a previous paper we have described the methodological and technical strategies followed in our genealogical and familial reconstruction. Readers are referred to that paper (Gamella, Martín, and Quesada 2014). Below we summarize its main points.

2.1 Gitano identity and identification processes 
.... 
 

MULTIPLE INDICATOR CLUSTER SURVEY BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ROMA SURVEY 2011-2012

https://mics.unicef.org/files?job=W1siZiIsIjIwMTUvMDEvMjcvMDgvNTIvNTgvNDUxL01JQ1M0X0JpSF9Sb21hUG9wX0luZm9ncmFwaGljcy5wZGYiXV0&sha=b0bf1d7cc6a13a2f

MULTIPLE INDICATOR CLUSTER SURVEY BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ROMA SURVEY 2011-2012



Roma Health Report Health status of the Roma population Data collection in the Member States of the European Union

https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/social_determinants/docs/2014_roma_health_report_es_en.pdf
Roma Health Report Health status of the Roma population Data collection in the Member States of the European Union

Executive Summary
 Introduction 

This study was carried out by Matrix Knowledge in collaboration with the Centre for the Study of Democracy, the European Public Health Alliance and individual national researchers on behalf of the Consumers, Health and Food Executive Agency and DG SANCO. The purpose of this report is to provide an evidence-based review of literature on Roma health, covering 2008-2013 and the following indicators: 

1. Mortality and life expectancy 
2. Prevalence of major infectious diseases 
3. Healthy life styles and related behaviours 
4. Access and use of health services and prevention programmes 
5. Prevalence of major chronic diseases 
6. Health factors related to the role of women in the Roma community 
7. Environmental and other socio-economic factors

The methodology used was based on two steps: (i) Desk Research based on the review of secondary data (a literature review); and (ii) Fieldwork collecting primary data through semi-structured interviews.

Background and context

 There has long been a consensus that compared with the non-Roma population in Europe Roma have poorer health. The poor health of Roma is closely linked to social determinants of health. The social inclusion and integration of Roma communities is a joint responsibility of Member States and the European Union. The Commission monitors progress made by Member States through the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies1 . The EU has been also supporting international network initiatives e.g. Roma Summits and the Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005-2015). The Enlargement Countries have been encouraged to shape their strategies to support the integration of Roma (including health) based on Commission Communication of 2011. Results for better inclusion of the Roma population have been limited2 . In particular, issues related to health have been only partly addressed.  

The first Commission assessment of the NRIS reported some limitations regarding the possibility of measuring the potential impacts of the stated objectives3 . There is a need to establish specific targets, attainable goals within the timeframe set and measureable deliverables through an effective system of monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the national policies4 . The second assessment of the Commission in June 2013 reiterated Member States need to make stronger efforts to set up sound monitoring and evaluation methods to assess the results and impacts of Roma inclusion measures, including health, in order to enable policy adjustments when necessary. 

....