2016. június 14., kedd

HRISTO KYUCHUKOV - IAN HANCOCK: ROMA IDENTITY

web: http://www.slovo21.cz/nove/images/dokumenty_integrace/fin_cd_roma_identity_part%201.pdf

Roma Identity

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INTRODUCTION 

Hristo Kyuchukov :Constantine the Philosopher University, Nitra

The issue of Roma identity is not a new one in the field of Romani studies. Several previous publications were dedicated to this problem bringing different light to it (T. Acton, 1997; T. Acton and G. Mundy, 1997; A. Marsh and E. Strand, 2006). Throughout the centuries the Roma succeeded to build and preserve their identity, after they had left the Indian territory. And nowadays different groups of Roma (no matter what the outside world calls them) from the USA to Russia, from Turkey to Argentina believe and respect the Romanipen.

The Roma groups differ by dialects/languages, religion, traditions, but there are always many characteristics which make them Roma. The symbols used and ritual conducted for celebration of child birth, marriage or funeral could be different, depending on the religion but always there are similar beliefs and rules which are followed and which make the people Roma.

One of the strongest characteristics of the Roma identity is the language. Nowadays there are groups which lost the language or even never knew any variety of Romani but still they identify themselves as Roma. Romani is preserved in the songs, fairytales, poems of Roma, it is taught at schools in many countries as a mother tongue and it is used as a tool of communication from generation to generation.

The religion is another characteristic of the Roma identities. The Roma could be Christians or Muslims but there are certain Roma rules which are preserved and passed from generation to generation which are typical Romani and do not belong to Christianity or to Muslim religion.

The traditions of Roma are also different. Very often Roma are the ones who preserve the traditions of majorities, traditions which are lost or forgotten. The Roma adopt them as their own, however, at the same time there are so many traditions which are similar in different parts of the world among different groups, for example the understanding of ―clean‖ and ―polluted‖, what is allowed to be done in the presence of adults and what is not allowed, the children from very early age are taught what is part of Romani culture what is Gadžikano.

The collection of the papers in the present volume can be grouped around the following topics: language identity, ethnic identity, historical identity, social identity, educational identity...Perhaps there are many more identities which we do not cover...but we strongly believe that this small collection of papers brings new information to the issue of Roma identity.

The keynote papers written by Ian Hancock and Hristo Kyuchukov present the problems of Roma identity and issue of language identity among different Romani groups in Europe.

Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, Eva Davidova, Adrian Marsh discusses the ethnic identity issues in Central and Eastern Europe, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, in Turkey. Jana Horvathova presents the issue of ethnic identity from the point of view of an insider. The papers are extremely interesting, highly scientific and written in a highly readable manner.

The paper by Sarah Carmone presents in an interesting way a historical view of the ethnic identity of Roma, using a retrospective methodology. The problems of Roma identity and the education of Roma children in the Greece is covered by William New. Jaroslav Balvin presents the role of great Roma personalities in the process of preserving the Roma identity.

Milan Samko‘s paper discusses the language attitudes of Roma towards Romani and Slovak language in Slovakia. The paper deals with the issues of language identity among the Slovak Roma. The last paper by Lenka Haburajová-Ilavská and Jana Gabrielová discusses recommendations and policy papers of different European institutions towards building and developing of the Roma social, cultural, and educational identities.

The problems of the identities of Roma will be discussed in the future as well. However, at the end of the first decade of the new century it is extremely important to document the new trends concerning this problem in the field of linguistics, history, ethnology, sociology and education.

References:
Acton, Thomas (ed.) (1997). Gypsy politics and Traveller identity. Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press.
Acton, Thomas and Mundy, Gary (eds.) (1997). Romani culture and Gypsy identity. Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press.
Marsh, Adrian and Strand, Elin (eds.) (2006). Gypsies and the problem of identities. Contextual, Constructed and Contested. Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul.

 

ROMA TODAY: ISSUES AND IDENTITY 
Ian Hancock University of Texas at Austin, TX


The past two decades have seen enormous changes confronting both the Romani people, and those who study us and work with us. For so many Romanies, these changes have meant adapting once again to new and typically hostile surroundings, seeking security in employment, education, housing and in health and legal care. For the non-Romani world it has meant making room for newcomers who arrive with a complex baggage of stereotypes and a legacy of persecution. Since the collapse of communism twenty years ago hundreds of thousands of Roma from Eastern Europe have left to come West in search of a better life. For westerners, a colourful and largely inoffensive population that was very much restricted in the public mind to storybooks and film suddenly became a real, and evidently menacing, presence. This has not just affected Western Europe; in countries overseas too this has been the case; we need only to look at the hostile reception of Roma from the Czech Republic and from Hungary in Canada as an example.

There were some 180,000 Romanies in Italy four years ago, but today there is less than a quarter of that number. Amongst them, those from Romania are fewer than 6,000, 4,500 of whom are incarcerated, mainly for begging, theft, resisting arrest and for trespassing. These are, incidentally, exactly the same crimes as those listed in Dillmann‘s 1905 Zigeunerbuch which paved the way for the Nazi genocide. There are no reliable figures for how many Roma are now stateless throughout Europe, although estimates place the numbers at 10,000 in Bosnia, 1,500 in Montenegro, 17,000 in Serbia, and 4,090 in Slovenia.

Reports issued by the EU‘s Agency for Fundamental Rights make it crystal clear: racism against Roma is everywhere on the increase throughout Europe. Today, the Roma are just as poor and marginalized, as unemployed, and as badly housed as they ever were. They are just as far from living the normal lives of citizens in their own countries as they were before the EU‘s expansion, and comparisons have been made with the atmosphere in Germany during the 1930s. During the past two years, at least ten Roma have been murdered—and those are only the reported cases. An estimated 80% of incidents of anti-Gypsyism go unreported. Evicted families left stranded in the road after their settlements have been demolished are especially vulnerable to acts of violence from hostile gangs. Beatings and rapes are commonplace.

In September 2001 a BBC news release stated that the Council of Europe ―issued a blistering condemnation of Europe‘s treatment of the Roma Gypsy community, saying they are subject to racism, discrimination and violence . . . the United Nations says they pose Europe‘s most serious human rights problem.‖ An editorial in The Economist in 2005 described Romanies in Europe as being ―at the bottom of every socio-economic indicator: the poorest, the most unemployed, the least educated, the shortest-lived, the most welfare dependent, the most imprisoned and the most segregated.‖ An EU report called it ―one of the most important political, social and humanitarian questions in today‘s Europe‖. We are half way through the Decade of Roma Inclusion, but clearly the results of efforts to bring change have still to be judged, and we‘re not doing too well so far.

Those who went before us were equally unsuccessful; I was reading a report recently published forty years ago in the journal Soviet Studies that described the situation of Roma in one particular eastern bloc country. It claimed that while the socialist system had created all of the prerequisites necessary to deal with the ―Gypsy problem,‖ those ―prerequisites‖ were not working. That ―Gypsy problem‖ was described as the Roma‘s ―lack of responsiveness to Marxist deterministic formulae,‖ blamed upon their having inherited pre-communist notions of capitalism, and with one or two exceptions, Gypsies were still ―beggars, thieves, violent and a scourge in the countryside,‖ to quote from one government report. We were to blame because we were deliberately being antisocial by clinging to our distinctive identity, since as a people, they said, we came from the same racial stock as the non-Romani population. This contradicts, incidentally, a Romanian foreign minister, who stated publicly not very long ago that criminality was a racial characteristic that set us apart from the rest of the population. We did not satisfy Stalin‘s definition of nationhood, those reports maintained, because we ―neither possessed common territory nor maintained a common culture and economic way of life.‖ Marxist ideology gave Roma a social identity, not an ethnic one.

Four decades of communism were not able to solve their ―Gypsy problem,‖ and the two decades that have passed since then have not accomplished a great deal either. We have seen a number of positive changes it is true, for example the Czech government recently banned the Workers‘ Party in that country as xenophobic and a threat to democracy, mentioning specifically its attacks on Roma. But for each move forward, there are others that operate against us. The French government has just come under fire for failing to provide adequate accommodation and voting rights for Travellers; Switzerland‘s most recent report to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities said that it was not considering ratifying the International Labour Organization‘s Convention 169 because it was concerned that the treaty might apply to Roma; Canada is planning to draft a new immigration law that will give the Minister of Immigration the power to declare which country is safe in Europe, and then rule that because of the new category refugees cannot come to Canada from that country. We can predict that they will put all of the EU countries on this list, which means that Roma will not be able to go to Canada as refugees under the new law. It is almost predictable that any formal report on Roma will use the word problem; a quick Internet search for the words ―Gypsy problem‖ that I made when I was writing this presentation last month brought over twenty-two thousand returns. Let me repeat that: an Internet search for the words ―Gypsy problem‖ brought over twenty-two thousand returns.

It should perhaps be more openly acknowledged that we also have a gadjo problem; after all, those 22,000 references on the Internet did not originate with us. But the reality is that we Romanies and you gadjé have a whole lot of problems with each other. And if they are to be dealt with successfully, just as in a successful marriage the key words are communication and compromise. I live, like an increasing number of Romani people, with a foot in two worlds, and I can identify a number of these issues from both perspectives. The non-Romani world sees us as the eternal outsiders, not wanting to fit in yet wanting what it has, living by deception and theft, taking everything while con-tributing nothing except perhaps entertainment—loud, dirty and leaving a mess behind besides. These are some of the ―Gypsy problems‖ the gadjé have with us.
From our position, our overwhelming problem with gadjé is racism. This directly underlies and supports the problems that it holds up—those of poverty, those in employment, schooling, health care and housing, and in human and civil rights. Poverty amongst some Romani populations is absolutely overwhelming. In 2006 a World Bank report said ―Roma are the most prominent poverty risk group in many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They are poorer than other groups, more likely to fall into poverty, and more likely to remain poor. In some  cases poverty rates for Roma are more than ten times that of non-Roma. A recent survey found that nearly 80 per cent of Roma in Romania and Bulgaria were living on less than $4.30 per day . . . even in Hungary, one of the most prosperous accession countries, 40 per cent of Roma live below the poverty line.‖ George Orwell wrote that ―the first effect of poverty is that it kills thought.‖ Seeing ourselves as victims, though, is a loser‘s game; we must use our own skills to change our situation, and if we don‘t have those skills then we must get them. Ultimately was must rely on ourselves. The outside world is not going to solve our problems for us and if we expect it to do so, it will be a very long wait.
So what to do? A large sign in Romani on my office wall reads Education is the Passport to Freedom. I firmly believe this, and I urge that we make education our highest priority in the discussions that follow here in Brussels. I will not elaborate upon the weightier issues that stem from racism, their solution will follow in due course once proper educational programmes have been designed and implemented. Just as issues of employment and housing exist because of racism, their solution will come about because of education. And I am not speaking simply of education for Romani people, but also for the non-Romani populations.

I made the point in a recently published essay that it is the vagueness regarding Romani identity that has allowed it to be so casually manipulated by outsiders, and this brings me to the main thrust of my talk this morning. If we knew who we were, and had more status allowing us to be heard, we would have a say in how we are portrayed. If a journalist wants to say we originated in Egypt, as one recently did, who are we to say she was wrong, and what would we say to correct her, and where would that protest even be heard or acknowledged? Because our history was lost to us many years ago and we thus cannot provide it, the non-Romani world has not shirked in creating various identities for us. I don‘t believe that we can make history unless we know our history; Alain Besançon has said that ―a man without memory is of absolute plasticity. He is recreated at all moments. He cannot look behind himself, nor can he feel continuity with himself, nor can he preserve his own identity.‖ As long as the storybook Gypsy influences the journalist‘s and the novelist‘s portrayal of us, as long as the instant experts in the media feel confident that what they write will go unchallenged, as long as their imagination has free rein, we will continue to be ―recreated at all moments,‖ as Besançon says, never in control of our own identity.

Without education we cannot be articulate; we lack a loud enough voice. We complain, but are not heard. Five members of the Roma Civic Alliance attending a conference on Roma in Bucharest recently were made to leave when they criticized the government‘s inaction. Their voice was stifled. Without education we cannot tell people who we are, and where we come from, and how we have had the strength and determination to survive centuries of persecution, slavery and genocide and still be here. When we have our own educators, lawyers and doctors, we will no longer need to rely on the outside world, and go to the gadjé with our hands out. As long as we continue to do that, we will never be respected. We don‘t want the non-Romani world to love us, particularly, but we do want its respect.

Educational curricula for Roma must be carefully planned. Will they promote integration or assimilation? The older generations must be comfortable in the knowledge that it is not turning their children into gadjé, which is a great fear among American Romanies. In turn, education about the Romani people for state schools must present our history and culture in a uniform way. I have already mentioned the media. While they could be a powerful ally, they are overwhelmingly just the opposite. A quarter century ago Kenedi Janós wrote ―the mass media, in a veiled, and often less-veiled form, goad opinion in an anti-Gypsy direction.‖ Newspapers disseminate opinion on a regular basis as well as news. Newspapers make people‘s minds up for them. Newspapers create attitudes. When the biggest daily paper in Romania, Evenimentul Zilei wrote that ―Gypsies are believed to be genetically inclined to become criminals‖ it was repeating Hitler‘s rationale for the extermination of Romanies in the Third Reich. When another Romanian daily, the Cronica Romana, advised customers not to do business with any salesman because ―the colour of his skin‖ is an indication of his being ―untrustworthy,‖ the message is clear. And this is not an attitude restricted only to central and Eastern Europe. From England headlines such as ―Gypsies! You Can‘t Come In!‖ in the Sunday Express or the Sun‘s ―How long before we kick the whole lot out?,‖ for example, fueled public hostility, and a marked jump in anti-Gypsy public opinion. I was stunned to learn that the Foreign Press Association has just presented the BBC production Gypsy Child Thieves with its Media Award for the best Television Story of the Year. The irresponsible move on the part of the BBC aside, in showing this for the second time despite outrage from Romani organizations following its first broadcast six months ago, the Foreign Press Association‘s claim that its purpose is to ―continually strive to enhance communication and understanding between the rich diversity of cultures of this world and the global community‖ is a travesty. No understanding of the situation of those children came from the documentary, and in no way did it present our ―rich culture.‖ Instead it helped hammer down even more firmly the growing Romaphobia in Britain, the country where I was born, ensuring further hateful newspaper headlines. The documentary has just been shown in Italy and this country too, and complaints have been filed with the Belgian Centre for Equality and with the Media Supervisory Authority for Audiovisual Media in Belgium.

Fictional print media can also perpetuate stereotypes, though usually those of romance, magic, and mystery. Two recently published titles are Sasha White‘s 20 Gypsy Heart; the book‘s cover reads ―Can a man bent on settling down convince a free-spirited woman . . . to risk her Gypsy Heart? Warning: this book contains explicit sex explained in graphic detail with contemporary language,‖ and Isabella Jordan‘s Gypsies, Tramps and Heat: An Anthology of Erotic Romance, tells the reader ―Lose yourself in the dark eyes and crystal ball of a gypsy lover!‖
Film also presents Romanies in a negative way specifically for entertainment. Now showing is the movie Werewolf; a year ago we were watching Drag Me to Hell, and before that Thinner. My students‘ first exposure to Gypsies was through the Disney version of The Hunchback of Notre Dame. There is an Internet link specifically for ―Gypsy curse movies,‖ and typing that in on Google brings up 64,000 hits.

While there was a cursory reference in the BBC documentary to the shameful conditions experienced by Roma in today‘s Europe, no attempt at analysis was made to explain why such a situation has come to exist, no explanation of the profound psychological legacy Romanian Roma have inherited from 550 years of slavery, indeed no mention of that slavery at all, when it was the former slave-owners who received compensation from the government for their loss, while no programmers were created to help integrate the uneducated and penniless Romani ex-slaves into free society. There was no reference in that documentary either to the fact that after the Holocaust the Romani survivors of that genocide were turned away from the camps with no help, no war crimes reparations, to rebuild their shattered lives in a hostile world where laws against them were still in effect.
The Chinese say that the beginning of wisdom is to call things by their right name. If we treat ―Gypsies‖ as one people, one ―community,‖ we are simplifying a complex situation and ignoring the great differences that distinguish the different Romani populations. In July, 2007, Newsweek International ran a story entitled ―All over the world, people are embracing the culture of the Roma people,‖ but of course we have no single culture, and the cultures we do have are certainly not embraced by peoples all over the world. But it makes good copy. Finnish Kaale and Spanish Calé have more differences than similarities; Romanichals differ very considerably from the Kalderasha, and so on. Those differences have been used to deny Romani populations any shared ethnic identity, and instead to use social and behavioral criteria to define us. The quote from Soviet Studies I read earlier is an example of that kind of thinking, and I‘ve repeated the words of the Czech sociologist, Jaroslav Sus, several times before, who claimed that it was an ―utterly mistaken opinion that Gypsies form a nationality or a nation, that they have their own national culture, their own national language.

 Instead of thinking negatively in terms of identity, about the things that make one group different from another, we must think instead of what all of us share, in terms of language, culture and ancestry. After all, those are things we came with into Europe. The characteristics that divide us now have all been acquired from the non-Romani world. Let me then turn to what I think are the main issues that bear examination. Firstly, do we proceed regarding Roma through-out Europe as ethnicallydefined populations or as socially-defined populations? Clearly the latter has been the case so far, since both Romanies and non-Romanies have usually been grouped together, for example in the various Roma and Gypsy Traveller organizations and festivals. Certainly common cause is every reason for different groups to work together, and that should continue to be the case. But I maintain that not enough acknowledgment is made of the cultural distinctiveness of Romani peoples, distinctions that must be taken into account for example in the areas of teaching, or housing. The fact is that different Romani subgroups are not anxious to work with each other, given a choice, let alone with non-Romani groups who, from the Romani point of view, are gadjé after all.

If Roma are to be regarded ethnically, then a number of questions immediately arise. Can we in fact speak about one Romani people? Well, the answer is both yes and no. Let me elaborate on that. A military origin for Romanies is not a new idea; over the past one and a quarter centuries researchers, including de Goeje, Clarke, Leland, Burton, Kochanowski, Bhalla, Courthiade, Mróz, Haliti, Lee and Knudsen have all argued for this—the consensus being that it was the Ghaznavid invasions during the first quarter of the 11th century that led to the move out of India. The work of Soulis, Fraser, Marush-iakova & Popov and more recently Marsh has further-more demonstrated that it was also the spread of Islam that was the principal factor in the migration of our ancestors into Europe from Asia during the medieval period. I won‘t go into the historical and linguistic details here, they are presented in a book of my essays edited by Dileep Karanth and shortly to be published by the University of Hertfordshire Press. What is significant about this is that we now understand that our ancestors were never one people speaking one language when they left India, but included many ethnolinguistic components.

I have argued elsewhere that like our language, our identity as Roma came into being during the sedentary Anatolian period, the professional status of the Indians and the contact variety of their language crystallizing into the Romani language and people, particularly under the influence of Byzantine Greek. There were no ―Roma‖ before Anatolia.

I should like to advance here a different perspective which, I believe, provides an alternative way of understanding the question of identity, and why the question of identity confuses journalists and sociologists, and why it causes us ourselves so much of a problem.

In light of the particular details of our origins and of our shared and unshared social history since then, certain conclusions must be drawn: First that the population has been a composite one from its very beginning, and at that time was occupationally rather than ethnically-defined; Second that while the earliest components—linguistic, cultural and genetic—are traceable to India, we essentially constitute a population that acquired our identity and language in the West (accepting the Christian, Greek-speaking Byzantine Empire as being linguistically and culturally ‗western‘), and Third that the entry into Europe from what is today Turkey was not as a single people, but as a number of smaller migrations over perhaps as much as a two-century span of time. These factors have combined to create a situation that is in some sense unique, that is to say we are a population of Asian origin that has spent essentially the entire period of our existence in the West. We are the proverbial square peg trying to fit into a round hole.

Because the population was fragmenting and moving into Europe during the very period that an ethnic identity was emerging, there is no sense of our ever having been a single, unified people in one place at one time. We can speak of a ―core of direct retention‖ consisting of genetic, linguistic and cultural factors traceable to Asia and evident to a greater or lesser extent in all populations identifying as Romani, but we must also acknowledge that all of these areas have been augmented too through contact with European peoples and cultures, and it is the latter accretions that account for the sometimes extreme differences from group to group.

For some, ―core‖ Romani culture has been diluted practically out of existence, sometimes by deliberate government policy as in 18th Century Hungary or Spain, yet such populations are nevertheless regarded as ―Gypsies‖ by the larger society on the basis of appearance, dress, name, occupation and neighbourhood and are treated accordingly, but have no traditional ethnic community into which to find refuge. At the other extreme are Romani populations in substantial numbers, such as the Vlax or Sinti, who vigorously maintain the language and the culture and who are restrained from functioning in the European mainstream because of them. Because of this, no single educational package will do for every group. We will need group-specific—within the larger framework of country-specific— programmes.

While these will provide knowledge of a common origin and early history, and explain our differences, they are not likely to serve to coalesce all groups into one. What relationship they will ultimately recognise remains to be seen, but ideally some sort of commonalty should be achieved—there is strength in numbers.

My second point that I‘d like to have discussed addresses the psychological damage that persecution has brought with it—not just the fear Roma live with daily in too many places, fear that affects both mental and physical health, but the deeper psychological damage that history has wrought. I don‘t believe that any attention has been paid to this at all. In 1988 in Austria, on the anniversary of the Anschlüss, Romani survivors told a London Times reporter that they were still haunted by fears of recurrent Nazi persecutions. Apocryphally, there are stories of isolated Romani families in far eastern Europe who believe that the Nazis are still in power.

Some Romanies bear another, heavier legacy—a perspective on life inherited from the hundreds of years of slavery. For more than five centuries, Vlax Roma had no decision-making powers. This has created a worldview which sees the situation of Roma as having been created by non-Roma who, having caused the problems arising from it, must therefore be responsible for solving those problems. Having no internal autonomy or problem-solving power, the slaves had to go to the gadjé for intervention, or else get by on their wits. If, for centuries, a people have lived in a society where every single thing, including food, clothing and even one‘s spouse was provided from outside, i.e. at the discretion of one‘s owner, and if getting anything extra, including favours, depended upon one‘s influence with that owner, then it must instill an assumption that this is how one survives in the world. And while slavery has been abolished now for a century and a half, remnants of this way of thinking are still in evidence. Not only are assistance and material things sought from outside rather than from within the community, but cultivating useful and influential contacts outside of the non-Romani world is also a priority, and becomes a mark of prestige within it. A man can become the leader of his community on that basis alone. This kind of thinking does not encourage selfdetermination or personal initiative; but before it can be addressed and changed, it has to be understood.

I want to say something last of all about those who are sometimes called pasaxèrja in American Vlax. It is a word that means ―passengers,‖ and refers not to those who genuinely want to work with us and help bring about change—such people are very welcome—but instead to those who have hitched a ride on the Gypsy Industry bandwaggon, those who get a grant, write one or two things about us while it‘s a hot topic, and then disappear. These are too often people who don‘t know any Roma socially, and who have no understanding of Romani mentality or culture. The author of one of the most oft-quoted work on the ethnopolitics of eastern European Roma actually says in the introduction to his book ―I don‘t like Gypsies very much;‖ a similarly highly profiled book on the treatment of Roma in the Holocaust includes the words that we are, ―with exceptions, a lazy, lying, thieving and extraordinarily filthy people . . . exceedingly disagreeable people to be around.‖ Such people are self-serving, taking but giving nothing. Let‘s talk about what to do about that too.


PROJECTION HYPOTHESES IN LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY AMONG MUSLIM ROMA 

Hristo Kyuchukov Constantine the Philosopher University, Nitra 

Theoretical backgrounds of group identity

The issue of language and identity among different ethnic groups is well investigated, but still there are many questions, which did not get their answers. There are cases where different ethnic groups speaking the same language identify themselves as one group, and at the same time there are cases when two groups, which speak the same language identify as different groups. This is why Donald Horowitz (1975:113) says that ―group boundaries are often fluid. Most research on ethnic relations has tended to take the groups as it finds them, as if they all existed in their present form since time out of mind.

As Horowitz (1975) says most groups change their boundaries slowly and imperceptibly, but some changes quickly, deliberately and noticeably. Ascription is of course the key characteristic that distinguishes ethnicity form voluntary affiliation. Ethnic identity is generally acquired at birth. The identity can be changed on individual or group level. Linguistic and religious conversions are also possible. A group may become more or less inscriptive in its criteria for membership, acculturated to the norms of some other group, ethnocentric and hostile to other groups. Group boundaries can become either wither or narrower. 

Some group identity may be lost by assimilation. There are two principal varieties of assimilation. Two or more groups may unite to form a new group, larger and different from any component parts. This is referred to as amalgamation. Alternatively, one group may lose its identity by merging into another group, which retains its identity. This is called incorporation. (D. Horowitz, 1975:115)

On the other hand, there is a possibility of proliferation: a new group comes into existence without its ―parent group‖ (or groups) losing its (or their) identity (D. Horowitz, 1975: 115). 

   ............ 

Similar processes were studied by Elena Marushikaova and Veselin Popov on example of four Roma groups in countries of former Soviet Union and they introduced the notions of segmentation and consolidation to describe the constant ongoing processes of transformation of Roma groups. (Marushiakova & Popov 2004 : 145-191.

Some characteristics of Muslim Roma 


In my study I do observe the following groups of Muslim Roma: 
1. Romani spoken by groups which some 80-100 years ago were Muslims, but nowadays they are Christians (Orthodox or Evangelic Christian). They speak only Romani and their language and identity are changed. 

2. Roma groups speakers of both Romani and Turkish

All the groups in the study are Muslim, however some of the groups switched to Evangelic religion. They are still speakers of Turkish and/or Romani in their everyday communication. Most of the Roma groups celebrate the Muslim as well as some of the Christian holidays – Christmas – Krečuno, St. Basil day – Bango Vasili (Roma New Year – January 13), St. George day – Gyorgyovden/Dţorţovdan or Hederlezi (May 6), Easter - Patragy/Patradi/Paskelle.

The wedding celebrations are in a way very similar: the first day the celebration is in the house of the bride. Her hands and hair are painted with Hanna. The second day the celebration is in the house of boy. The funerals are mostly done with a Muslim priest, according to the Muslim religion. The Evangelic Roma do not do the funerals any more in a Muslim tradition.

Publications on Romani spoken by Muslim Roma 

For last two decades or so few authors have published number of studies on Romani spoken by Muslim Roma on the Balkan Peninsula. On the Arlia dialect spoken by Muslim Roma in Macedonia has publications mainly V. Freedman. On Sepetči dialect spoken in Turkey various papers published M. Heinschink. The dialects of Muslim Roma in Greece are described in various publications I. Sechidou. And the Muslim dialects of Bulgaria are described by H. Kyuchukov. 
The publications of the mentioned above authors are focused on Romani or Turkish spoken by the Roma groups. There are cases when they identify as Roma although they do not speak Romani, but only Turkish. Their Turkish, however contents Roma words as well. 


Names of Muslim Romani Groups 

The dialects which the Muslim Roma groups speak are divided into Vlax and nonVlax dialects, although the boundaries some time are very difficult to be found. In Bulgaria the dialects are called Xoraxano (non-Vlax dialect) or Laxo (Vlax dialect). The speakers of Vlax dialect with Christian religious are called Purčorja (north-east part of Bulgaria – Dobrich and Russe). Althogh with Ortodox Christian religion they have a lot of borrowings from Turkish, but not from Bulgarian. The speakers of Vlax dialects, with Muslim religion are called Laxo, Dţambazi, Zagondţii, Kalburdţii...
The names of the non–Vlax Roma groups, based on their professions are Sepetčii, Kalajdţii, and etc. In Bulgaria there are no strict boundaries between the groups regarding their religion. Muslim Roma can be speakers of Vlax and non-Vlax dialects, and it is the same – Ortodox Christian and Evangelic Christian Roma can be speakers of Vlax and non-Vlax Romani as well.

In Greece the Vlax dialects are called Dorika, Finikas Romika, Laxo. Speakers of the Vlax Romani dialects are mainly Ortodox Christian by religion. Speakers of non-Vlax Romani are Muslim by religion.

In Macedonia the non–Vlax dialect is called Arlia and the speakers are Muslim by religion. The Speakers of Vlax dialects are Ortodox Christian and they are called Dţambazi or Gurbeti .

In Turkey the dialects are called Yerlija (non-Vlax) or Laxo (Vlax) dialects and both groups are Muslim by religion.

Although it is very difficult to identify the dialects by dividing them to Vlax and non-Vlax, I will try to present them in the following Table 1
......


Case studies   

Case study 1

A 52 years old woman (a teacher) from Bulgaria, from a village close to the town of Pleven, identifies as a Turkish, but she does not speak any Turkish. She speaks only Bulgarian. Her grandparents came to Pleven from Macedonia at the beginning of 1900. Part of the relatives emigrated to Turkey at the beginning of the 20 c. – and they were sieve makers. The other grandfather (the father of her mother) who remained in Bulgaria was a smith. They have Muslim names but during the process of Bulgarization of the Muslims in mid 1980-s they were forced to changed their names. In everyday communication they use their Muslim names. They do speak Bulgarian only but the older generation used to speak Turkish as well. Nowadays the youngest generation is studying Romani language and Roma traditions and identifies as Roma.

Case study 2

A Rom in his early 30-s from Bulgaria, from the surroundings of the town of Pleven, from the groups of smiths and horse shoes makers, speaker of Vlax dialect, call themselves Turski cigani (Turkish Gypsies). The grandparents had Muslim names but now the younger generation has Christian names only. They do not keep the Muslim traditions. They are Orthodox Christians but the funerals are done with Muslim priest and with Music band.

Case study 3

Roma from the village of Rosen in Bulgaria, close to city of Burgas on the Black Sea use to have Muslim religion, but nowadays they have converted to Evangelic Christianity. They use to have Muslim names, but nowadays they are with Christian names and at the same time they use in parallel their Muslim names as well. They are speakers of non-Vlax Romani dialect which also has some features of Vlax dialects.

Case study 4

Roma from Turkey, from the town of Çatalca, not so far from Istanbul, live in two settlements: the Roma from the first settlement call themselves Kibar Çingene (Polite Roma) and they do not speak any Romani. They identify as Turks and consider themselves more prestigious as a group from the Roma from the second settlement, who speak Romani language and identify as Roma.

Case study 5

The town of Kavarna on the Black sea in Bulgaria is a town which belonged to the Romanian government till 1940. The Roma here are Muslims and most recently part of them converted to Evangelic Christianity. They are speakers of Turkish and Romani but they do not know Romanian language (even the elder generation). It is obvious that the base of the dialect is non-Vlax, but there are some Vlax words as well.

Language problems with Muslim Roma dialects  

As one can see all the described above case studies are diverse and in a way it is difficult to define the boundaries between the dialects and the group identity. The dialects spoken by Muslim Roma are a good example of the processes described by D. Horowitz (1975). In all Balkan countries there is a process of assimilation towards Turkish identity. The reasons are different: political, economical and personal. Being a Turk in some Balkan countries is more prestigious than being a Rom.

At the same time there are processes of Amalgamation and Incorporation where in one Roma dialect can be found features of other Roma dialects as well. In most of the cases in Roma settlements where usually two or three dialects live together and they are in constant contact for many years, always there are influences. These is very well explained by E. Marushiakova and V. Popov (2001) for the case of Bulgaria, and these kind of phenomenon exist also in other Balkan countries.

Usually there is a Matrix dialect and Embaded dialect, and the identification usually is based on the Matrix dialect. This is shown in the next Table 2.

......

Discussion
Speaking in the terminology suggested by Horowitz among the Muslim Roma groups are present the process of assimilation or incorporation into majority group (Bulgarian, Turkish, or another minority group – the Turkish minority as is the case in Bulgaria and in Thracian Greece): Incorporation A+B→A. From other side for last 20 years a process of proliferation is observed as well: Muslim Roma becoming followers of the Evangelic Christianity and together with their religious traditions they change their language as well: A→A+B .

Bases for a new sociolinguistic hypothesis

Roma are bilingual and there are many theories about bilingual speakers which could be used for explanation of one or another phenomenon among Roma communities. Most of the existing theories, however, do not connect the degree of spoken language with their ethnic identity. In the linguistic/sociolinguistic literature still is very little written about ethnic identity and language identity (I. Hancock, 2006; C. Fought, 2006; J. Hewitt, 1988)

So I take the example of Muslim Roma from the Balkans as a base for new hypotheses. The processes of assimilation and differentiation described by Horowitz exist among other Roma communities in different parts of Europe. There are Roma who prefer to identify as Hungarians, Romanians, or Albanians and etc.

Language, Identity and Projection Hypotheses

A. Tabouret - Keller (1998:315) argues that ―The language spoken by somebody and his or her identity as a speaker of this language are inseparable […]. Language acts are acts of identity‖. At the same time the speech acts are seen as acts of projection ―The speaker is projecting his inner universe‖ (Le Page and TabouretKeller, 1985:181).

As a base for Projection Hypotheses I take the ideas of Taboret-Keller (1998). The individuals or groups using language A or language B use different symbolic codes. The use of one or another language shows the ability of the individual or the group to switch from one symbolic code to another. In some cases the changes form one language/respectively identity can be done quickly within a day – the speaker is using different codes in his everyday communication. And he changes his identities. He is projecting different worlds in different situations.

The switch to other codes and identity can take longer period and it depends on the motivation of the speaker. The motivation could be an outside force: the actions of Maria Teresa and new Hungarians in Austro-Hungarian Empire; the assimilated Roma have new language and new identity respectively. Or the 36 motivation could be the different prestige of different minority groups in a society. Identifying with another minority group or individuals with higher prestige you have new projection in the process of the speech act.

Conclusions 

There is still a lot of work to be done among Roma groups in order to discover their dialects, cultures and identities and how the language influences their identity. There are cases when different religious and profession groups have different identities but they have the same Romani dialect. The idea to connect the language and the identity in a new sociolinguistic hypothesis is based on the speech act itself as a process of projection of the internal world of the speaker.

Among Roma the language has much stronger value and speakers from different professional groups and different religious, but with the same dialect have much closer relation based on their dialect because they project in the same way their inside world during the speech act.

The Muslim Roma being speakers of different dialects/languages, having different professions and even changing their religion, still in their everyday life and communication they project their Muslim identity and connect it somehow with the language they use as a symbol system of the Muslim world.

References: 

Fought, Carmen (2006). Language and Ethnicity. Cambridge: Cmbridge University Press
Hancock, Ian F. (2006). Romani Origins and Roam identity. A reassesment of the Arguments. In : T. Acton and M. Hayes (eds.) Counter-Hegemony and the Post Colonial ―Other‖. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press.
Hewitt, John P. (1988). Self and Society. A symbolic Interactionist Social Psychology. Fourth Edition. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.
Horowitz, Donald L. (1975). Ethnic Identity. In: N. Glazer and D. Moynihan (eds.). Ethnicity. Theory and Experience. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Le Page, R. B. and Tabouret-Keller, A. (1985). Acts of Identity. Creole-based approaches to ethnicity and langauge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Marushiakova, Elena and Popov, Vesselin (2001). Dialect, Langauge and Identity of the Gypsies (in case of Bulgaria). In: T. Stolz, and B. Igla ( Hrsg.) Was Ich mochte sagen wollte... A multilingual Festschrift for Norbert Boretzky on occasion of his 65 birthday. Berlin: Academie Verlag.
Marushiakova, Elena and Popov, Vesselin (2004). Segmentation vs Consolidation: The example of four Gypsy Groups in CIS. Romani Studies, Ser. 5, 14, 2: 145-191.
Tabouret-Keller, Andree (1998). Language and Identity. In: F. Coulmans (ed.) The Handbook of Sociolinguistics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers


                ROMA IDENTITIES IN CENTRAL, SOUTH-EASTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE
Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov Bulgarian Academy of Science 

Introduction
 From the very beginning we would like to underline that in our paper we will not enter the discussion related to the notions of Roma, Sinti, Kale, Gypsy, Travellers and so on, into which many authors put different content. In this case we will talk only about "Roma" in the narrow sense, i.e. about the communities who live mainly in the regions of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (or rather lived only there before the migration of large parts of them in nineteenth and twentieth century towards Western Europe and New World). 

Multidimensional identity structure of the Roma
 In order to be able to understand the complex multidimensional identity structure of the Roma, expressed on various levels and in various contexts, first we have to take into consideration the fact that the Roma are not a hermetically isolated and self-sufficient social and cultural system. Everywhere in the world Roma have always existed at least in ‗two dimensions‘, or in two coordinate planes - both as a separate community and as a society (as its ethnically-based integral part within the respective nation-state). The distinction community - society among the Roma has to be analysed in its complexity, and in particular in its entirety discussed from two different perspectives. (Marushiakova 2008: 101-120; Popov 2008: 491-503).

The Roma represent a non-homogeneous social and cultural ethnic community that is structured according to a certain hierarchy on various taxonomic levels. It is divided into separate, more or less distinctive groups, each and every one of which with its own ethno-social and ethno-cultural characteristics. Departing from the ―group‖ as a basic unit we can discern the various hierarchical levels of existence of the Roma community with the respective forms of identity – group, subgroup divisions and meta-group units – whereas, depending on the various factors, each and every one of those levels could become a leading and determining factor in the overall structure of their multidimensional identity (Marushiakova and Popov 1997: 56-58).

The processes of formation and development of the identities of the individual Roma groups are not hermetically isolated within the community limits, but are in inseparable connection with the processes in the society in which they live. The entire mosaic of identities is conditioned by the common frames of the respective social and political formations in which the Roma live. The multiple impacts of various orders (economic, political, ideological, etc.) on the part of the macro-society, in which they live, have left their significant imprint on their overall development as community and the common structure of their identities. This community (and identities) development is irregular, multidirectional, and sometimes even controversial. A few interrelated and inter-influencing cardinal trends however can be discerned, which will be presented here briefly and without going into detail and variants. 

Internal community development 
The Roma community, just like any other community is not a static and unchangeable formation – neither as an ethno-social structure, nor as ethno-cultural characteristics. Its internal evolution leads to ongoing considerable changes in its overall structure. Processes with different direction, velocity and frequency flow constantly among Roma groups. These processes can be reduced into two main contradictory and correlated tendencies. On the one hand, there goes a process of segmentation of the group into separate subgroup divisions formed either on a family/clan, or a territory principle; on the other, however, there goes a process of consolidation of the separate subgroup divisions into one group. In both cases, the newly formed communities gradually accept the dimensions of a new, unique Roma group. (Marushiakova and Popov 2004a: 145-191) 

Nowadays the mosaic of the various Roma communities in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe is extremely varied. (Marushiakova and Popov 2001b: 33-53; Tcherenkov and Laederich 2004, 1: 235-554) The historical development (either in one direction or another, with the dominating of either segmentation or consolidation, as well as their mutual constant intertwining) among those communities has demonstrated clearly the course of the above-mentioned processes within the Roma community on the whole. These processes have in all likelihood been characteristic of the community ever since the time of their arrival in Europe to date.

This development of the Roma community in the modern age, after the disintegration of the old Empires and the emergence of the new states in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, has become to a great extent limited within their confines, which results in the occurrence of a new 42 level of Roma identity (an identity as a Roma community within the borders of the respective ethno-nation).

This level of identity has turned a very sustainable one, and currently a large part of the Roma communities in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe have found themselves limited within the borders of individual states. The historical examples have demonstrated that even when in the event of a change in state borders parts of the same group happened to remain on the opposite sides, even without serious hindrance to cross-border communication among its members, a single generation is enough for the unity of the group to disappear and to form two new groups (in the respective countries). The memory of the former affinity disappears definitely after two-three generations or remains only on an abstract level, or in the sphere of folklore. Even when the memory is preserved the distinction of the two separate groups is irreversible.

Evolution of the community as part of the respective nation
This is a relatively recent process related to the modern age. The first expressions of the struggle of the Roma for civil emancipation date from the second half of the 19th c. in the Balkans, within the conditions of the Ottoman Empire. (Marushiakova and Popov 2001a: 76-79) However, we can only speak about the true development of those processes in the first half of the 20th c. In the circumstances of the new ethno-national states that emerged in Southeastern Europe, the Roma wanted to integrate as fully-fledged citizens in the new social realities. This is in fact the primary strategic goal of all Roma organizations created during that period (the 1920s and 1930s) in Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania and Greece. (Marushiakova and Popov 2004b: 435-436) These social organizations have become the heralds of the 43 movement for civil emancipation of the Roma, paying attention at the same time to the safeguarding and development of the ethno-cultural traditions of the community (i.e. the two levels of identity, community and society, do not contradict, but on the contrary, complement and enrich one another).

The so-called ―socialist era‖ exerted a particularly powerful impact on the processes of social integration and their imprint on the common structural identity of the Roma in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. This period comes after the end of WW II and lasts until the end of the ―Cold War‖ and the breakdown of the so-called ―socialist system‖ in 1989. It won‘t be exaggerated to say that this period became a key factor in the development of the Roma community in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

The outcome of these processes for the Roma in Central, Eastern and SouthEastern Europe in the envisaged period stands out clearly against the fate of their fellow brethren living in other parts of the world as regards the extent of social integration, which in this region is definitely greater (no matter what is written in the human rights reports and publication over the past 10-15 years, and unfortunately also in considerable number of academic studies, that accepted those kind of production as a serious source about the history and current situation of the Roma in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe). That is why we should not be surprised by the fact that the awareness of belonging to a respective nation-state among the Roma in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, is more pronounced (compared to the Gypsies/Roma in Western Europe or in other parts of the world) and occupies a central place in the general structure of their identity

Development of the preferred ethnic identity and/or construction of a new identity  
The processes of the development of the identity in that direction are common among large segments of the Roma community in Central, Eastern and SouthEastern Europe that possess (or at least wish to demonstrate in public) a different, ―non-Gypsy‖ identity. These processes should not be mistaken for the abovementioned possibility for the development of the Roma as an integral part of a given nation, although formally very often the results are rather similar (at first glance, at least).

The envisaged processes of identity development among the Roma have their old historical roots and contemporary new dimensions. If we compare the situation in the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, we shall notice that various conditions and various types of state policies (or the lack of such) towards the Roma could yield similar results. The entire societal stand, and the de facto absence of a specialized state policy towards the Roma within the Ottoman Empire, has created opportunities for large portions of that community to follow the path of voluntary assimilation towards the domineering Muslim/Turkish ethnoreligious community, which is reflected in the changes in identity of large sections of them. (Kyuchukov 1993: 29-31; Marushiakova and Popov 2001a: 46-47; Marushiakova and Popov 2006) Contrary to that, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the state adopted a series of measures aiming at forceful social integration, which targeted also the complete annihilation of the Roma as a separate ethnic community and their irreversible assimilation by the surrounding population. The outcome of such a policy is clearly discernible nowadays in many parts of the former Empire, e.g. in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Ukraine (the Transcarpathian region). Large portions of the Roma in these regions are with a 45 preferred Hungarian identity and have lost entirely or partially their ethnic culture, but, together with that considerable part of them, have failed to adapt to the new social and cultural realities.

A specific case in themselves represent the Romanian-language speaking Roma communities who name themselves Rudari/Ludari in Bulgaria, Romania (Wallachia) and East Serbia, Bâeši/Beaši/Bojaši/Bajaši in Romania (Transylvania), Hungary, Slovakia and Croatia, Karavlasi in Bosnia, Banjaši in Serbia (Vojvodina), Lingurari in Romania (Moldova) and the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. (Chelcea 1944; Calota 1995; Marushiakova and Popov 1997; Marushiakova and Popov 2001b; Sikimić 2005). These communities resettled from the lands of present-day Romania in the second half of the 19th c. - the first half of the 20th c., and their identities have become quite varied. Most often they define themselves as ―Wallachians/Romanians‖, but also as ―Cigany‖ (in Hungary), and in recent years as ―Roma‖ (in Croatia, in parts of Serbia), (Kovalcsik 1996; Marushiakova and Popov 2000; Marushiakova et all 2001).

Processes in search of and attempts at constructing a new, non-Gypsy identity have been observed among other Gypsy communities in the Balkans. These processes have gone farthest with the so-called ―Balkan Egyptians‖ in Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and Serbia, who although considered for many centuries as ―Gjupti/Gjupci‖ in Macedonia, ―Jevg‖ in Albania, etc., have at present not only construed their own entire and detailed national history, but have even been granted official recognition by the international forces as a separate community in Kosovo, as part of the RAE entity - Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians (Marushiakova et all 2001).

Development in the context of global Roma nationalism
This is by far the latest trend that has emerged in the development of the Roma community and its identities in the 20th century. At the First Congress in London in 1971 the foundations of the International Romani Union were laid down. From this Congress started the trend to impose the name of the largest subdivision of the Gypsy community, the name Roma, on the entire community. The principle ―our state is everywhere in the world, where Roma people live‖ became the leading concept, i.e. the Roma were considered part of the respective nations. Together with this however the Congress adopted a banner and a hymn of the Roma, which are typical symbols of a nation. This ideological concept about the essence of the Roma community has become the leading one at the ensuing IRU Congresses in Geneva (1978) and Göttingen (1981), (Kenrick 1971: 107-108; Marushiakova and Popov 2004b: 439-440).

The Fourth IRU Congress in Warsaw laid the beginnings for a new and important stage in the development of the international Roma movement. It was characterized by the large-scale participation of representatives from Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe states, where the prevailing majority of the Roma live. During the ―socialist era‖ those countries had formed new Roma elite, more or less distanced in many parameters (education, social status, etc.) from the Roma in Western Europe. With the coming of this new fresh force onto the scene, the international Roma movement gained rather different dimensions. The Fourth IRU Congress adopted the concept that the Roma are citizens of the countries in which they lived but had to seek nevertheless their own place in the future of united Europe. The first part of this concept was predetermined by the relatively greater share of social integration of the Roma in Central, Eastern and SouthEastern Europe, whereas the second one was a response to the emerging directives for the future development of those states and the prospects of their integration into the new European realities.

In the search of a place for the Roma in the processes of common European integration the rather unclear concept of the Roma as a ―trans-border national minority‖ also emerged. During this period a lot of hopes for improving the social status of the Roma and solving their numerous problems in the countries in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe that had appeared or had acutely exacerbated as a result of the hardships of the transition period, had been laid on international law and the European regulations and institutions. The deep disappointment from the lack of considerable changes as result of signing and ratifying the Framework Convention for the national minorities in the countries in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, which granted to Roma a national minority status (unlike of the status of Gypsies/Roma in most of Western European countries), resulted in the seeking of new ideas for the development of the Roma community. It is thus natural that against this backdrop the concept of the Roma as a ‗nation without a state‘ emerged. (Pietrosanti 1997).

This trend became a foundation-laying one after the Fifth IRU Congress in Prague in July 2000 and became the priority of the future activities of the Union. The International Romani Union itself was declared a governing body that represented the Roma nation before the international institutions, and had all the symbols of the nation-state: a Parliament (legislative power), a Commissariat (executive power) and a Supreme Court of justice (juridical power). The new leadership of the organization set as a primary goal the officialization of the IRU stand before international institutions, i.e. to aim to obtain a fully-fledged membership status in world organizations - the UN, UNESCO, and above all in the 48 European institutions - the Council of Europe, European Union (Acton and Klimova 2001: 157-211).

The Gypsy/Roma identities in the new EU realities  
With the onset of the 21st century a series of considerable changes became palpable that were related above all to the finalization of the processes of European integration in the majority of the countries in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Most of them have already joined the European Union. The migration floods and the illegal (or semi-legal with a trend for definite legalization) labor mobility became something common not only for the newly acceded countries, but to a certain degree for the entire Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European region. These common processes encompass the Roma from the region, too, which leave its impact on the development of the Roma identities and grants them new, common European dimensions. Together with this on the international level, the ideas of global Roma nationalism, represented mainly by the new organization of the European Roma and Travellers Forum, returned to the concept of Roma as a transnational, European minority.

In the new European realities the development of the Roma community acquires new and wider spatial dimensions that transcend the existing state borders. Large portions of the existing Roma groups migrate in various forms from Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe to various countries in Western Europe settling permanently there (or with intent to settle). At this stage the relations (including through marriage) among the members of the groups remain lasting, but it is not difficult to forecast that the development of the processes of segmentation and consolidation of the groups will certainly acquire new dimensions that will 49 find their expression in group (and subgroup and meta-group) identities, i.e. eventually, after a few decades we‘ll have a totally different overall tableau of the Roma presence in united Europe.

The basic trends in the development of the Gypsy/Roma identities as outlined in this paper are constantly intersecting, overlapping and thus enriching one another. The processes of the development of the Gypsy community are influenced by a number of ―external‖ factors related to the specific situation in the various countries in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and the common processes of European integration and globalization. That is why at this stage it is very difficult to predict what specific dimensions the Gypsy/Roma identities will acquire in the short and in the long term and what their development will be like.

References:  
Acton, Thomas and Ilona Klimova (2001). The International Romani Union. An East European answer to West European questions?. In: Guy, Will (Еd.) Between Past and Future. The Roma of Central and Eastern Europe. Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press. Pp. 157-226.
Calota, Ion (1995). Rudarii din Oltenia. Studiu de dialectologie si de geografie lingvistica romăneasca. Craiova: Sibila.
Chelcea, Ion (1944). Rudarii. Contributie la o enigma etnografica. Bucuresti: Casa Scoalelor,.
Kenrick, Donald (1971). The World Romani Congress. Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society, III Ser., Vol. L, No. 3. Pp. 107-108.
Kovalcsik, Katalin (1996). Roma or Boyash Identity? The World of Music, 38, No. 1. Pp. 77-93.
Kyuchukov, Hristo (1993). Kratka psihologicheska harakteristika na ciganite mjusjulmani v Balgaria. [Short psychological characteristic of Muslim Gypsies in Bulgaria]. In: Etnicheskata kartina v Balgarija. Sofia: Club'90, Pp. 29-31.
Marushiakova, Elena (2008). Gypsy/Roma Identities in New European Dimension: The Case of Eastern Europe. In: Marushiakova, Еlena. (Ed.) Dynamics of National Identity and Transnational Identities in the Process of European Integration. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 468-490.
Marushiakova, Elena and Vesselin Popov (1997). Gypsies (Roma) in Bulgaria. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
Marushiakova, Elena and Vesselin Popov (2000). Myth as Process. In: Acton, Tomas (ed.) Scholarship and the Gypsy Struggle. Commitment in Romani Studies. A Collection of Papers and Poems to celebrate Donald Kenrick’s Seventieth Years. Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press, pp. 81-93.
Marushiakova, Elena and Vesselin Popov (2001a). Gypsies in the Ottoman Empire. Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press.
Marushiakova, Elena and Vesselin Popov (2001b). Historical and Ethnographic Background. Gypsies, Roma, Sinti. In: Guy, Wil. ed. Between Past and Future: the Roma of Central and Eastern Europe. Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press, pp. 33-53.
Marushiakova, Elena and Vesselin Popov (2004a). Segmentation vs. Consolidation: The example of Four Gypsy Groups in CIS. Romani Studies, Ser. 5, 14, No. 2. pp. 145-191.
Marushiakova, Elena and Vesselin Popov (2004b). The Roma - a Nation without a State? Historical Background and Contemporary Tendencies. In: Burszta, Wojciech et al., (eds.) Nationalisms Across the Globe: An Overview of Nationalisms in State-Endowed and Stateless Nations. Vol. I. Europe. Poznan: School of Humanities and Journalism. pp. 433-455.
Marushiakova, Elena and Vesselin Popov (2006). The ‗Turkish Gypsies‘ on Balkans and in the Countries of former Soviet Union. In: Marsh, Adrian and Elin Strand, (eds.) Gypsies and the Problem of Identities. Contextual, Constructed and Contested. Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul. pp. 179-189.
Marushiakova, Elena, Herbert Heuss, Ivan Boev, Jan Rychlik, Nadege Ragaru, Rubin Zemon, Vesselin Popov, Victor Friedman (2001). Identity 52 Formation among Minorities in the Balkans: The cases of Roms, Egyptians and Ashkali in Kosovo. Sofia: Minority Studies Society ―Studii Romani‖.
Pietrosanti, Paolo (1997). Project for a non-territorial republic of the Roma nation. Unpublished manuscript.
Popov, Vesselin (2008). The Gypsy/Roma between the Scylla of Marginalization and the Charybdis of Exotization in New EU Realities. In: Marushiakova, Еlena. (ed.) Dynamics of National Identity and Transnational Identities in the Process of European Integration. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 491-503.
Tcherenkov, Lev N. and Laederich, Stephane (2004). The Rroma otherwise known as Gypsies, Gitanos, Γυφτοι, Tsiganes, Ţigani, Çingene, Zigeuner, Bohemiens, Travellers, Fahrende, etc. Volume 1: History, Language, and Groups. Volume 2: Traditions and Texts. Basel: Schwabe Verlag.



CONTEMPORARY CHANGES IN ROMA IDENTITY IN THE CZECH AND SLOVAK REPUBLIC 

Eva Davidová University of Ceske Budejovice 


The Roma, diverse and scattered across the European countries and almost throughout the world, is unified by the ethnicity, based on their common origin, language, culture and perception of values and ethnic identity, feeling of affiliation to Romaness, Romipen. The Roma – whether they called themselves by the ethnonyms of Roma, Sinti or a taken-over name, given to them by the other, majority population – i.e. Gypsies, Romanies or Travellers in England, Scotland and Ireland but also in America, Gitanos in Spain,Tsiganes in France, Zigeuner and Sinti in Germany and Austria, Cigáni or Cygany, Cikáni in Slovakia, partially also in Bohemia and Moravia, to a major degree in Bulgaria, Hungary and similarly also in other countries - represent within Europe a common largest ethnic minority, though varied according to the country and group. This important fact, however, is unknown to majority of the Roma and often they do not even know of institutions representing them – whether globally as is the case of the International Romani Union (IRU), officially active since April 1971, or recently within the European Union which is the case of many leading institutions. Their activities and impact on all the Roma is still problematic and the representatives of these organisations, institutions and Roma intelligentsia realise that more intensive work is required in the Roma communities in individual countries in order to support their ethnic identity.

So far there has not been a uniform scientific or legal definition of the terms such as nation, nationality, national or ethnic minority. Nation is defined as a community of people with common origin, culture and language which usually has its own state – in case of the Roma it is the country in the territory of which they have settled and lived for a long period of time. In Europe with 8-10 million Roma scattered in multiple countries, where they constitute the largest national minority, the Roma, Sinti and Travellers (in the United Kingdom – in England, Scotland and Ireland) consider themselves to be a common transnational ethnic group, some sort of Roma European nation. This definition was also referred to by the participants in the World Romani Congress of the International Romani Union held in Prague in July 2000, attended by the Roma from almost 40 countries worldwide. In the memorandum ―We, the Roma nation‖ they reiterated their desire for the recognition of the transnational Roma nation representatives: ―We share the tradition, culture, origin, language, therefore we consider ourselves to be a nation, even though we do not strive for the creation of a Roma state. We present to the mankind a request to be represented as a nation, which we are. We seek the representation and new ways of the representation of individuals, regardless of their nationality. The current policies do not reflect the existing needs of individuals in the changing world and the needs of those who continue to starve and suffer from the violation of their fundamental human rights. For that reason we offer this particular, possible and needed solution. ―

In 2002 this was articulated in a scientific manner by Rom Ian Hancock, an outstanding representative of the Roma nation, in his book called ―We are the Romani People―, as well as by Thomas Acton in his book called ―Romani Culture and Gypsy Identity― (1997), and by others.

There is still lack of unity in the way the majority society calls the Roma and this unclarity relates not only to their standing, but also impacts their selfdetermination and feeling of belonging to the Romaness, Romipen: Are the Roma/Gypsies in each country a minority or do they constitute Romani nationality, nation or an ethnic group?

In the Czech and Slovak Republic for example all the ethnic Roma are called the members of Roma nationality, although the Roma themselves usually do not present or declare their nationality in Census. Since1990 they have been able to declare their nationality because in both the republics (former Czechoslovakia) the Roma nationality status was adopted. Nevertheless, majority of the Roma do not declare this nationality. The majority population has so far been grappling with the definition of this population, i.e. who is and who is not the Roma, and how to encourage them to declare the Roma nationality in statistical surveys. The main reason for the reluctance of the Roma, elderly people in particular, to declare their nationality has been the negative past experience of several generations and their fear of any registration whatsoever. Some of them are convinced that any registration may be followed by persecution, as was the case during Holocaust in the World War II, when the records from the Census of Gypsy population were used pursuant to Act No 117/1927 Coll. and Government Order No 68 Coll. of 1928, based on which the Roma received the so called Gypsy identity cards that significantly restricted their fundamental human rights and freedoms. Nowadays they are also afraid of potential racially and xenophobia motivated attacks which might follow if they declare the Roma nationality and make themselves visible.

Moreover, some of the elderly Roma today do not even understand precisely the meaning of the concept of nationality, which is new and unfamiliar for them since they have always considered themselves to be primarily members of their 56 group or a family-based community. In reality, though, the majority of them simply do not want to be officially considered or registered as the Roma and mostly declare another nationality, usually the Czech or Slovak in the Czech Republic and Slovak or Hungarian in the Slovak Republic. Withholding one‘s own ethnic or national identity during the Census, whether intentionally or not, has become a common practice of the Roma population both in our country and in the former socialist countries. Yet it proves their Roma identity.

The number of the Roma, ascertained through these censuses, is therefore strongly underestimated and irrelevant – in comparison to the actual number of the ethnic Roma which is estimated at least at 220 thousand in the Czech Republic and even 360 to 500 thousand in the Slovak Republic. The Roma constitute in fact the largest minority expressed in percentage of the total population, in the Slovak Republic in particular.

Today, the majority society stresses again the social aspect, not the ethnic one, which is why many Roma families are wrongly judged and placed in socially excluded communities, covered by the term of social exclusion. Building on this approach is also the state policy of social integration, i.e. de facto a gradual adaptation of the Roma to the majority population – without any clarification of social and ethnic relationships, thorough knowledge of specific features of lifestyle of such families. The environment, in which they live, has been newly labeled as socio-culturally disadvantaged environment or disadvantaged environment. This term of socially disadvantaged environment is officially used in the framework of well meant assistance to these families in the field of education, welfare and health care (including the award of projects and grants at the level of EU) and its features are associated more with social than broader cultural or ethnic aspects. Yet ever since 1990 the use of Romani language and the presentation of the Romani culture 57 has been made possible and to a certain degree also encouraged. A proof thereof is the foundation and activities of the Museum of Romani Culture, publishing of books and magazines in Romani language (partially), Romani studies at several universities in the Czech and Slovak Republic and other positive phenomena – which, however, is not in contradiction with the above referred to issues.

Nonetheless, the essential thing is who the Roma believe they are and what path they want to follow – ensuing from this is their identity, whether they feel their belonging to the Roma nation or merely to their family group. Currently, there are vast differences between the individual groups and generations.

Even in these two republics they are divided into groups and family-based extensive families. Both in the Slovak and Czech Republic the most numerous groups are the Slovak Roma (servike Roma) and partly the so called Hungarian Roma (ungrike Roma) – both called Rumungre. Most of them arrived following 1945, i.e. the end of the World War II, in several migration waves in the Czech and Moravian towns, industrial as well as border areas, where they have settled and lived ever since for three of four generations, representing now almost 85 percent of all the Roma living here. Apart from these large groups, there are small numbers of Czech and Moravian Roma/Gypsies – members of families who survived the World War II Holocaust of Gypsies and Jews, and Sinti – the German Gypsies living in Bohemia and Moravia. Here too, a specific group accounting for almost 10 percent of Roma population in each of our two republics is the Vlach Gypsies (Vlachike), nomadic until February 1959, who preserve their language, internal social structure and system of values and do not mix with other Roma. That is the internal ethnic division of Roma. Vlachike Roma as well as Sinti, though, have preserved their ethnic identity to which they are strongly attached - their Vlach and 58 Sinti language, their system of values and traditions, including their own internal courts (kris).

The majority society in the Czech and Slovak Republic judges and distinguishes the Roma not according to their ethnic and family affiliation, but the social group to which they are ranked. This is mostly done through an external assessment of the living standard and the way of life of a family or a group, but also through the so called degree of social integration, as still perceived here by the majority society – from the Roma living a relatively good, troublefree life (including Romani intelligentsia, elite and entrepreneurs), via the middle group of the until recently employed and the so called better integrated Roma to the socially excluded groups and communities, the so called ―difficult to adapt― Roma, mostly unemployed and having ever more problems. This stratification, however, is not correct and in many Roma living in these countries it has a negative impact on the feeling of their ethnic belonging.

The feeling of one‘s standing and social status within the community keeps changing, also from generation to generation. Since 1990s the Roma living in Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia, especially those belonging to the Slovak and Hungarian groups, apart from sub-ethnic division have started to classify themselves also internally into the rich (barvale) and poor (čore), or the successful and unsuccessful – which is how they assess and define one another. The first group comprises the young Roma intelligentsia, growing in numbers and significance (even though it is not always rich), the Roma entrepreneurs and members of the Romani elite, whose affinity, however, is based on different values – namely the achieved social and economic standing. They often do not want to have anything in common with the latter, still prevailing groups and do not communicate with them. Even some young Roma, who have successfully attained 59 higher or university education, often times do not identify themselves with ―the others―, mostly troubled Roma and do not feel any urge to help them solve the situation they are in, not only materially. This approach of a part of the current Romani elite is on the one hand understandable, because they do not want to give up social and economic position in the majority society which they have gained after a hard struggle. On the other hand, though, it proves the existing, ever more serious problems in the internal social stratification of Roma communities and changes in the ethnic identity.

In the Czech and Slovak Republic only recently, or since 1990, the majority society has started to officially point out that with respect to Roma in multicultural society an account has to be also taken of ethnicity, which is not the case in reality. The specificity of the Roma is, however, perceived today by the majority once again predominantly from the social point of view, not from the point of view of their ethnic specific characteristics. The environment, in which the Roma families live, is in practice described by term of ―socio-culturally disadvantaging― or ―disadvantaged environment―. This new concept is used especially in connection with Roma families faced with socio-economic problems as a consequence of unemployment and living in the so called socially excluded communities, often called ghettos. It is also used in the government integration policy of Roma population, in the area of social services and system of education, where many Roma children are labeled as children from socially and culturally disadvantaged environment. The characteristic features of this so called disadvantaged environment are causally associated rather with social than broader cultural context and once again tend to have social rather than cultural or ethnic nature. Mistaking the ethnic specific characteristics for the characteristics of social strata then more 60 easily results in the division of Roma and the negative impact of their feeling for Romaness - Romipen.

The Romani solidarity and cooperation in larger families and groups of relatives has been substantially weakened in the Czech Republic, particularly among the members of younger generation, living in towns.

Thus, major changes between the individual generations of the prevailing majority of Roma occur with respect to their ethnic identity. These changes were brought about by the past assimilation pressures exerted by the former – communist society, namely from 1950s to late 1980s, i.e. for the period of 40 years, when the specific features of ―gypsies‖ were fought against with the aim to ―make them similar ―to the others, i.e. Gazhe (Gaje) and hen the language, lifestyle and tradition of Roma people were declared to stand in the way of future of their children. These forced pressures led to serious erosion of the traditional system of values in many Roma communities and families, including a gradual loss of family authorities.

A negative implication is also the gradually decreasing knowledge and use of the Romani language by the younger middle-aged and young generation, in town environment in particular. The worst impact of this pressure exerted by the society in the past consists in the fact that many members of younger generations deem their Roma ethnicity (ethnic affiliation) to be a stigma and therefore wish to assimilate and become the Czechs, Slovaks or Hungarians and present themselves as Roma by their culture only. This gives rise to problems in the current ethnic identity of the Roma, many of whom suffer from the feelings of ambivalence, unclear stance to their own ethnicity. This fact is truly alarming.

References: 
Acton, Thomas and Mundy, Gary (1997). Romani Culture and Gypsy Identity. Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press.
Hancock, Ian (2002). We Are the Romani People: Ame Sam e Rromane Džene. Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press.


“YAŞASIN ROMANLAR!” EMERGING ROMANI ORGANISATIONS AND IDENTITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY, 2000-2010

Adrian Marsh University of Greenwich, London 

The previous decade in Turkey has seen a major and exceptional change in the perceptions of identity amongst the Turkish Romani peoples. Where once the refusal to acknowledge anything other than a nationalist, ethnocentric Turkish and Muslim identity was common, now the Romani and other ‗Gypsy‘ populations (Romanlar, Domlar, Lomlar, Abdallar, Göçmenler, Gezginler, Göcebeler and others) of Turkey have begun to assert a strong counter-narrative of indigineity and exceptionalism, positing them at the centre of Ottoman history and the foundation of the Republic. The conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and the mubadele (population exchanges) of the 1920‘s and 1930‘s are the keystones in this reconfiguration of Romani identity, with the trinity of Fatih Sultan Mehmed, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and now Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as representative of those who have given to the Romanlar and acknowledged them as an equal part of the body politic.
The current ―democratic opening‖ (Roman açılımı), initiated by the AKP government in Istanbul in December 2009, has created a momentum that may well prove the most significant change in the situation of Romani people anywhere in Europe, particularly if (as widely expected) Turkey joins the ―Decade for Roma Inclusion‖ this year. There are real risks however, of a ‗backlash‘ against this recognition of a Turkish ‗ethnic‘ minority in Turkey, as the traditional forces for reaction in the military and the ‗deep state‘ seeks to resist the moves towards 63 growing democratization and shifting notions of Turkish citizenship from the narrow vision of the past to a pluralist future. There are also no guarantees that the pursuit of an Anatolian exceptionalist narrative will bring the Turkish Romani communities into closer relationships with Roma in the remainder of Europe, a position that the rewriting of Romani historiography and the ―late origin theory‖ currently being discussed amongst scholars and researchers may only bolster, by placing a greater importance upon the ethnogenesis of the Egyptians in Byzantium in the eleventh century CE1 . However, these are ‗extraordinary times‘ and the Romani peoples of Turkey are living through them with hope, anticipation and not a little anxiety...

The first attempts to establish Romani social and cultural associations in the Turkish Republic were met with repression; in 1996 a small group of Romanlar in Izmir had attempted to establish an arts and theatre-based organization for young Romani people. This association was closed by the police and the leader of the organisation was prosecuted and fined for attempting to subvert the notion of an indivisible, ethnically homogeneous Republic with a form of ethnic separatism. Other attempts in 1998 and 1999 were also made with similar results and it was not until the change in legislation surrounding the registration of associations and foundations (dernekler) under the AKP government elected in November 2002, that this became possible. Since that time, there have been some forty new Romani, Domari and Lom associations founded (some more short lived than others). At present, there are approximately twenty-four active associations and four or five regional federations2 . One of the most recent associations to open, the  Avrupa Yakısı Balkan Göçmenleri Roman Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği (The European Balkan Region Culture and Assistance Association for Romani Travellers3 ), in Istanbul‘s Zeytinburnu district4 directly acknowledges the complex origins of Romani and other ‗Gypsy‘5 communities in Turkey, especially with reference to the mubadele that followed the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). The Abdallar, Dom and Lom communities in Turkey have all opened their own associations following the work of the ERRC/hCa/EDROM project, ―Promoting Roma Rights in Turkey, 2006-08‖6 , increased interest from European Roma NGO‘s7 and a growing interest in the situation for Romani communities from institutions such as the Council of Europe‘s Commissioner for Human Rights8 , the European Union and the European Commission. Scholarship, research and international organizations too have taken a far greater interest in the situation of Turkish Romani communities since 2000, than over the whole of the previous five decades9 . The planned Romani Research Centre at Adnan Mederes Universitesi, in Aydın will open in autumn 2010, further raising the profile of Romani scholarship and research in Turkey and the region.

The changes are dramatic then, with perhaps an unprecedented interest in Romani and other ‗Gypsy‘ groups from a wide variety of perspectives and approaches. The most startling example of these is the moves by the national government of the Republic to acknowledge the disadvantages faced by Romani communities in Turkish society, in education, housing, social services, welfare, health care provision and employment. With the Roman açılımı that began in Istanbul, 9th December 2009 and continued with the huge meeting (Roman buluşması) on the 14th March 2010 in the Abdi Ipekci Spor Salonu, Zeytinburnu in Istanbul, the AKP government and the Prime Minister‘s Office in particular seem to have taken a surprising degree of interest in the plight of Romani communities10 . The government has also begun to address some of the legislation that has discriminated against Romani communities, removing derogatory references11 and aspects of the law that constituted prejudicial treatment on the basis of their identity. In addition, housing has been promised for some 3,400 Romani families living in 42 areas that will cost no more than 100 lira (approximately 50 Euros) per month, to begin to address the problems faced by some 20,000 nomadic or peripatetic Romani Travellers.

Despite the enthusiastic reception for ‗Tayyip Baba‘ (‗father Tayyip‘) at the Romani ‗gathering‘ (buluşması) in Zeytinburnu and his apparent commitment to addressing their problems, there are many issues that remain challenging. The fundamental lack of access to education is one of the major concerns that many of the Romani associations focus upon and there is little support being given to any initiatives to encourage Romani children to attend school. Poverty is the primary reason for the problem of low attendance, together with very poor expectations from teachers and educators and bullying experienced by Romani children from their peers. Most have no schooling at all beyond the most basic of literacy skills and Romani girls are almost entirely absent from schooling. Adult literacy and numeracy levels are consequently very low and employment prospects bright, both as a result of low educational experience and prejudice regarding ‗lazy‘ and ‗untrustworthy Gypsies‘, on the part of employers. Health care and access to medicines are beyond the reach of most Romani families, with the costs of natal care meaning most children are born in the cramped and over-crowded homes that Romani people live in, with little or no medical intervention. All of the health related problems found across Europe in Romani communities are present in Turkey, especially amongst the mobile groups, including the very real prejudices that Romani and other Gypsy people face in accessing health services. Housing may be being built in new areas for Romani people at low cost, but the repercussions of forced eviction and demolition of long-standing Romani neighbourhoods in Mersin, Adana, Diyarbakir, Ankara and most notably, Sulukule in Istanbul12, have not been addressed, nor does the Urban Regeneration Law 5366 look set to undergo any reform in the near future, with its disproportionate impact upon Romani communities.

The other implications for this shift in attitudes are closely intertwined with the darker side of Turkish politics and nationalism. The assault on the community of Selendi in Manisa province in December 2009, where 1,000 strong mob of ultranationalists burnt 300 Romani families out of their homes has remained uninvestigated and no individuals have been brought to charge. The provincial authorities have promised new housing but the local municipality, who it has been alleged instigated the attack in the first place have promised no such resettlement in the city, nor compensation to the Romani people who lost their homes and property. Ultra-nationalist hate speech has been steadily increasing against the Romani communities in Turkey for the past five years, but more recently this has burgeoned, particularly on the internet. The possibility of a wide-scale, ultranationalist led backlash against Romani people as ‗another‘ minority demanding rights, through interference from Europeans who have no understanding of Turkey and want to see the Republic undermined, is very real.

The tensions then are these; an apparently increasing assertion of Romani and other identities (the Lom, Dom, Abdallar) through the process of establishing of associations, including women‘s associations, combined with an increasing recognition at the highest government level of Romani rights and the promotion of equality through a ‗democratic initiative‘, opposed by an increasingly ultranationalist rhetoric of exclusion and homogeneity, coupled with violence and threats to persons and communities, whilst local municipalities continue to deny Romani rights through demolition of homes, refusing access to schooling and little actual support for any of the necessary measures to achieve the kind of changes that the Prime Minister is urging. At this point, the initiative of the Prime Minister‘s office remains just that; there is no lead ministry that has taken on responsibility for implementing any of the suggested reforms to improve social inclusion and the office responsible for housing developments in Turkey (TOKI) remain almost unaware of the proposal from PM Tayyip Erdoğan for identifying and allocating housing for Romani communities. It is not even clear whether these proposed measures are intended to address the mobile populations‘ housing needs or those that have been displaced by forced evictions, nor where such housing projects might be located. State Minister Faruk Çelik has now completed his remit to organize consultations and no further steps are planned at present, leaving the situation unclear and almost suspended without a strategy or action plan to continue. On the other hand, the PM continues to meet with local Romani leadership in visits to differing cities, as he did in Izmir recently, continuing a dialogue between his office and the Romani communities.

In wider society, the perceptions of Romani people are perhaps changing, as they become more ‗positively‘ visible in the media. Advertising campaigns are using Romani people such as Balik Ayhan and other musicians, television drama serials feature the stories of young Romani singers ‗discovered‘ by wealthy musical composers and their consequent relationship that defies both ‗Gypsy‘ and non-Gypsy conventions ‗to be together‘ and the popular musical talent shows, such as ‗Roman Star‘ attract high ratings. Debate programmes (Beş N, Bir K) feature Romani topics and figures from the Romani leadership such as Erdinç Çekiç appear alongside progressive intellectuals and writers to discuss the issues. Yet the deep seated prejudices remain and little changes the attitudes in ordinary Turks that relegate ‗Gypsies‘ to a second class status, beyond the pale of ‗normal‘ Turkish society.

To draw some conclusions, the changes that have taken place since 2000 are dramatic and do demonstrate an overall positive trend, but they are fragile and insecure at present and may even have effectively stalled, as European criticism from the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights and others has suggested, alongside a more positive appreciation of the recent initiative by EU politicians. Proposed policies though have little to support them and the impressive rhetoric of PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan notwithstanding (nor the reality of his personal commitment), little can change without the support of the ministries (education, social services, employment, health, housing) that deliver services to Romani communities, nor a positive engagement with the wider tranche of European Romani strategies and initiatives, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular. The civil service bureaucracy is in many ways a much more conservative bloc than the current AKP government and the question of the attitudes of other actors in Turkish politics, such as the People‘s Republican Party (CHP), the military and the constitutional court, adds a whole layer of complexities and contingencies to this issue. AKP will have to continue to promote the ‗Romani democratic initiative‘ at the same time as persuading the more conservative elements and actors that this is not going to produce a divisive, ‗ethnic‘ minority and a potentially ‗separatist‘ situation in the Republic, something that the Romani associations categorically refute. In order to do this, AKP and the Romani associations must continue to articulate a non-diasporic, Anatolian exceptionalist and refashioned Romani identity that looks, not to other Roma communities and notions of Indian ethnogenesis but to Ottoman history, Islam and the early Republic for its legitimating discourse.

The key to the issue of Romani rights in Turkey remains the recognition of equality before the law and under the Constitution and the active implementation 70 of those rights for all citizens, as enshrined in both. This is at the heart of the Romani movement here and represents the aspirations of all the Gypsy communities who are opposed to the notion of rights as a ‗minority‘ or a transnational identity. The successful social inclusion of Romani and other Gypsy communities in Turkey is the primary goal of all activity by the associations and their collective federations. In this, the situation in Turkey provides perhaps a model for the successful pursuit of Romani rights across Europe, in contradistinction to the dubious benefits of the past twenty-five years of promoting Roma identity as a European, trans-national minority based in a narrative of ‗otherness‘ and non-European origins. As equal citizens in the Turkish Republic, the Romanlar may be able to achieve, providing the fragile and somewhat precarious democratic initiative continues to move forward, true citizenship in a European pre-accession nation-state and demonstrate the falsity of the commitment to the Roma by the existing member states. That fact alone should encourage Roma rights activists and advocates, scholars and researchers to pay a great deal more attention to Turkish Romani communities than they currently do.

References:
Acton, Thomas & Marsh, Adrian (2008). ―Glocalisation‖: a new phenomenon or an age-old process? Current adaptations in changes in Gypsy/Roma/Traveller Identity in the Turkish Republic‖, Paper delivered to a regular session "Globalisation and (De-)/(Re-)Construction of Roma/Gypsy/Traveller Identities” at the 38th Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, Budapest 26-30 June.
Acton, Thomas & Marsh, Adrian (2007). The Development of Roma / Gypsy / Traveller Identity during the candidacy for EU membership of the Turkish Republic. Paper delivered to the Annual Conference of the Gypsy Lore Society, Manchester, 7 September.
Aksu, Mustafa (2003). Türkiye’de Çingene Olmak, Istanbul, Ozaan Yayincilik Araştirma
Alford Andrews, Peter (2002). Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, [with Rüdiger Benninghaus] Beihefte zum Tbinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients Reihe (Geisteswissenschaften) Nr. 60.2, vols. 1 [1994] & 2, Weisbaden.
Alpman, Nazim (1994). Çingeneler, Istanbul, Ozan Yayincilik.
Altinöz, Ismail (2006). Gypsies in the Balkans during the Ottoman period, Paper presented to the Third International Congress on Islamic Civilisation in the Balkans, 1-5 November, Bucharest, Romania.
Altinöz, Ismail (2005). Gypsies in Ottoman Society. Paper presented to the Gypsy Lore Society 2005 Annual Meeting and Conference on Gypsy Studies, 9-10 September, Facultad de Filosofia, Universidad de Granada, Spain.
Çağaptay, Soner (2003). Citizenship policies in interwar Turkey. Nations & Nationalism, vol. 9, no.4, pp.601-619.
Destani, B. (ed.) (2007). Minorities in the Middle East: Muslim Minorities in Arab Countries, 1843 – 1973, vol. 1, 1843 – 1930, Slough, Archive Editions.
Duygulu, Melih (1994). Çingene. Dünden Bugüne Istanbul Ansiklopedesi, Cilt 2, Istanbul, Kültür Bakanliği ve Tarih Vakfi‘nin Ortak Yayinidir, pp. 514 – 516.
Kyuchukov, Hristo (1998). The oral traditions among the Roma in Istanbul. In: Mengelwerk voor Muysken. Amsterdam.
Marsh, Adrian (2008). A brief history of the Gypsies in Turkey. In:We Are Here! Discriminatory Exclusion and Struggle for Rights of Roma in Turkey, Edirne Roma Association, European Roma Rights Centre, Helsinki Citizens‘ Assembly, Istanbul, pp.5-20.
Marsh, Adrian (2008). Ethnicity and Identity: who are the Gypsies? In: We Are Here! Discriminatory Exclusion and Struggle for Rights of Roma in Turkey, Edirne Roma Association, European Roma Rights Centre, Helsinki Citizens‘ Assembly, Istanbul, pp.21-30.
Marsh, Adrian & Karlidağ, Melike (2008). A study of research literature regarding Turkish Gypsies and the question of Gypsy identity. In: We Are Here! Discriminatory Exclusion and Struggle for Rights of Roma in Turkey, Edirne Roma Association, European Roma Rights Centre, Helsinki Citizens‘ Assembly, Istanbul, pp.143-58.
Marsh, Adrian & Strand, Elin (eds.) (2006) . Gypsies & the Problem of Identities: Contextual, Constructed & Contested. Papers presented at the First International Romanī Studies Conference in Istanbul, at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, April 10-12 2003, Svenska forskininginstitutet i Istanbul Transactions 17, London, I. B. Tauris.
Marsh, Adrian (2005). Gypsies and Alevis: the impossibility of Abdallar identity?‖ [with Elin Strand] in Hege Irene-Markussen [ed.] Alevis and Alevism: Transformed Identities, Istanbul, Isis Press, pp.154-74.
Özcan, Ali Refat (2006). Marriage Among the Turkish Gypsies‖, The Social Science Journal, vol. 43, pp. 461-470.
Özcan, Ali Refat (1998). Turk Çingeneler (Turkish Gypsies). Erzerum, Atatürk University Press.


THE ROLE OF HEALTHY ROMA SELF-CONFIDENCE IN THE INTEGRATION PROCESS 

Jana Horváthová Museum of Romani Culture, Brno  

Until the mid 20th century two major approaches of the majority society to the Roma prevailed, striving either for their elimination (expulsion from the country, persecution, physical liquidation), or for their assimilation. The efforts to assimilate the Roma exerted particularly since the end of the 17th century constituted the more progressive solution as against the expulsion, persecution and physical liquidation which did not bring about any improvement at all. Sometimes too excessive assimilation pressures aimed at the Roma inclusion in majority society, they did not exclude them from the society, but on the contrary, wanted to include them at any cost, even by force. It was this force-based approach that proved to be ineffective since it was unnatural. This was ascertained, however, only towards the end of the 20th century, thanks to the application of the new fields of science such as psychology, sociology and ethnology. The final quarter of the 20th century, its last decade in particular, brought new, more humane and respectful approaches that raised the inclusion efforts to a new level – namely the policy of integration; the inclusion of the Roma in majority population with the possibility to preserve some of their ethno-cultural specifics. Though the history witnessed several waves of assimilation in relation to the Roma, no assimilation pressure in the Bohemian countries has ever been so conceptual, consistent and persistent, and thus also ―successful‖ as the pressure exerted by the communist regime. I believe it is important to share an example from recent history in order to illustrate the 75 socially devastating consequences of ignoring (disregarding) or even overt belittling of the functioning Romipen – Romany culture.

The attempts of the Czechoslovak communist regime to assimilate the Roma were launched in 1958 through the policy of state controlled assimilation. The Roma were supposed to totally disappear in the majority population. This policy within the purview of the Stalin‘s national policy relied on the disregard of ethnocultural specifics. It was not desirable to remind the citizens of Gypsy origin - as they were called at that time since the term Roma was forbidden throughout the communist era – of the moments of their common identity, such as history and culture. The state support provided to Gypsies covered especially their material needs. The other population perceived it as unfair and advantageous for Gypsies, while in reality they did only harm to them by depriving them of their agelong self-sufficiency, they taught them to rely on the state. (It entailed first and foremost the improvement of housing conditions, allowances for meals for school children, etc). Contrary to the material sphere, the spiritual culture of the Roma suffered from ever stronger devastation and demoralization. The Romany culture was officially degraded with the aim to eliminate it: the Romany language was considered to be a mere argot of the mob and criminals. The children at schools or in the substitute institutional care were punished for using the Romany language. The whole complex of surviving Gypsy culture was presented as a manifestation of retardation dating back to the capitalist era. That is why it was necessary to cure it, or to eradicate it. The Roma themselves started to believe these statements, they got to understand that they should be ashamed of their past as well as their presence and for the sake of progress to overcome their Gypsiness as fast as possible and to cast it away as primitive and immature. The Roma were encouraged not to speak the Romani language with their children and to 76 generally adapt to the surrounding majority society. However, only the members of the lowest social strata of the majority population were willing to communicate with the Roma, the culture of whom the Roma started to take over. Within the implementation of assimilation policy, the regime also hastily liquidated the traditional Romani concentrations and resettled the Roma from isolated Romani settlements in the eastern parts of the country in the industrial areas with lower density of Roma population. Here, they were given new flats and jobs. At this very point the policy as implemented in practice turned into unmanageable spontaneous transfers of citizens, the Roma town districts and the whole housing estates (socially excluded locations) came into being, with in fact segregated Roma schools. 

The regime rashly and headlong demolished the Roma family structure and hierarchies which have existed for centuries and constituted the backbone of their communities. The Roma started to loose faith in the cornerstones of their culture, whatever it might be, but did not receive any adequate replacement. The loss of values brought them into a vacuum, conducive to deep demoralisation. The Roma themselves started to believe that their culture was paltry and undeserving of attention. Moreover, the already disintegrating traditional structures failed to support them. The state paternalism, on the contrary, taught the Roma not only to rely on it, but also to take the advantage of it. 

Although the assimilation policy included also the Roma literacy programme, the obvious social handicaps of Roma children were not addressed at schools, thus many of these children ended up in special schools – intended for the mentally retarded. Under the totalitarian regime the consequences were not that tragic since really everybody had the right to work, though the Roma were hired to do the most physically demanding unskilled jobs. The consequences of long-term 77 lack of success of Roma children in Czech schools were tragically manifested after the fall of the regime. The market mechanisms revealed the unpreparedness of the Roma and led to their total failure in the labour market. Soon after the Velvet Revolution the Roma were the first to lose their jobs and until now have had difficulties to find a job due to their low level of skills. 

Serious identity problems have been faced by the Roma until now (not only in the Czech Republic, but obviously in the whole post-communist block). The deeply rooted feeling of inferiority hinders also the process of equal involvement in the majority society. Frustrated people burdened by multiple problems not addressed in the past and visibly different from the rest of the society have difficulties in communicating with their surroundings, prefer to stay in isolation, but are also de facto isolated in their socially excluded locations by local self-governments. Let us imagine this misery using the example of language. The parents seeking to get rid of unpopular Gypsy stigmas intentionally speak only Czech to their children, the Czech they know, i.e. with improper phrases and poor vocabulary. Such children then cannot speak the Romani language at all and they speak poor Czech, often with a funny Romani accent. Starting with the first grade they understand neither the teacher, nor the reading material, so without the help of an assistant or extra classes they are losers from the very beginning of their school attendance. Their being a failure at school constitutes for the Roma the starting point of their living the dead-end life of their parents – at the bottom of the society. 

The communist regime has for sure provided the Roma with a lot of positive moments, apart from guaranteeing the right to work, civil equality and material advantages, it was also the right and duty to attend school. The communist regime naturally made it possible to high achievers from among the Roma to attend a higher education institution, however in exchange for the cooperation with the 78 regime – for assimilation, severing their ties with their own community. This way the Roma elite alienated from their communities, to which they could no more be of assistance. This is one of the essential negative consequences of the assimilation policy - apart from the loss of values and self-confidence. The assimilation leads to the loss of the elite of the given community, to general humiliation and distortion of identity, without which it is very difficult to get involved in a healthy manner in the majority society as its equal partner. Unhealthy and unnatural environment promotes unhealthy processes. In order to choose sensitive programmes of integration it is necessary, however, to have an insight in the functioning of Roma communities, their everyday life. 

The socially excluded Roma locations are now full of dark-skinned people considered to be Gypsies by the rest of the society, though they in the effort to obtain a better social standing present themselves as Non-Roma. The luxury of being self-confident of the Roma origin is in our country (or generally in the post-totalitarian countries which experienced tough assimilation) is the privilege of only exceptional Roma, who managed to become well educated and get a decent position in the society. A number of Roma persons who studied under the previous regime are familiar with these feelings, when only upon attainment of higher education they were capable of assuming the burden of hated Gypsiness and to claim their origin and their never forgotten, but humble identity. It is only with the attained education that these people regain the lost self-confidence as well as the consciousness of the value of their own Romani culture, they get the courage to publicly acknowledge their next of kin and predecessors, their fajta. And that is very liberating. The issues of personal identity and healthy self-confidence are interrelated. We can have the so called assimilated gadjé who back at home within their family members will share their Roma feelings from the 79 Non-Roma everyday life, in which being genuine Roma they cower in order for them not to be recognised. Or we can have strong Roma with healthy selfconfidence ho have no problems with their identity and therefore have no need to offset their social handicaps by aggression or other socially dangerous behaviour. To accept and put up with one’s own identity is essential for a successful integration, for healthy and independent involvement in the majority society, as its equal member. 

The identity problem of the Roma is fed and worsened by the antiRomani aversion affecting the whole society. It does not create suitable conditions for the integration of Roma into the hostile surrounding community. On the other hand, the stalled Roma integration, with obviously troublesome behaviour of the Roma, is the source of anti-Romani aversion. We are thus getting into a vicious circle, which forms the so called Roma problem. Its individual components, however, support one another and reproduce. In other words, for the Roma to have a healthy self-confidence as citizens of equal value is one of the prerequisites for successful integration, or rather its successful completion. 

The surveys of Romipen are nowadays needed and necessary in order for us to find out what is the Roma experience, what are the concrete barriers that hamper their integration in the whole society. Based on the experience gained in our museum I shall share one example: the deep rooted belief that the Roma are not interested in the non-Romani education in order not to get assimilated, is at least in the prevailing majority of Czech and Slovak Roma, a myth caused by the lack of knowledge of the situation, experience and perception of the Roma. In our institution remedial classes are given to 53 Roma children – living in the adjacent socially excluded Roma location. The interest of parents in these classes is immense and we cannot satisfy the demand. The parents of these children, half 80 illiterate special school leavers, are not able to help their children with their studies, even though they would sometimes wish to do so. The Czech schooling places specific and challenging demands on pupils in their homework and other preparation for school, which necessitates the parents‘ assistance. If they are incapable of that, the socially neglected children equipped with poor language skills, when faced with the first failures, lose their interest in school, which becomes a hostile territory. Initially, the young Roma children have ambitious goals as to their future integration in the majority society and career. With the beginning of their school attendance and the subsequent frustration, they quickly abandon their ambitions (notoriously known is the frequent case when a dream to become a medical doctor soon turns into a dream to become a nurse, and if everything turns out well in reality the girl becomes at least an orderly, more often though only a hospital cleaning lady). And the children put up with the fact that they will live just as sad and miserable life as their parents. The adults know these ends well from their own experience, which is why they do not support these ambitions of their children, they do not trust themselves or their children. (Naturally, there are other reasons too, not as fundamental as the one I mentioned). This is just a small example of what I revealed during the field survey done by our Museum and what obviously exists in reality. There are many more similar examples, the society is full of similar wrong ideas about the Roma which make the communication difficult. The knowledge of the current life of the Roma and their culture is crucial in order for us not to keep hitting our heads against the closed door during our integration endeavours, when this door can be slightly open, one can enter and start constructive communication in a peaceful atmosphere. 

Now, let me mention some sort of a topical delicate appendix to this topic. In the current – only Czech though – discourse of social anthropology oriented at the Roma, spreading and flourishing is a popular and populist statement that the Romaness is a disadvantaging factor of the integration process. Sometimes, it is literally said: ―The Romaness as a disadvantaging factor is an element causing retardation mainly in two areas: it hampers education and through its system of family solidarity slows down the process of personal responsibility and motivation.― (I. Gabal and P. Víšek 2009: 31–32.) This statement is welcome also by officials responsible for updating the Roma integration policy, members of selfgovernments, and often those who simply do not know how to cope with the Roma and are tasked with finding quick solutions, while having only shallow knowledge of the current situation of the Roma.

This fairly dangerous statement, since it is discreetly misleading, mixes two diverse moments. First, the Romaness is confused with the manifestation of demoralisation and perhaps also the so called ―culture of poverty― of the population in socially excluded locations. This decayed situation, from the moral and spiritual point of view (not necessarily the material point of view), quite often found in the socially excluded, is not anything that would constitute the supporting pillar of the Romani traditional culture, i.e. the manifestation of genuine Romaness. That would be a fatal confusion that could result in multiple subsequent mistakes concerning the real integration of the Roma in the society. (Jakoubek, M. and Hirt, T., 2004; Hirt, T. and Jakoubek, M., 2006) 

The second issue consists in the irrelevance of the given to statement in the quest for the ways of Roma integration or the fight against social exclusion. If the socially excluded, i.e. also the socially needy, were the upholders of Romaness, then the statement on Romaness as the factor of retardation would be merely a 82 statement without any profound meaning whatsoever for future solutions. The integration endeavours focus on people at the bottom of the society who have so far been incapable of getting off the bottom and take care of themselves. It is caused by the overall situation of these people, not by their potential material poverty, which actually is the consequence of the level of their education attainment and the spiritual state. People at the bottom live their lives rather unconsciously, without any profound philosophical dimension. If in their everyday lives they practice anything that could be considered the specific characteristics of the Romani culture, it is done merely unconsciously, by force of habit, because they cannot act otherwise. These socially excluded people, the inhabitants of the most appalling communities hardly ever present themselves as the Roma. It is them who suffer from the most serious inferiority complex, though masked by aggressiveness. That is why also their consciousness of ethnic identity or their interest to acknowledge the Romaness is strongly weakened, if not totally obliterated. According to my research these ―Roma people‖ (whether genuine or in the negligible number of cases those who only declare to be the Roma) declare their Romaness in Census to the lowest degree. On the contrary, the Romaness was declared by the Roma who have put up with their origin, by the self-sufficient Roma who are capable of taking care of themselves and their families. The Roma well aware of their worth, the Roma heading for successful integration or already integrated. 

People affected by demoralisation and overall decline do not think about their identity or culture or general spiritual questions. Even if the Romaness really was a disadvantage, it would be beyond the democratic regime to “reeducate” these people within a short span of time, to prevent them from behaving the way they are used to since no awareness campaign is sufficient to 83 meet this challenge. We might proclaim enlightened statements: ―The Roma people, when in need do not rely on your next of kin, on your family, do rely on the state and its authorities!― Or: ―Focus on yourselves, do not think of your nearest and dearest, stand up against your family, against your parents, this is the only way to get off the bottom!― That would, however, be very foolish and it would consequently lead to other unthought-of negatives. Who would then take care of this old and rejected generation of parents and grandparents, would they now end up in the old folks‘ home? How about the feelings of deprivation, which are mutual, present both in the parents and their revolting children? But the main thing is that the meaning of these naive statements would not be grasped by the socially needy since for them it is the deeds that count. The arguments used claim that a typical, not ethnic but social feature of the ―culture of poverty‖, is the focus on family solidarity, on its safety net. Does it, however, make sense to strive for the demolition of this safety net, if there is no adequate replacement?! Has not the family safety net always been rather a virtue of necessity? Is not this almost instinctive reliance on one‘s relatives and nobody else a proof that something does not work in this country, that the society does not offer these people adequate guarantees of preventing them from a fall? Does it make any sense to campaign against the ―Romaness― – sometimes in the ethnic sense of the word – and on other occasions merely in the social sense against the ―culture of poverty― if the state coordinated system and policy solutions of pulling these people out of the isolation are not implemented?

The apparent contradiction in these so called expert statements is also visible in the confused switching from the statement about the disadvantaging ―Romaness― (i.e. the set of behaviour of the ethnic – the Roma) to the term of ―culture of poverty‖ used when describing the Romani lifestyle, in which its social 84 character is highlighted as against the ethnic one. The culture of poverty is characterised similarly to the ―disadvantaging Romaness― by strong ties of solidarity in a large family“. Yes, the ―culture of poverty‖ truly is a disadvantaging factor of integration and let us do something to eliminate it. This culture of poverty is not the cause, but the effect of the long lasting situation of the Roma. Therefore, essential is not the statement whether the alleged Romaness or culture of poverty are the disadvantaging factor, but the proposal of solution of how to eliminate this ―makeshift― or ―ersatz― culture of poverty. How to find its adequate replacement? Where will these people find help and support if not in the family safety net?

Our Roma people in their subjugation and humbleness are sometimes willing to listen to these theories, which, however is unthinkable for the Roma European representation or the still proud Roma groups such as Sinti, Manus or also Kalderash. This discourse would be considered unacceptable, but for them also difficult to understand. It ensues from the entirely different experience the Roma had in the free Europe as against that in the post-communist countries. The Roma, who had not been exposed to tough assimilation pressure, could remain selfconfident, unbowed and their Romaness, their identity has never been disturbed by this pressure. 

References:   
Gabal, I. and Víšek, P. (2009). Strategie boje proti sociálnímu vyloučení. Pracovní studie pro formulaci a implementaci politiky začleňování obyvatel vyloučených lokalit do české společnosti a její sociální a ekonomické struktury. Praha červenec – říjen. 
Jakoubek, M. and Hirt, T. ( 2004). Romové: kulturologické etudy. Plzeň
Hirt, T. and Jakoubek, M. (eds.) (2006). Romové v osidlech sociálního vyloučení. Plzeň.


MEMORY, HISTORY AND RROMANIPEN: REFLECTION ON THE CONCEPT OF TRACE 

Sarah Carmona M. M. S. H University of Aix-Marseille, France Universidad Hispalense of Sevilla, España

"We must write the history of our ancestors ourselves" Ian Hancock, 
The Pariah Syndrome "An event is not a being, but an intersection of possible routes' P. VEYNE, how we write the story.

History is a thread which connects events between them, gives them form to interpret them, and understand their transcendence. This thread is woven by the historian. A paradoxical person, half scientific, half dreamer ... women and men provided with all the complexities involving humankind, with a cultural background, social, intellectual, political, moral and spiritual ones as well. And yet, still a player of here and now, that is, of the present time.

 
We can understand history as the memory of people. The shaping of a memory through writing allows the historian to fight against forgetting and collective amnesia. However, the association history/memory makes more sense when referring to the writers of chronologies and to historians. When it comes to the modern historian, one must first ask the question of the objectivity of science 87 what is proposed by the historian as a narration. Thus, we are faced with the question of the perspective and of the ideology of the historian. Even if the historian wants to develop scientific methods, the political and ideological substrate, assumed or not, is the hurdle to overcome, both by the historian as well as by the readers. The facts themselves are merely a jumble in which the historian must put a hand in so as to achieve coherence and meaning. And it is there, behind the fabric of human logic that we can glimpse their true motivations. The issue of subjectivity and objectivity is crucial in historical writing. Obviously, the most reasonable advice is, in order to think correctly of history, should be under no circumstances to lose sight of an epistemological approach. Without which for some, collective memory could transform itself into the elaboration of a collective myth.

 What is really a memory?  

Can it be constitutive of our identity, both personal and collective, community or national? Memory is a narrative, a narrative, a narration in which logically the facts, circumstances, episodes are articulated. However, memory is primarily a "sense of things." It is also the meaning we give to what we remember. We are all concerned by the idea, the need to "remember", we are all aware of the importance of historical memory, the "duty of memory". Without doubt, memory is fundamental and its loss is terrifying, as well as troubling. It may even lead the individual affected by this towards the total elimination of an identity, considering here identity as what remains beyond that which differs. Yet, even more tragic than forgetting, is undoubtedly the loss of our sense of what has happened. There is nothing more important and fundamental to "remember with meaning‖, whether in 88 a conscious manner, an intellectual or natural one. Ignoring the intrinsic and general meaning of what the facts teach us and form our identity represents the most terrible of losses and the greatest of pains. 

How can we collectively remember? 

Remembering collectively is to make for ourselves something that we have not lived, as if these events and their meanings are housed within our fortified inner self in the form of memories. This is the narration of past circumstances that we feel, or that we are made to feel, as part of us, and as personal. The sociological notion of collective memory proposed by Maurice Halbwachs (1950) describes how a past can be stored in individual memory, history and society. Individual memory is defined of course from the perspective of the social dimension. "It is in the society that normally, the individual acquires his memories, and the individual remembers them, which are recognized and located by the individual concerned" (Halbwachs, 1992: 38) Memories, even personal, are evoked from the outside. Moreover, if an individual or group of person is incapable of capturing and reconstructing their memories against the group they belong or society as a whole, this phenomenon is made difficult. And this is all the more so when it is about, as is the case of our community, a people who unfortunately suffer from the syndrome of Pygmalion.


Thus, the organization of memory whether individual or collective may depend on the social experience and may rely on what Halbwachs calls "the social framework of memory‖, which is represented by language, space and time. These frameworks define social practices. By that, collective memory is understood and perceived in this context as a continual upgrading of knowledge, beliefs, abilities 89 and standards "through which a society ensures the permanence of its representations." Collective memory appears here as a social concept and political key - fundamental as it shapes the identity of a group and vice versa. 

Here we must stress that without doubt one of the main vectors of this "collective think and feel" factor is language since, as Halbwachs (1952:275) emphasizes "the whole system of social convention is attached to it" and it allows us to reconstruct our past at every moment. Language is thus the space in which all humans think in common. To understand, study, and underline the richness of our language consists therefore of remembering, and of "creating a memory". The fact that the study of our history is being achieved mainly through the study of our language is another argument and illustration of this idea. It is for this reason that the organization of memory, individual or collective, depends on social experience. It has been established that linguistics is a political science. Naming things is to decide on their position within a whole, to specify their meaning. Naming something is therefore affirming the ability to act.


People without a shaped memory, inscribed in writing or in oral form are not people without history. It is not because people celebrate their past exploits that they have historical knowledge of themselves. People without memory are not people without history. Unlike individual memory, groups and societies are more prone to amnesia. They can "forget" their past if institutions do not endeavor to conserve and maintain this along with self-esteem and education. As we are a nation without territory and thus without institutional structures linked to this task, our memories have been rendered weak (and still are) under the yoke of oppression, the need for survival and the devastating Pygmalion syndrome. 

Indeed, in the fifteenth century, 400 years after our departure from India, our ancestors presented themselves as coming from India. Hieronimus de Forli tells us about Rroma in Italy in 1422 and wrote « aliquit dicebant, quod erani in India » (―they say they are from India‖ in Crónica di Bologna, 1749, Citado por J.P. Clebert, Ludovico Antonio Muhatori , cittá di Castello 1916, tomo 18 of the Corpus chronicoum Bonenensium, Parte I, pp. 568-570.), This mention of the origins of our people is in no way unique. At least five articles between 1422 and 1630 mention the knowledge of, and the demand for recognition of, our Indian origins.

Logically, we can wonder about the process of supposed "amnesia" from which our people suffer in modern and contemporary times. It is therefore necessary to try to understand how and why this phenomenon could have happened. Firstly, it is likely, as we are reminded by Ian Hancock (2006), that when our ancestors arrived in Christian Europe, its inhabitants had difficulty differentiating the source of our individuality. As a result, our ancestors were given incorrect ethnonyms. Unfortunately, even at that time, our ancestors were well aware of their origins, after 300 years of traumatic history, punctuated by wars and constant geographic displacement, the beliefs and images that majority society could impose on our people represented undoubtedly an important factor in the deformation of our own perceptions of ourselves. It is most probably as well that what others saw in us, to some extent conditioned us. We made ourselves, the image that majority society made of us. Such are the disasters of ignorance and prejudice! This phenomenon, called the Pygmalion syndrome, is known both in practice and in theory by an experiment in social psychology highlighted by Robert Rosenthal and Leonor Jacobson (1968).

The basic assumption is as follows: the prejudices of a person on the behavior or the nature of another transfer from "prophecy to automatic realization‖. It suffices to convey a prejudice in order that this phenomenon is realized and conveyed at the speed of light. There is nothing magic, but rather the force of which may have expectations of the other on behaviors. This process of manipulation of identity has been able to operate in such a way on our people that the wrong image, conveyed by the prejudice, has ended up being assimilated and internalized. Without land, the direct protagonists of vicissitudes from a more than turbulent medieval history, without an institution able to preserve a true image of our people just as much in relation to the outside as to that intrinsically, we became lost in what others saw (or wanted to perceive) of us. 

Once the confusion took hold, in the context of survival, the Rromani people were not at all perceived in the same way once they entered into Christian Europe. Their survival became much more difficult. They were not a military force but rather regarded as pariahs who may be spies, the Christian chroniclers tell us most of the time with repulsion of clair voyance talents and even of artistic skills, it is clear that establishing the truth about Rromani identity was surely not their priority. In some cases, this mistaken identity was very useful to the Rromani population as a whole. In Spain, in the midst of the Reconquista, as in other European countries, they presented themselves as "Dukes of Egypt" on pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela, Christians fleeing Muslim invasions, which began as a very attractive card, thereby facilitating their establishment, such as in the Kingdoms of Castile, and furthermore enabling them to obtain permission for certain rights of free passage and privileges. 

It is also equally important to think historically; during the Middle Ages what mattered was not where the people came from, but with whom, as well as 92 against whom the people fought. It therefore appears that there has been a confusion of ourselves and others on the identity of our ancestors. Yet, in light of the texts from the XV, XVI and XVII centuries respectively which refer to our conscious knowledge of being from Indian lineage, this confusion was therefore not made on our origin. 

As we discussed earlier, it is from the XVI that a strong change in perception of the Rromani people, by European dominant society of that respective time, starts to occur. The increasing attempts of centralization and state control, together with the control of the states over their respective citizens and domains, the different foreign and colonial policies, all led to a shift in the perception of mainstream society on the Rromani communities spread throughout Europe. The different and strong culture of the Rromani communities, as well as their skills and even mastery of crafts and art of war (since leaving Kannauj, our history is a continual battle) were potentially considered dangerous. To force a people into submission, the more favorable attitude to adopt is no doubt the one of denying and manipulating their respective identity, history and culture. However, this "loss of memory" could not destroy these traces, these marks, these cultural traits that to this day unite all Rroma and that we know as Rromanipen. 

Plato, Ricoeur, the traces and Rromanipen 

Everyone knows what a trace is. It is a very ordinary word and of a common usage. The simplicity of this definition leaves little room for a theoretical interpretation. However, the more the words are simple, the more the questions and issues they raise are complex. A trace can be a mark, an impression, that of an animal, a man, a vehicle but can also be seen in a figurative sense. In this case, a trace is a mark 93 left by an action, an event in the past. A trace can also be a miniscule amount. Finally, in geometry, a trace is a point, a place of intersection with a plane. We can relate these definitions with four other concepts: 1). A trace that would be a fingerprint, or a mental imprint (Paul Ricoeur, 2000); 2). A trace that comprises an indication, a small amount (Carlo Ginzburg, 1989); 3). The concept of trace as memory as documented, oral or experienced (P. Ricoeur, 1955; Marc Bloch, 1974), and 4). The trace as a line or writing.

The concept of trace is fundamental and if I dwell on this it is because it leads to a reflection on the concept of memory of imagination and of truth. The parable that best illustrates this transcendence is the enigma known as the Platonic metaphor of the wax block. In this dialogue between Socrates and a Sophist, Plato establishes a relationship between two problems: first, that of "eikon‖, the image or imagination of the presence or of the present representation of something that is absent; the other, that of "tupos", the imprint, or the trace, illustrated by the metaphor of the wax block. For Plato, the intersection of these two issues raises the question of truth and error.

Plato understood here by error, the erasure of marks or failure to adjust the image to its print. What is this metaphor of the wax block that illustrates the problem of the trace, of the "tupos" in the philosophy of Plato? This dialogue of Plato compares the soul, or the mind to a wax block, which can be very different according to the person who serves to register, to engrave feelings and thoughts (the "semeia). These feelings or thoughts, recorded by memory, constitute consciousness, and knowledge. This metaphor is very important because it lies at the intersection of a triple dialectic between memory and forgetting, between knowledge and ignorance, between truth and error. For Plato, truth or true opinion 94 is the result of the faithfulness of memory with traces, while that which is false or erroneous is from inadequacies to this trace. 

Much later, Paul Ricoeur (2000) would develop this concept and refer to three types of traces: The first trace is the emotive one that ―results from the shock of an event." It is the psychological mark which is either directly experienced or not. The second type is the trace of memory, one that is cerebral, studied by neuroscience and serves as the connection between impressions of the outside world and the prints in the physical brain. The third type of material trace is the physical evidence, written or otherwise, on which the historian works. 

All these three types of traces could constitute without doubt that which undoubtedly results in what is very difficult to understand and feel for a person not belonging to the Rromani people and to what we know as Rromanipen. A collective memory, and a collective feeling which is neither based on the academic knowledge of our history, nor on the development of core myths, nor on the cult of national heroes. This is the sense of belonging to the same people, to the same set of values and rules. It is also experimenting with a similar sensitivity and even skills, a deep appreciation of oneself even in the other, the feeling of belonging to a large sibling group, a duty of solidarity, beyond the distances and the differences that we see also in each of the groups we belong. Ultimately, Rromanipen could be defined in the same sentence as that defined universally - collective memory: this is what unites us beyond that what separates us. 

On many occasions, this concept, which is ours, has been subjected to political development or to a romantic dream. As we discussed before, Rromanipen is not built on a Gadţikane fashioned memory, historical and institutionalized, but rather on the strength and power of these traces present both in the Rromani people 95 as in each of the individual members who constitute the community. For over 1,000 years and in every move we make on a daily basis in each Rromani household, from Istanbul to Santiago de Chile, via Bucharest, Sarajevo, Amsterdam, London, Paris and Granada, we reinterpret our history. In each of Rromani word, however used, we celebrate Rromanipen.   

If Rromanipen, this personal and profound feeling is so strong, why the need to reclaim our history?

Considering Rromani history written by Rromani historians is to think of the idea of an entity provided with a national consciousness and history. Behind the writing of a history, it is difficult that there is no political dimension or protest. For centuries, the Rromani people have been the object of all kinds of research, scrutinized from all angles by all types of looks, from the most benevolent to the most contemptuous, which in one way or another have ended up as only playing into stereotypes and lies. The history of perceptions of majority society on our people shows that we have never been recognized for what we are. We were, and we are now, still largely a nation of model clay figures. From the romantic image of the wandering musician to the congenital antisocial image the Nazis created of us, to the mentally retarded in specialized Czech or Slovak institutions or the Gypsy woman dancer with blood of fire from the Sacromonte tableaus, we have been and we will remain, if we fail to be a player in our own culture, elaborations, creations of the gadjikane world.

Since Aresaipe (the Arrival of our people to Europe), our identity has been denied, which has been usurped and manipulated. Our history has been revised, more or less consciously, always prepared from a perspective and a different 96 sensitivity to that which experience we have within ourselves. Obviously, to study and understand the history of people to which one belongs is not a sine qua non; the quality of scientific work does not depend on the researcher's ethnic precedence but nobody can shake off cultural and emotional ties. The Rromani look and sensibility is essential for a sound study of our history. 

Rromani historiography is young. It is still in a pre-adolescent phase, a key period which requires a questioning of identity and claim. Prejudice and racism are based inter alia on the handling and denial of the identity of the other. Retrieving, interpreting and promoting our history are therefore the most useful tools in overcoming the lack of self esteem and undoubtedly the most effective of weapons against stigma and xenophobia. 

Moreover, a trend which is very popular in the field of anthropological, sociological and historical studies of our people consists of denying the sense of community that unites all the Rromani people in the world, thus minimizing the implications for us of Rromanipen. This tendency involves emphasizing the cultural differences of different groups that make up the Rromani people and underestimating or trivializing those aspects that unite us. The «divide et regna» (divide and rule), from the age-old principle, immortalized by Philip II of Macedonia, is a clearly effective modus operandi. Contrary to any healthy society, it would seem that for some, diversity is not, in the case of our people, perceived as an asset but rather as an element of division. These "Gypsyphiles" who (due to a lack of training of some and political leaning of others, imply that the Rroma are not people or an ethnic group or a community or even a culture as their references are incompatible with their classifications) are correctly branded as "negationists" by Ian Hancock in ―The Pariah Syndrome‖ (1987) and the French history specialist Claire Auzias (2009).

The Rromani people are not outside the world. Our nation is bound to modernity and to the countries in which we live. We are citizens and can moreover affirm our rights that the countries grant us. In theory, racism is prohibited in our civilized world; there is therefore no measure that prohibits us in relation to anything on the basis of being Rromani. However, in practice, the opposite occurs. Our life is hell if we want to safeguard our cultural heritage, and our identity. And yet, this is where the real challenge and the real fight lies. Saving our heritage and identity in a world where for decades we are made to believe that the role model, one that applies - is that of the majority or dominant society. Many things will have changed when our people have regained their pride and confidence in themselves. 

History is the mirror of the past but also that of the present, an instrument of knowledge or manipulation and a weapon of power, of development or of destruction. History is still to be realized. 

Refernces:   
Auzias, Claire (2009). Choeur de femmes tsiganes. Marseille: Editions Egrégores. 
Bloch, Marc (1974). Apologie pour l’histoire ou métier d’historien. Paris : Armand Colin. 
Derrida, Jacques (1967). De la grammatologie. Paris : Editions de Minuit. 
Ginzburg, Carlo (1989). Traces. Racines d‘un paradigme indiciaire. In : Mythes, emblèmes, traces. Morphologie et histoire. Paris : Flammarion. 
The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth Century Miller (1980). Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore; First published in Italian as Il formaggio e I vermi. (1976).
Halbwachs, Maurice (1952). Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, originally published in Les Travaux de L'Année Sociologique, Paris, F. Alcan, 1925 
Halbwachs, Maurice (1950). La mémoire collective. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1950 
Halbwachs, Maurice (1992). On Collective Memory. Trans. and ed. Lewis A. Coser. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hieronimus De Forli (1749). Crónica di Bologna, Citado por J.P. Clebert, Ludovico Antonio Muhatori, cittá di Castello 1916, tomo 18 (Corpus chronicoum Bonenensium) Parte I, págs. 568-570. 
Hancock, Ian (1987). The Pariah Syndrome: an account of Gypsy slavery and persecution, Ann Arbor, Mich.: Karoma
Hancock, Ian ( 2006) . On Romani Origins and Identity: questions for discussion. In: A. Marsh and E. Strand (eds). Gypsies and the problem of identity: contextual, constructed and contested. Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute. 
Jervolino, Domenico (2001). Ricoeur et la pensée de l‘histoire : entre temps et mémoire. Labyrinth, vol. 3. 
Ricoeur, Paul (2000). La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli. Paris : Seuil. 
Ricoeur, Paul (2000). Histoire et vérité. Paris : Le Seuil. 
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Personality, Identity, and Character Explorations in Moral Psychology

web: http://www.thedivineconspiracy.org/Z5275W.pdf

Personality, Identity, and Character
Explorations in Moral Psychology

Edited by Darcia Narvaez
University of Notre Dame Daniel K. Lapsley
University of Notre Dame

In the last decade there has been a remarkable resurgence of interest in studying moral rationality within the broad context of personality, selfhood, and identity. Although a concern with the moral self was never entirely absent from the cognitive developmental approach to moral reasoning, it is fair to say that sustained preoccupation with the ontogenesis of justice reasoning did not leave much room for reflection on how moral cognition intersects with personological processes. Indeed, some topics, such as moral personality, moral selfhood and identity, and the study of virtues and of character were pushed to the margins for paradigmatic or strategic reasons, because, for example, such notions could not be reconciled to moral judgment stagetyping, or could not provide what was wanted most, which was a way to defeat ethical relativism on psychological grounds. Yet the neglect of the moral dimensions of selfhood and personality could not endure for long, mostly because moral notions go to the very heart of what it means to be a person. Moral notions penetrate our conceptions of what it means to live well the life that is good for one to live. These are foundational questions that have commanded deep reflection since antiquity, reflection that psychological science cannot evade, not the least because the moral formation of children is the central concern of parents, schools, and communities who are charged with educating the next generation. It matters to us that we raise children to be persons of a certain kind. It matters to us that we become such persons. In this respect there are few domains of study more crucial than moral psychology, and few topics of greater importance than the development of moral self-identity, moral character, and moral personality. Yet moral psychology is not a cohesive field of study, and, indeed, psychology is not a unified discipline.

to moral psychology can be found in diverse literatures and fields of study that invariably invoke different theoretical traditions, methodologies, and terms of reference. Some of the best writings on moral psychology are not written by psychologists at all, in fact, but by philosophers, two of whom are contributors to this volume. Oftentimes researchers who study dispositions do so without the moral domain in mind. Or, those who study the dispositional aspects of moral functioning – under the headings, say, of moral self-identity, character, or personality – propose powerful and interesting models, albeit without developmental grounding, bypassing entirely relevant developmental literatures that might serve integrative purposes. In turn developmental research on moral self-identity would profit from the well-attested literatures of social and personality psychology that flesh out adult forms of moral psychological functioning. As it stands now, “moral personality” is like an orphan who wanders about developmental, personality, and social psychological neighborhoods, recognizing some commonplaces but getting lost all the same. We would like to bring the study of moral personality home to an integrative field of study. The purpose of this edited volume is to provide a seedbed for the study of the moral self and the nature of moral identity, personality, and character. The impetus for this volume was the 2006 Notre Dame Symposium on Personality and Moral Character, which brought together renowned scholars from diverse perspectives to wrestle with how best to understand the moral dimensions of personality, and what this might require by way of theory and methodology. To our knowledge this was the first time that nationally visible scholars representing developmental, social, personality, and cognitive psychology were assembled to address theoretical and empirical questions regarding moral selfhood, personality, and identity. A second Notre Dame Symposium in 2008, held under the auspices of Notre Dame’s College of Arts and Letters Henkels Lecture Series, resulted in more voices being added to the ongoing conversation. The aim of the two Notre Dame symposia, and now of this volume, is to carve out space for a new field of study on the moral self that is deeply integrative across the domains of psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience. Heretofore, the fragmented research on moral personality has been mostly a study of cognition without desires, rationality without brains, agents without contexts, selves without culture, traits without persons, persons without attachments, dispositions without development. We hope the present volume starts to change all that. One will find here diverse points of view and genuine disagreement about the meaning of foundational constructs, to be sure, but we are confident that the volume points the way to promising integrative futures.

Overview of the Chapters The volume includes contributions from philosophy, personality, neuroscience, and from social and developmental psychology. We were tempted to group this overview by discipline, but such an organizing scheme would only reinforce disciplinary boundaries and undermine the volume’s thematic intention, which is that such boundaries are likely to get in the way of strong integrative theory building and research. The first two chapters set the pace for the volume by presenting options for moral personality from the perspective of extant theory and research in personality science. In the first chapter, Dan McAdams explores the implications of his “new Big Five” perspective for the moral personality, while Daniel Cervone and Ritu Tripathi take up the social cognitive option in the second. For McAdams, personality is (1) an individual’s unique variation on general evolutionary design for human nature, which is (2) experienced as a pattern of dispositional traits, (3) characteristic adaptations, and (4) selfdefining life narratives, which are (5) situated complexly in social contexts and culture. If one wants to ask about moral personality, one must first specify at what level the question is directed. Moral personality is a plural concept. Moral considerations are embedded at each level, although perhaps morality is of prime importance in the construction of self-defining life stories – the internalized and evolving narratives that people construct to make meaning and find purpose in life. In summarizing 15 years of research on life stories of generative adults, McAdams contends that life stories of personal redemption are particularly valued as a powerful narrative of virtue and goodness in American adult life, one that provides a script that motivates, sustains, and provides meaning for moral projects. In Cervone and Tripathi’s view, a more flexible approach to personality theory is available in the social-cognitive perspective. They emphasize a model that includes cognitive appraisal and the limits of working memory that can move us down the road in explaining the shifting behavior people exhibit. They show how the Knowledge-and-Appraisal Architecture (KAPA) model of personality best captures the distinction between affective and cognitive processes, and contextual variation, in disposition. KAPA provides a way to characterize the consistency in personality across situations 4 Introduction by combining “enduring knowledge about the self ” and “dynamic processes of meaning construction that occur within a given encounter,” factors that vary idiosyncratically and are constrained by working memory limitations. In each situation, the individual appraises affordances based on self-efficacy (knowledge of self) in the context (beliefs about the situation). Appraisals operate continually as dynamic functions within situations, allowing the individual to select an appropriate course of action. Owen Flanagan (Chapter 3) and David Wong (Chapter 4) each provide powerful philosophical perspectives on personality and identity. Flanagan defends the notion of personality against recent claims that character traits do not exist or, if they do exist, are trumped easily by the demand characteristics of situations. He also unpacks problematic metaphysical assumptions that underlie self-narratives, including the notion of “free will,” and certain master-narratives (“hard work and effort pay”) that function like heuristics, but are larded with descriptive and normative claims that do not bear analysis. His point here is that proper moral education requires the examination and critique of the metaphysical assumptions underlying moral precepts, especially in regards to master-narratives about the self or the good life. In Chapter 4, Wong explores the interplay among culture, morality, and identity. In his naturalistic theory, moralities are part of culture. After sorting out various philosophical difficulties with respect to culture, Wong proposes that we think of culture as a kind of conversation that necessarily involves plural voices, and he works out the implications of this metaphor for understanding moral identity. For example, he points out the differences between a conversationalist view of culture – one that fluctuates, exhibits tensions, diversity, and contradictions – and an essentialist view that considers culture fixed and static. The conversationalist view allows the individual to select which aspects of a culture to adopt, to adapt, or reject. Within this conversation, one’s moral identity may also fluctuate. Wong urges us to consider that such culturally flexible behavior may also apply to morality. Individuals may be not only linguistically bilingual but also morally bilingual. The first four chapters, then, provide overviews and critiques of moral personality from psychological and philosophical perspectives. The next two chapters take up neuroscience and evolutionary perspectives on moral functioning. In Chapter 5, Jorge Moll, Ricardo de Oliveiros-Souza, and Roland Zahn review the research on moral cognitive neuroscience. They stress that human emotion and cognition functionally are not separate but intertwined, which is most evident in the experience of a moral dilemma Introduction 5 when motivational significance is linked to abstract symbols and ideas. They note that the neurophysiology of attachment often underlies moral motivation. The brain systems that promote attachment enable humans to imbue other things with motivational abstract meaning, or what the authors’ call “sophisticated moral sentiments.” These allow an individual to embrace broader notions of “other” as understood by his culture, which Moll et al. term “extended attachment,” at the same time “promoting altruistic behaviors within sociocultural groups” and “facilitating outgroup moralistic aggression.” The next chapter by Darcia Narvaez also builds on evolutionary neuroscience to suggest a dynamic view of moral personality, expressed as three ethics rooted in evolved strata of the brain. The three basic moral orientations – Security, Engagement, and Imagination – can be dispositional or situationally activated, influencing perceptual processing and goal salience. The most primitive and related to survival, Security, becomes the default ethic, if early experience is too far from the environment of evolutionary adaptedness. To develop sophistication, the other ethics require nurturing experience during sensitive periods. Narvaez challenges moral psychology to pay more attention to early development, sensitive periods, and their relation to moral functioning. In Chapter 7, Ross Thompson reviews developmental literatures that speak to the development of moral character in early childhood. After reviewing classic moral developmental theories, he explores current research findings on the development achievements of infants and young children, including the ability to understand others’ needs, awareness of intentionality and of normative behavioral standards. Although these literatures are not traditionally considered a contribution to moral development, they are clearly foundational to the emergence of the moral self. Thompson also reviews evidence regarding moral affect and on the development of conscience, which he regards as the foundation of the moral personality. Conscience can be defined as the cognitive, affective, and relational processes that influence how young children construct and act consistently with generalizable, internal standards of conduct. The burgeoning research on early conscience development shows that young children are developing moral orientations that are simpler, but fundamentally similar, to those of older children and adolescents, and that the moral capacities of youngsters have been underestimated. Thompson argues that the conceptual foundations of moral reasoning are well-established in early childhood; and that the development of cooperation and compliance and other features of the moral self are bound up with the dynamics of early relationships with caregivers. 6 Introduction Daniel Lapsley and Patrick Hill (Chapter 8) also take up developmental issues, but their starting point is modern personality theory. Lapsley and Hill begin by considering some broad issues concerning the basic units of personality, and recent advances in understanding the trait-structure and types of personality. They then extract five themes from the extant empirical literature on personality development – including temperament, persons, and contexts, continuity and consequence, the special status of early adulthood – and explore their implications for theory and research in the moral character development literature. After noting the two traditions of social cognitive development, Lapsley and Hill attempt to explicate a possible developmental course for the social cognitive mechanisms that seem to underlie moral selfidentity, as well as prospects for future integrative research. In Chapter 9, Daniel Hart and Kyle Matsuba present a distinctive model which claims that the contours of moral identity are constrained not only by stable aspects of personality but also by characteristics of family and neighborhood, a view that aligns with the best insights of developmental contextualism. By invoking two constituent layers to moral personality – enduring “dispositional traits” and “characteristic adaptations” – the model shares some affinity with the “new Big Five” framework of McAdams, “but it emphasizes the importance of broader contextual influences as well.” Whereas moral identity includes self-awareness, a sense of self-integration, and continuity over time, a commitment to plans of action and an attachment to one’s moral goals, moral identity is also a joint product of personal and contextual factors. They review evidence of factors that lead to moral commitment, including relationships that draw adolescents into moral activities and protect against “moral collapse.” Community service is one such activity that promotes moral identity and civic engagement. The new Big Five framework is also put to good use by Lawrence Walker and Jeremy Frimer (Chapter 10) who examined adult brave and caring exemplars. Walker and Frimer assessed moral personality at the levels of dispositional traits, characteristic adaptations, and integrative self-narratives, along with moral reasoning. Overall, caring and brave exemplars were distinguished in their personality profiles, with strong differences (favoring caring exemplars) evident in nurturance, generativity, and optimistic affective tone. Moreover, the caring exemplars’ communal, generative, and affiliation/intimacy orientations were evident both at the levels of characteristic adaptations and in the life-story narratives. Differences between moral exemplars and nonexemplars were also examined and were best revealed, not so much at the level of dispositions and adaptations, but at the level of life-story narratives. Walker and Frimer identified a foundational core to the moral personality, which is characterized by (1) an orientation to agency and communion; (2) the tendency to reframe critical life events redemptively, that is, as leading to positive results; (3) the presence of mentors and helpers in early life; and (4) the quality of childhood attachments. Robert Emmons (Chapter 11) describes the rich yield that result from explicating the features of a particular virtue – gratitude – and the role it plays in motivating moral action. For Emmons, gratitude serves as a moral barometer that provides one with an affective readout, which accompanies the perception that another has treated one prosocially, as well as with a moral motive. Reviewing evidence of the “moral motive hypothesis,” Emmons shows that gratitude shapes prosocial responding, and that gratitude is a psychologically substantive experience, relevant to how people negotiate their moral and interpersonal lives. From gratitude we move on to the dispositional basis of altruism. Is there such a thing as the “altruistic personality”? Gustavo Carlo, Lisa PytlikZillig, Scott Roesch, and Richard Dienstbier (Chapter 12) think there is. After reviewing the empirical basis of their claim, they describe a study on those who volunteer others to help victims, reporting that those with greater altruism were more likely to volunteer themselves, especially when trait distress was high. Moreover, sex differences were found for those volunteering others. Men with high distress and high prosocial traits were more likely to send others to help whereas women with these traits were less likely to do so. Carlo and his colleagues conclude with some fertile suggestions for future research. In Chapter 13, Michal Pratt, Mary Louise Arnold, and Heather Lawford take up the relationship between prosocial moral identity and a sense of generativity in adulthood, using narrative strategies that build on McAdams’s life-narratives approach. They articulate a refreshing theoretical perspective that cuts across traditional developmental psychology, personality theory, and family studies, integrating life-course and systems perspectives. Following Erikson, they consider identity and morality to be mutually sustaining, and identity to be a central motivation throughout the life span. Pratt, Arnold, and Lawford present evidence for the early construction of generative moral themes during adolescence and emergent adulthood. These themes are revealed in the stories that adolescents tell about their lives and, in particular, in their account of their commitment to moral ideals. Hence the authors show the usefulness of tracing themes of identity through the lifespan, but also that of generativity. After considering the nature of gratitude (Chapter 11), altruism (Chapter 12), and generativity (Chapter 13), the volume next examines the problem of 8 Introduction integrity, personal responsibility, and moral identity. Barry Schlenker, Marisa Miller, and Ryan Johnson (Chapter 14) argue that what determines the strength of the relationship between moral beliefs and moral behavior is a person’s commitment to ethical ideologies. These ideologies function as a dominant schema that influences the appraisal of the social landscape and guides behavior. Some individuals have steadfast commitment to ethical ideologies (“integrity”), while others view the commitment as expedient and adaptable. The authors view the principled-expedient continuum because of its implications for moral identity, self-regulation, and moral behavior, and because it captures some of the great tensions in human affairs. Schlenker designed the Integrity Scale to measure steadfast commitment to ethical principles. Research using the scale indicates that integrity is accurately perceived by friends, is reflected in self-beliefs, affects social judgment, and predicts pro-social and anti-social activities. The authors conclude with an account of the “triangle model of responsibility,” which explains when and why the self-system becomes engaged in moral action (or disengages from undesirable behavior). Chapter 15, by Benoit Monin and Alex Jordan, takes up a social psychological account of the moral self. After challenging a self-consistency view of moral identity, the authors draw a distinction among three other possible meanings: moral identity as a normative ideal (a type of identity that has deeply integrated moral values and leads to an exemplary life); moral identity as a stable personality variable (how much one sees the self as a moral person); and moral identity as a dynamic and reflective self-image (a fluctuating sense of one’s morality at any given moment). As social psychologists, they focused on the third meaning. They argue that everyday situations and behaviors affect our moral self-regard from moment to moment, and that this fluctuating self-regard in turn affects later behavior. They review empirical evidence to show that that when people are made secure about their morality – in the sense that they have already demonstrated their “moral credentials” – they sometimes act less morally. They also find that people sometimes boost their moral self-image to compensate for failure in other domains. When the behavior of moral exemplars is seen as an indictment of other people’s choices, they are disliked rather than admired. Linda Skitka and Scott Morgan argue in Chapter 16 that a moral frame of mind can cut both ways as a “double-edged sword.” That is, the way that people’s moral concerns play out in everyday social interaction may not always have normatively virtuous implications. For example, stronger moral conviction about specific issues is associated with more intolerance of attitudinally dissimilar others in both intimate (e.g., that of a friend) Introduction 9 and distant (e.g., with the owner of a store one frequents) relationships; lower levels of goodwill and cooperativeness in attitudinally heterogeneous groups; and decreased ability to compromise on procedural solutions for conflict. People are also more likely to perceive vigilantism and other sacrifices of due process as fair when they achieve “moral” ends. This “doubleedged sword” of moral perception shows that what can be described from the mindset of the actor as moral is nonetheless condemned as immoral from the mindset of the observer. Although primarily associated with prosocial and positive consequences, people’s moral convictions, motives, and sentiments are sometimes associated with negative and antisocial consequences as well. As a result, the authors warn that efforts to increase the centrality of moral identity or of moral concerns could have paradoxical effects – and double-edged swords – that lead as much to negative as to positive consequences. A social cognitive theory of moral identity is endorsed in Chapter 17 by Karl Aquino and Dan Freeman. What is prized about this line of research is its application to a specific context, which is the ecology of business settings. For the authors, moral identity is a self-regulatory mechanism that motivates choices, behaviors, and responsiveness to others, to the extent that identification with morality is judged as highly self-important. Indeed, whether moral identity influences moral behavior hinges on its salience, that is to say, its self-importance. Moral identity is motivational to the extent that one desires to maintain self-consistency. However, the authors point out that the salience of moral identity can be influenced by situational factors, including financial incentives, group norms, and role models. These factors may increase or decrease the salience of moral identity within one’s working self-concept. Moral identity exerts greater regulatory control and motivational potency when situational factors elevate its salience. The authors review empirical evidence for the social-cognitive view of moral identity, along with certain moderators of moral identity, particularly as these apply to business settings. The volume’s final chapter (Chapter 18) is by Augusto Blasi, whose writings on moral self, identity, and personality are considered classic and foundational to the emerging discipline. In his chapter, Blasi seems to take a sharp turn from his usual emphasis on the moral self to an emphasis on the importance of reflective reasoning of the mature moral agent. He offers a masterful critique of the intuitionist shift in some areas of moral psychology, taking on in turn, Haidt (2001), Hauser (2006), and Gigerenzer (2008). Calling on evolutionary explanations, these theorists present rather fuzzy and unfalsifiable theories about the primacy of evolved heuristics 10 Introduction and intuitions in moral judgment, despite the fact that they admit intuitions often lead us astray. Blasi is critical of their dismissal of the reality and importance of reasoned reflection in the way we live our moral lives. In emphasizing the dominance of intuition and heuristics in moral judgment, not only do they ignore everyday moral functioning, they ignore the great number of studies conducted showing how reasoning and reflection are normal parts of adult lives. Blasi presents sample types of skills adults need for optimal functioning, and advocates a shift in emphasis in the field toward understanding mature adult functioning. The volume concludes with a brief reflection by the editors on some of the recurring themes and tensions that resonate throughout the volume, and with some ideas for an interdisciplinary field of moral personality studies. We thank the University of Notre Dame for its generous support for hosting the two symposia around which this volume was developed. We thank everyone who attended the symposia, and the volume contributors for their inestimable scholarship. We thank Eric Schwartz for his efforts in getting the project off the ground and Simina Calin for seeing it through to completion. The first editor thanks the Spencer Foundation for its support during the completion of this project. We hope this volume has a galvanizing impact on a new, integrative field of study.

The Moral Personality Dan P. McAdams

Going back to the ancient Hebrews and Greeks, Western writers have struggled to characterize morality and to define a moral life. Poets and storytellers have told moving tales of human virtue and evil, of how people have led moral lives or failed to live up to moral standards. Philosophers, theologians, and lawmakers have codified morality in terms of legal systems, moral imperatives, ethical standards, commandments, norms, rules, principles, and a vast array of codes and constructs designed to regulate, sanction, and affirm certain forms of human conduct. In the last 100 years, psychologists have gotten into the act. From William James to Lawrence Kohlberg, psychological theorists and researchers have proposed their own conceptions of moral life, typically couching their pronouncements in the language of science and backing up their claims with empirical data. Psychologists have invoked such terms as moral development, moral character, moral identity, moral schemas and values, altruism, cooperation, prosocial behavior, conscience, and the like. Until recently, however, few writers have explicitly discussed the prospects of a moral personality. Picking up the central theme in the current volume, this chapter makes a case for the viability of this new term and for the psychological and social complexity it brings to the fore. What is a moral personality? The question implicitly assumes an answer to a more general question: What is personality? The author of the first authoritative textbook on personality psychology – Gordon Allport (1937) – proposed 49 different definitions of personality before he settled on his own. Personality has been defined as a set of traits that assure individual continuity, as the motivated core of human behavior, as a self-regulating system designed to maximize adaptation to life’s challenges, and on and on. Shorn of its sexist language, Allport’s (1937) definition is still one of the best: Personality is “the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his [the individual’s] unique 1 adjustments to his environment” (p. 48). Like Allport’s, most definitions envision personality as a broad and integrative thing that accounts for continuity in human behavior over time and across situations, and that captures some of the uniqueness of an individual life (McAdams, 1997). In the early and middle decades of the twentieth century, personality psychologists proposed and formulated a large number of grand theories aimed at capturing the breadth of the concept. Spelled out in exhaustive detail in textbooks on personality theory (Hall & Lindzey, 1957), these diverse and more or less irreconcilable systems were grouped into those espousing psychoanalysis (e.g., Freud, Jung, Adler, Horney, Fromm, Sullivan), humanism (Rogers, Maslow, May), behaviorism and social learning (Rotter, Bandura), personology (Murray, McClelland, White), traits and types (Eysenck, Guilford, Cattell), developmental stages (Erikson, Loevinger), and cognitive schemas (Kelly, Mischel). Today the grand theories of personality are viewed mainly as historical set pieces. Contemporary perspectives on personality are typically much more limited, and more empirically grounded, than the grand theories ever were, as different researchers today carve out their own pieces of what Allport believed to be the “dynamic organization.” Nonetheless, the urge to synthesize disparate findings remains strong in personality psychology. To that end, a growing number of personality psychologists today are coming around to an integrative framework for the field of personality studies that conceives of personality itself in terms of five basic concepts (Hooker, 2002; McAdams, 1995, 2009; McAdams & Adler, 2006; McAdams & Pals, 2006; Roberts & Wood, 2006; Sheldon, 2004; Singer, 2005). In a broad synthesis drawn selectively from traditional theories and contemporary research trends, McAdams and Pals (2006) recently articulated this five-point framework for an integrative science of personality. They described personality as (1) an individual’s unique variation on the general evolutionary design for human nature, expressed as a developing pattern of (2) dispositional traits, (3) characteristic adaptations, and (4) self-defining life narratives, complexly and differentially situated in (5) culture and social context. From the standpoint of McAdams and Pals (2006), each human life is an individual variation on a general design whose functional significance makes primary sense in terms of the human environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA). Variations on a small set of broad dispositional traits implicated in social life (both today and in the EEA) constitute the most stable and recognizable aspect of psychological individuality (McCrae & Costa, 1997). Beyond dispositional traits, however, human lives vary with respect to a wide range of motivational (Emmons, 1986; Little, 1999), social-cognitive The Moral Personality 13 (Mischel & Shoda, 1995), and developmental (Elder, 1995; Erikson, 1963) adaptations, complexly contextualized in time, place, and/or social role. Beyond dispositional traits and characteristic adaptations, furthermore, human lives vary with respect to the integrative life stories, or personal narratives, that individuals construct to make meaning and identity in the modern world (McAdams, 1985, 2006, 2008; McLean, Pasupathi, & Pals, 2007; Sarbin, 1986; Tomkins, 1987). Culture exerts differential effects on different levels of personality: It exerts modest effects on the phenotypic expression of dispositional traits; it shows a stronger impact on the content and timing of characteristic adaptations; and it reveals its deepest and most profound influences on life stories, essentially providing a menu of themes, images, and plots for the psychosocial construction of narrative identity. What then is a moral personality? It depends on what aspect of personality you are talking about – be it dispositional traits, characteristic adaptations, or life stories.

Moral Personality at the Level of Dispositional Traits


Personality begins with traits. From birth onward, psychological individuality may be observed with respect to broad dimensions of behavioral and emotional style that cut across situations and contexts and readily distinguish one individual from another (Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005). Through repeated and complex transactions between genes and environments over developmental time, early temperament differences morph into the broad traits of personality that may be observed in adulthood, and that go by such names as “extraversion,” “dominance,” and the tendency toward “depressiveness.” Typically assessed via self-report scales, dispositional traits account for broad consistencies in behavior across situations and over time. A considerable body of research speaks to the longitudinal continuity of dispositional traits, their substantial heritability, and their ability to predict important life outcomes, such as psychological well-being, job success, and mortality (McAdams, 2009; Ozer & Benet-Martinez, 2006; Roberts & Pomerantz, 2004). Decades of factor-analytic studies conducted around the world suggest, furthermore, that the broad universe of trait dimensions may be organized into about five regions or clusters, now routinely called the Big Five (Goldberg, 1993; McCrae & Costa, 1997). The most well-known conception of the Big Five divides traits into the categories of extraversion (vs. introversion), neuroticism (vs. emotional stability), conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience. 14 Dan P. McAdams The Big Five traits capture broad variations in human social behavior that human beings have evolved to take note of and to care about. It is not so much, then, that evolutionary forces have shaped levels of the Big Five traits (although this, in principle, could be true as well), as it is the fact that humans have evolved to note variations in these kinds of traits, for these variations have important bearing on adaptation to group life. As cognitively gifted and exquisitely social animals, living in groups and striving to get along and get ahead in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, human beings have been designed by natural selection to detect differences in others with respect to such qualities as how sociable and dominant a person is (extraversion), the extent to which a person is caring and cooperative (agreeableness), a person’s characteristic level of dependability and industriousness (conscientiousness), levels of emotional stability and dysfunction in other people (neuroticism), and the extent to which a person may be cognitively flexible or rigid in facing a range of adaptive problems (openness to experience) (Buss, 1996; Hogan, 1982). For human beings, relative success in meeting a wide range of adaptive problems – from raising viable progeny to building effective coalitions – may depend, in part, on the accurate perception and judicious assessment of such qualities of mind as dominance, friendliness, honesty, stability, and openness. Factor-analytic studies of trait ratings in societies the world over suggest that the Big Five structure, or something very close to it, emerges in many different cultures and language traditions (Church, 2000). The reason is clear: The Big Five implicitly encodes those broad and pervasive individual differences in personality that have tended to make a big difference in adaptation to group life over the course of human evolution, as they continue to make a difference today. For human beings (and for certain other primates, too), group life is moral life (de Waal, 1996). Human beings have evolved to be moral animals, to detect cheating and other breaches of moral standards, to uphold codes of moral conduct, and to react with righteous indignation, and even murderous intent, when those codes are violated (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Wright, 1994). Considerations of morality infuse social life. Human beings have evolved to express strong moral feelings, to hold deep moral intuitions, and to develop elaborate moral codes with respect to at least five domains of social life, argues Haidt (2007): (1) harm and suffering, (2) reciprocity and fair exchange, (3) authority and the hierarchical structure of groups, (4) loyalty and commitment to others, and (5) sacredness/ purity. It should not be surprising to learn, therefore, that the five basic traits identified by personality psychologists carry considerable moral meaning. The Moral Personality 15 For example, agreeableness speaks to caring and altruistic tendencies, and the opposite qualities of mean-spiritedness, callousness, and cruelty. People high in agreeableness may be more sensitive to the suffering of others, may be more positively disposed toward fairness and reciprocity, and may prove more loyal to others with whom they feel close bonds (Matsuba & Walker, 2004). Conscientiousness encompasses qualities such as honesty and dependability in interpersonal relationships. A recent meta-analysis shows that adults who are high on the trait of conscientiousness tend to invest more heavily in family and work roles, tend to be more religiously observant, and tend to be more involved in prosocial volunteer activities, compared to individuals low in conscientiousness (Lodi-Smith & Roberts, 2007). Low levels of conscientiousness predict a wide range of outcomes that carry negative moral meaning – from substance abuse to dishonesty in the workplace (Bogg & Roberts, 2004; Roberts & Hogan, 2001). Adult conscientiousness may be the end result of a long and complex developmental course through which early-childhood temperament dimensions, such as conscience (Kochanska & Aksan, 2006) and effortful control (Li-Grinning, 2007), combine with propitious environmental experiences to produce a well-socialized, rule-abiding, hardworking, and civically minded adult. The personality trait that may be most closely associated with moral reasoning and thought is openness to experience. People who are dispositionally high on openness tend to be highly imaginative, reflective, intellectual, and broadminded. They welcome change and complexity in life, and they show high levels of tolerance for ambiguity. By contrast, individuals lower in openness tend to be more concrete, dogmatic, and traditional. Openness tends to be positively associated with both education level and intelligence. Individuals high in openness to experience tend to score higher on Loevinger’s (1976) ego development (McCrae & Costa, 1980), which itself is closely associated with Kohlberg’s (1969) stages of moral reasoning. Therefore, high openness tends to predict postconventional moral reasoning in adults; low openness is associated with conventional and preconventional moral reasoning. Extremely low scores on openness, furthermore, tend to predict right-wing authoritarianism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). A large empirical literature links authoritarianism to rigidity and intolerance in the moral and political realms, and to racism, sexism, and prejudice against outgroups (Altemeyer, 1996). In sum, a number of broad dispositional traits appear to have implications for the moral personality. Certain dispositional profiles – high conscientiousness and agreeableness, and at least moderately high openness to 16 Dan P. McAdams experience – tend to be associated with patterns of behavior and thought indicative of high moral functioning. Most generally, conscientiousness and agreeableness tend to predict pro-social behavior whereas openness to experience tends to predict principled moral reasoning. These general tendencies begin to sketch a dispositional outline of the moral personality. But a more detailed portrait requires the move to more subtle and contextualized aspects of personality. Dispositional traits can take us only so far in understanding how personality relates to morality. To articulate a more nuanced understanding, one must move from the dispositional sketch provided by personality traits to a second level of personality.

Characteristic Adaptations: Moral Goals and Schemas

From middle childhood onward, human beings build a second layer of personality upon the dispositional base, even as that base continues to develop thereafter. Residing at the second level are characteristic adaptations – a wide assortment of motivational, social-cognitive, and developmental constructs that are more specific than dispositional traits and that are contextualized in time, place, and/or social role (McAdams, 2009; McAdams & Pals, 2006). Included in this list are motives, goals, strivings, personal projects, values, interests, defense mechanisms, coping strategies, relational schemata, possible selves, developmental concerns, and other variables of psychological individuality that speak directly to what people want and do not want (e.g., fear) in life and how they think about and go about getting what they want and avoiding what they do not want in particular situations, during particular times in their lives, and with respect to particular social roles. Characteristic adaptations have typically been the constructs of choice for classic motivational (Deci & Ryan, 1991; Murray, 1938/2008), social-cognitive (Cervone & Shoda, 1999; Mischel & Shoda, 1995), and developmental (Erikson, 1963; Loevinger, 1976) theories of personality. Whereas broad personality traits provide a dispositional sketch for psychological individuality, characteristic adaptations fill in many of the details. Among those characteristic adaptations that are most instrumental in shaping morality are personal goals and projects (Freund & Riediger, 2006; Little, 1999). Goals and projects are always about the future – the imagined ends for tomorrow that guide behavior today. Research has shown that personal goals focused on caring for others and making positive contributions to society in the future are often associated with greater psychological well-being and reports of higher life meaning (Bauer & McAdams, The Moral Personality 17 2004; Emmons, 1999; Kasser & Ryan, 1996). Findings like these suggest that certain features of a moral personality benefit not only others, but also the self. As situations change, as people grow older, as individuals move from one social role to the next, goals and projects change to meet new demands and constraints. For example, as people move into their thirties, forties and beyond, their goals may reflect the greater developmental urgency of what Erikson (1963) called generativity. Generativity is an adult’s concern for, or commitment to, promoting the well-being of future generations, as evidenced in parenting, teaching, mentoring, leadership, and engaging in a wide range of activities aimed at leaving a positive legacy of the self for the future (McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992). Erikson viewed generativity in highly moral terms (Browning, 2004; Wakefield, 1998). In their midlife years, adults face the moral challenge of providing care for the next generation and of contributing to the social good in ways that are congruent with and supportive of culture. Their efforts to do so may be bolstered or undermined by economic and psychological exigencies, by religious and political factors, and by the extent to which an adult is able to summon forth what Erikson (1963, p. 267) felicitously described as a “belief in the species” – a fundamental faith in the goodness and worthwhileness of the human enterprise. Generative goals and inclinations wax and wane over the adult life course, as the social ecology of life changes to meet new developmental demands and the unpredictable contingencies of everyday life. At any given time, however, personalities can be compared and contrasted in terms of the extent to which generative goals and generative concerns predominate. A growing body of research shows that individual differences in generative goals and concerns predict a wide range of behaviors that have moral significance. For midlife adults, high scores on measures of generativity are positively associated with greater levels of involvement in children’s education, patterns of parenting emphasizing both warmth and discipline, sustained efforts to pass on wisdom to the next generation, involvement in religious organizations, political participation, and volunteer work aimed at helping the poor (for reviews, see de St. Aubin, McAdams, & Kim, 2004; McAdams, 2001). Another set of characteristic adaptations that bear directly on moral personality are value-laden cognitive schemas and personal ideologies. What are people’s most cherished beliefs and values about what is good and true? How do they think through issues of morality in everyday life? Research in this domain ranges widely, from examinations of normative and humanistic ideological scripts (de St. Aubin, 1996, 1999) to the classic 18 Dan P. McAdams studies of moral reasoning pioneered by Kohlberg (1969) and his associates. Examples of the former prioritize the content of people’s moral beliefs and values, whereas the latter examine the structure of moral reasoning itself. A related line of research examines the extent to which moral schemas are activated in daily life. Individuals for whom knowledge structures linked to morality are quickly and consistently activated show high levels of moral chronicity (Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006). Compared to low moral chronics, these individuals may have greater access to moral schemas and may use those schemas more frequently as guides for processing social information. Representing different approaches to conceptualizing cognitive schemas about morality, personal ideologies, stages of moral reasoning, and levels of moral chronicity are integral components of the moral personality – as important to personality itself as are the fundamental Big Five traits. What makes them different from traits is their circumscribed and contextual nature. Whereas dispositional traits of conscientiousness and agreeableness describe cross-situational and longitudinal continuities in broad patterns of behavior, thought, and feeling, the more circumscribed constructs at Level 2 in personality – moral goals, moral schemas – speak to the contextualized details of personal morality. Whereas dispositional traits may show impressive continuity over time, the contextualized details of personal morality are likely to show much greater variability and sensitivity to developmental and social contingencies. Generative goals, for example, may prove to be important features of the moral personality during certain periods of life (e.g., midlife) but not during others; stages of moral reasoning may shape how people think about certain issues in life (e.g., fairness, justice) but not others; moral chronics have greater access to knowledge structures about morality but not to other kinds of knowledge structures. A broad accounting of moral personality requires, at minimum, the dispositional sketch and the contextualized details. But even that is not quite enough.

The Life Narrative as a Moral Construction

Late adolescence and young adulthood bring to the fore of personality the psychological problem of establishing an identity (Erikson, 1963; McAdams, 1985). In his theory of psychosocial development, Erikson viewed identity to be a special arrangement of the self. The arrangement functions to integrate disparate roles, goals, needs, fears, skills, and inclinations into a coherent pattern, a pattern that specifies how the emerging adult will live, love, work, and believe in a complex and changing world. The virtue of the identity stage is fidelity, Erikson maintained. One must show fidelity to a particular arrangement of selfhood. One must commit oneself to a particular kind of meaningful life. At the very heart of identity, then, is the problem of meaning and purpose in life (McAdams, 1985). What does my life mean in full? Who am I today? How am I different today from what I was in my past? Who will I be in the future? These large questions regarding the meaning of one’s life in full developmental time – past, present, and future – cannot be fully answered through dispositional traits and characteristic adaptations. Instead, they require a story of who I am, was, and will be. One way to read Erikson’s idea of identity is to see it as an internalized and evolving story of the self that people begin to construct in the emerging adult years (Habermas & Bluck, 2000; McAdams, 1985). Beyond dispositional traits and characteristic adaptations, then, lies the realm of narrative identity. Layered over the Big Five traits and the panoply of goals, motives, projects, fears, strategies, values, beliefs, and schemas that comprise the first two levels of personality is an emerging narrative identity – an internalized and evolving story of the reconstructed past and imagined future that aims to provide life with unity, coherence, and purpose. For both the self and others, the life story explains how I came to be, who I am today, where I am going in the future, and what I believe my life means within the psychosocial niche provided by family, friends, work, society, and the cultural and ideological resources of my environment. It is a story that distinguishes me from all others, and yet shows how I am connected to others as well. It is a story that narrates the evolution of a particular self, but it is a self in cultural context. Every life story says as much about the culture within which a person lives as it does about the person living it. In constructing a life story, people choose from the menu of images, themes, plots, and characters provided by the particular environments to which they are exposed (McAdams, 2006; Rosenwald & Ochberg, 1992). They make meaning within the milieu of meanings provided by culture. What prompts the emergence of narrative identity in late adolescence and young adulthood? Cognitive factors are surely important. With the advent of what Piaget called formal operational thought, adolescents are now able to take their own lives as objects of systematic reflection (Breger, 1974; McAdams, 1985). Whereas young children can dream about what might someday be, adolescents can think through the possibilities in a hypothetico-deductive manner. They can now ask themselves questions such as: What is my life really about? Who might I be in the future? What if I decide to reject my parents’ religion? What would it mean to live a good life? This newfound philosophical inclination requires a narrative frame for 20 Dan P. McAdams self-construction. The earliest drafts of narrative identity may take the form of what Elkind (1981) called the personal fable – fantastical stories of the self ’s greatness. But later drafts become more realistic and tempered, as reality testing improves and narrative skills become further refined. Habermas and Bluck (2000) have shown how adolescents gradually master the cognitive skills required for constructing a coherent narrative of the self. By the end of their teenaged years, they regularly engage in sophisticated forms of autobiographical reasoning. They can link together multiple autobiographical scenes in causal sequences to explain what they believe to be their own development in a given area of life. And they can extract underlying themes that they believe characterize unique aspects of their lives in full. Social and cultural factors also help to bring narrative identity to the developmental fore at this time. Their peers and their parents expect adolescents to begin sorting out what their lives mean, both for the future and the past. Given what I have done up to this point in my life, where do I go now? What kind of life should I make for myself? Paralleling the cognitive and emotional changes taking place within the individual are shifts in society’s expectations about what the individual, who was a child but who is now almost an adult, should be doing, thinking, and feeling. Erikson (1959) wrote, “It is of great relevance to the young individual’s identity formation that he be responded to, and be given function and status as a person whose gradual growth and transformation make sense to those who begin to make sense to him” (p. 111). In general, modern societies expect their adolescents and young adults to examine occupational, ideological, and interpersonal opportunities around them and to begin to make some decisions about what their lives as adults are to be about. This is to say that both society and the emerging adult are ready for his or her explorations in narrative identity by the time he or she has, in fact, become an emerging adult. As Erikson described it: The period can be viewed as a psychosocial moratorium during which the individual through free role experimentation may find a niche in some section of his society, a niche which is firmly defined and yet seems to be uniquely made for him. In finding it the young adult gains an assured sense of inner continuity and social sameness which will bridge what he was as a child and what he is about to become, and will reconcile his conception of himself and his community’s recognition of him. (Erikson, 1959, p. 111) Moral meanings run through life narratives. MacIntyre (1981) has argued that all life stories speak from a moral perspective. Either explicitly or implicitly, the narrator takes a moral stand vis-à-vis the self and society, The Moral Personality 21 draws on moral understandings which frame the narrative, and justifies or condemns his or her own identity tale in moral terms. Furthermore, in any given culture some stories exhibit greater moral cachet than do others. For example, Cobly and Damon (1992) describe how men and women nominated as moral exemplars construct their own lives as tales of steadfast commitment to ideals and the progressive enlargement of one’s moral mission over time. Walker and Frimer (2007) compared life-narrative accounts of Canadian adults awarded honors for either bravery or a lifetime of caring commitment, and they contrasted the accounts with the life stories of a matched control sample. Among their many informative findings, Walker and Frimer showed that the stories of brave and caring exemplars tended to underscore secure attachment experiences and the transformation of negative events into positive outcomes, to a greater degree than did the stories told by the matched controls. Finding positive meanings in negative events is the central theme that runs through McAdams’s (2006) conception of the redemptive self. In a series of nomothetic and idiographic studies conducted over the past 15 years, McAdams and colleagues have consistently found that midlife American adults who score especially high on self-report measures of generativity – suggesting a strong commitment to promoting the well-being of future generations and improving the world in which they live (Erikson, 1963) – tend to see their own lives as narratives of redemption (Mansfield & McAdams, 1996; McAdams & Bowman, 2001; McAdams, Diamond, de St. Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997; McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001). Compared to their less generative American counterparts, highly generative adults tend to construct life stories that feature redemption sequences, in which the protagonist is delivered from suffering to an enhanced status or state. In addition, highly generative American adults are more likely than their less generative peers to construct life stories in which the protagonist (a) enjoys a special advantage or blessing early in life; (b) expresses sensitivity to the suffering of others or societal injustice as a child; (c) establishes a clear and strong moral value system in adolescence that remains a source of unwavering conviction through the adult years; (d) experiences significant conflicts between desires for agency/power and desires for communion/love; and (e) looks to achieve goals to benefit society in the future. Taken together, these themes articulate a general script or narrative prototype that many highly generative American adults employ to make sense of their own lives. For highly productive and caring midlife American adults, the redemptive self is a narrative model of an especially good and morally enhanced life. 22 Dan P. McAdams The redemptive self is a life-story prototype that serves to support the efforts of midlife men and women to make a positive contribution to society. Their redemptive life narratives tell how generative adults seek to give back to society in gratitude for the early advantages and blessings they feel they have received. In every life, generativity is tough and frustrating work, as every parent or community volunteer knows. But if an adult constructs a narrative identity in which the protagonist’s suffering in the short run often gives way to reward later on, he or she may be better able to sustain the conviction that seemingly thankless investments today will pay off for future generations. Redemptive life stories support the kind of life strivings that a highly caring man or woman, deeply committed to moral principles, is likely to set forth. At the same time, the redemptive self may say as much about American culture and tradition as it does about the highly generative American adults who tend to tell this kind of story about their lives. McAdams (2006) argued that the life-story themes expressed by highly generative American adults recapture and couch in a psychological language especially cherished, as well as hotly contested, ideas in American cultural history – ideas that appear prominently in spiritual accounts of the seventeenth-century Puritans, Benjamin Franklin’s eighteenth-century autobiography, slave narratives and Horatio Alger stories from the nineteenth century, and the literature of self-help and American entrepreneurship from more recent times. Evolving from the Puritans to Emerson to Oprah, the redemptive self has morphed into many different storied forms in the past 300 years, as Americans have sought to narrate their lives as redemptive tales of atonement, emancipation, recovery, self-fulfillment, and upward social mobility. The stories speak of heroic individual protagonists – the chosen people – whose manifest destiny is to make a positive difference in a dangerous world, even when the world does not wish to be redeemed. The stories translate a deep and abiding script of American exceptionalism into the many contemporary narratives of success, recovery, development, liberation, and self-actualization that so pervade American talk, talk shows, therapy sessions, sermons, and commencement speeches. It is as if especially generative American adults, whose lives are dedicated to making the world a better place for future generations, are, for better and sometimes for worse, the most ardent narrators of a general life-story script as American as apple pie and the Super Bowl. In their most recent studies, McAdams and colleagues have noted moral and political variations on the redemptive self as constructed by highly generative American Christians in their midlife years (McAdams, Albaugh, Farber, Daniels, Logan, & Olson, 2008). Most of the 128 men and women The Moral Personality 23 in this study believed they were leading exemplary moral lives. As a whole, the participants showed remarkably high engagement in pro-social behavior, charitable donations, volunteer work, and the like. Almost all of the participants, furthermore, were politically informed and regularly voted in municipal and state elections. Important variations in narrative identity appeared, however, with respect to political affiliation. In their selfnarrations, Christian conservatives tended to underscore the moral values of respect for authority, commitment and loyalty, and the sacredness of the self (Haidt, 2007) to a much greater extent than did liberals. They also constructed self-defining scenes in their life stories that highlighted what Lakoff (2002) described as a strict-father morality – emphasizing societal rules and self-discipline. By contrast, Christian liberals tended to underscore the moral values of preventing harm and promoting fairness or reciprocity, and their salient life-story scenes tended to emphasize what Lakoff (2002) called a nurturant caregiver morality, highlighting autobiographical episodes in which characters showed care toward others and expressed openness and empathy. Both the Christian conservatives and Christian liberals narrated their moral lives in redemptive terms. Their redemptive life stories served to buttress their moral commitments and sustain their efforts to make positive contributions to their families, neighborhoods, churches, and society. But their stories reflected somewhat different moral agendas and different plots and guiding metaphors for what ultimately constitutes a good life. Conclusion Personality is an individual’s unique variation on the general evolutionary design for human nature, expressed as a complex pattern of dispositional traits, characteristic adaptations, and self-defining life stories, situated in culture. By extension, a moral personality would consist of those traits, adaptations, and stories that best support and sustain a moral life in culture. What constitutes a moral life itself surely varies from one culture to the next, but certain common features – such as commitment to alleviating suffering, assuring fairness and reciprocity, respecting legitimate authority, manifesting loyalty and commitment to the common good, and valuing sacredness and purity (Haidt, 2007) – may be discerned across a wide range of cultures. Personality research suggests that, at Level 1 of personality, dispositional traits linked to conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience have strong moral implications. High scores on conscientiousness and agreeableness have been linked to pro-social behavior, commitment 2 4 Dan P. McAdams to societal institutions, honesty, integrity, and fewer instances of violating moral norms. At least moderately high levels of openness to experience appear to be a prerequisite for valuing tolerance and diversity in society, for understanding multiple perspectives, and for principled moral reasoning. Of course, high scores on these traits do not guarantee these behavioral correlates for every case; empirical findings in psychology are almost always probabilistic. But all other things being equal, high levels of conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience lay the foundation for a moral personality. At Level 2, the moral personality may be expressed through the characteristic adaptations that situate psychological individuality in time, place, and social role. Moral goals and schemas flesh out the details of the moral life. They spell out what moral aims people are trying to accomplish in their lives, how they take on moral roles in families and societies, what values they emphasize in pursuing moral ends, and how they think about moral dilemmas and choices in life. Unlike dispositional traits, moral goals and schemas show substantial change over time and across contexts, and they are often closely connected to developmental concerns. Among midlife adults, for example, goals and concerns linked to generativity have been shown to predict a wide range of morally significant behaviors, from conscientious parenting to civic engagement. Moral schemas are expressed in a wide range of forms, from personal ideologies (content) to stages of moral reasoning (structure). Layered on top of traits and adaptations are the internalized and evolving stories people live by. At Level 3 of personality, people construct integrative life narratives to provide their lives with some measure of unity, purpose, and meaning. Narrative identities are profoundly shaped by culture. Culture provides a menu of images, metaphors, plots, characters, and envisioned endings for the narrative construction of the self. In late adolescence and early adulthood, people living in modern societies begin to put their lives together into self-defining stories, reconstructing the past and imagining the future in terms of a sensible and culturally valued narrative with beginning, middle, and end. Different kinds of life stories reflect different moral agendas. In American society, especially generative adults – those committed to promoting the well-being of future generations – tend to construct redemptive stories for their lives. Appropriating culturally cherished (and contested) narratives of atonement, upward mobility, recovery, and liberation in American culture and heritage, highly generative American adults repeatedly narrate the movement from suffering to enhancement in their life stories. Their narratives conceive of the moral life as a personal The Moral Personality 25 quest in which a gifted protagonist, equipped with moral steadfastness, journeys forth into a dangerous world, overcomes adversity, and ultimately gives back to society in gratitude for the blessings he or she has received. Constructing a redemptive narrative identity may support and reinforce a moral life for many American adults committed to making a positive difference in the world. The redemptive self, then, is a particular kind of narrative identity that provides the psychological resources that many Americans who aspire to live a morally exemplary life feel they need in order to live such a life. But there are many ways to live a moral life, and many stories that might be told about it. Redemptive life narratives of the sort documented by McAdams (2006) illustrate one particularly powerful narrative form for living a good life in American society. But many Americans who believe they are living morally exemplary lives may reject this story as not true to their own lived experience – there are always exceptions to the narrative norms a culture provides. And it is quite likely that the life stories of moral exemplars in other societies do not resemble the redemptive self. At the end of the day, Level 3 in personality owes its very existence and constituents to the cultural menu for life narratives available to people living in a particular time and place. Culture provides a range of possibilities for life-story construction, and each culture provides its own characteristic range. It is, therefore, at the level of life narrative where the moral personality may show its greatest variation and cultural nuance. Certain basic traits – agreeableness and conscientiousness, for example – may provide a dispositional foundation for the moral personality. But what gets built upon that foundation may follow the architectural guidelines specified within a given moral community and culture.