Roma Identity and Ethnic Mobilisation
in Central European Politics
Paper prepared for the workshop on identity politics
ECPR joint sessions
Grenoble, 6-11 April 2001
Introduction
To what extent does the process of political mobilisation have an impact upon a minority’s
conceptions of ethnic identity? In many descriptions of ethnic politics and ethnic conflict
authors tend to apply the term ‘ethnic identity’ as a stable and ‘natural’ source of political
identification. They tend to treat the ethnic group as an unchanging entity and perceive ethnic
identity as a group characteristic that pre-exists political action. In particular with regard to the
developments in central and eastern Europe since the end of the 1980s ‘ethnicity’ has
increasingly come to serve as a way of explaining political conflict (Taylor 1996 : 889). But the
question of how conceptions of ethnic identity are actually produced and contested within an
ethnic movement and to what extent they are subject to constraint and facilitation rarely reaches
the research agenda.
This seems somewhat at odds with social constructivist approaches to identity in
contemporary social movement research (e.g. Calhoun 1991). There it has been emphasised
that identity should be regarded as the changing product of a social process through which
membership criteria are constantly re-elaborated. Group identity, it is argued there, is produced
and continuously re-defined by the process of collective action itself (della Porta and Diani
1999 : 87). Likewise, in social anthropology the notion of ethnic identity has been
problematised. A widely discussed text by Barth (1969), for example, defined ethnic identity in
terms of social boundary: the ethnic group is produced through social interaction by a practice
of self and hetero-ascription and is not an entity with permanent cultural characteristics (see
also Roosens 1998; Jenkins 1997). Moreover, in a more recent article Barth (1994) has
suggested that the creation of ethnicity not only takes place on the interpersonal level, but is
also deeply influenced by collective action (median level) and state policies (macro level).
In this paper I intend to examine the construction of a specific ethnic identity (‘Roma’
identity) within the context of political mobilisation in central Europe (CE). In order to do this I
will focus on discourses of Roma identity, i.e. on the way in which various political actors have
attributed meaning to the idea of Roma identity. By centring on the formulations of ethnic
identity, this research avoids the question ‘what is ethnic (Roma) identity’ but rather focuses on
the process of how this ethnic identity functions as a cognitive frame for political mobilisation
in a given political context.
For a number of reasons the Roma minority in CE provides an interesting case. First of
all, through the activities of ethnically-based interest organisations the Roma have since 1989
engaged in a process of political mobilisation against oppression and marginalisation. This has
been a remarkable development, because it is now for the first time that on such a wide
geographical scale a variety of stigmatised communities apply the concept of ‘Roma identity’,
seeking to capture the attention of both domestic and international politicians and media. Their
case offers thus the opportunity to look at a recently emerged ethnic movement in a specific
political situation (post-communism). Furthermore, among Roma activists and in scholarly
literature about Roma and comparable groups, the definition or even the idea of Roma identity
is intensely debated (e.g. Fraser 2000; Gheorghe 1997; Lucassen et al 1998). These discussions
may theoretically offer movement actors various possibilities to perceive or shape their ‘project
identities’. Moreover, the Roma offer an interesting perspective into the way in which
international context has affected domestic identity formation in CE. Specifically in the
framework of the EU enlargement process, this case provides us with the opportunity to
compare the impact of international attention across different countries.
This paper consists of three parts. The first part describes the historical background of
the emergence of Roma political activism in the 1990s in post-communist CE, concretely in the
Czech and Slovak Republics. The overview also includes a brief explanation of why exactly
these two countries were selected for my field research. In the second part of the paper the
concept of ‘framing processes’ (e.g. Benford and Snow 2000) is introduced as an analytical tool
to interpret the various descriptions of Roma identity in the sources. The data which form the
basis of the research consist mainly of summaries and transcripts of interviews with
representatives of the Czech and Slovak ‘Roma elite’ (31) conducted during three months of
field research in 2000. The data also include policy documents about the Roma produced by
governmental bodies and a collection of statements and speeches by politicians in power. Third,
the paper explores similarities and differences in the various actors’ descriptions of Roma
identity as a mobilising or countermobilising frame. It will specifically focus on whether
competing formulations of Roma identity by Roma actors can be linked to the political
opportunities that are presented by the political environment. To conclude, the paper shortly
dwells on the question of which consequences crucial framing disputes within the movement
and counterframings by agencies in power may have for the resonance of Roma identity as a
successful basis for collective action.
The Roma Movement in the Czech and Slovak republics
Although far from being exclusively a post-1989 phenomenon, the Roma movement has known
a rapid and spectacular development after the fall of communism in CE. Since the beginning of
the 1990s the number of Roma associations and Roma political parties continuously increased.1
But not only the impressive organisational growth is indicative. During the last decade Roma
activists and emerging Roma political elites across several European countries more clearly
than ever before attempted to promote new ideas about Roma ethnicity. They also tried to
enhance the political participation of their constituencies and aspired to influence national
policy making on minorities. Gheorghe and Mirga (1998) call it an ‘ethnic awakening’ and a
rise of ‘Roma ethnonationalism’, which they describe as a ‘transition [of a social group] toward
an ethnically mobilised group, having a common stance and interest’.
Puxon (2000: 94) argues that with the end of communism ‘[the] shocking increase in
anti-Gypsy violence and racial intolerance, evident throughout Europe, has begun to politicise
and unite a new generation to a degree not seen before.’ It is no doubt true that deteriorating
social conditions and the increase of anti-Roma behaviour in post-communist societies have
coincided with the increase of Roma movement activities. But reality is perhaps too much
reduced when anti-Roma violence is perceived as the only factor leading to the emergence of
the Roma movement.
Another part of the explanation presumably lies in the circumstances of the post-1989
period which offered Roma individuals unprecedented opportunities to establish interest
organisations. First of all, being able to build alliances with dissident organisations they gained support from the new elite. In Czechoslovakia, for example, Roma played an active part in the
anticommunist movement and joined the coalition parties that overwhelmingly won the first
democratic elections2
. Later, their ethnic claims received symbolic support from international
and domestic human rights organisations.3 Central European states were particularly sensitive
to the discourse of human rights norms because they realised this was becoming a key issue
pertaining to their standing in the international community (especially vis-à-vis the EU).
Furthermore, the new political environment of post-communism, which saw the emergence of
ethnically more homogeneous states, apparently functioned as a breeding ground for
ethnopolitical mobilisation in general. Ethnic cleavages gave rise to political party formation
and mainstream political parties started in some cases to voice certain claims in
ethnic-particularistic terms to buttress a general process of nation-building. Consequently, it is
not surprising that ethnic minorities such as the Roma, many of them being losers of the
political and economic transition, began to emphasise a sense of collective political identity.
They started to lodge complaints explicitly in the name of the ethnic group and urged upon their
governments the need for new policy initiatives to tackle the socio-economic marginalisation of
their communities and to eradicate anti-Roma racism.
One of the striking aspects, however, is that the term ‘Roma’ has been constructed and
promoted to encompass a variety of communal based identities across different countries. In the
Czech and Slovak Republics, for example, descriptions suggest that there are various
self-designations in use (e.g. Servika, Romungro, Vlach, Sinti) on the basis of markers like
language or traditions. The semantic relationship between such labels is complex
(Hübschmannová 1999). In sum, the word ‘Roma’ (meaning ‘human being’ in Romanes) is
certainly not a generalising self-appellation (as the word ‘gypsy’ is a generalising external
appellation – a so-called exonym).
The usage of the word ‘Roma’ as a political overarching name was first advocated by
interest organisations in Western Europe at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s.
Activists from different countries started to adjust their claims to each other and agreed in 1971
on a common platform called the World Roma Congress (WRC) that was aimed inter alia at
changing dominant thinking about the people these activists wanted to represent. The first
WRC later served as a direct inspiration for the goal orientation of international mobilising
structures like the International Roma Union (IRU) and the Roma National Congress (RNC).
One of the ideas which was kept from the 1970s was the replacement of negative sounding
terms like ‘gypsies’ or ‘tsiganes’ with ‘Roma’. The dissemination of the ‘new’ ethnic label (and
the eradication of ‘old’ social designations) was considered especially necessary with regard to
the pragmatics of the words for ‘gypsy’ in the central European languages (e.g. ‘cikán’ in
Czech, ‘cygan’ in Slovak and ‘cigány’ in Hungarian): unlike the English word ‘gypsy’ or the
Dutch word ‘zigeuner’ these names were invariably used in a derogatory way (Leudar and Nekvapil 2000: 489; Stewart 1997: 113)4
. Focusing on this aspect, one could say that as of the
1970s Roma movement organisations have been actively engaged in triggering a process of
‘ethnogenesis’ – a process which has gained momentum after the fall of communism.
The Czech Republic and Slovakia serve as two very instructive cases. Both countries
witnessed the rapid emergence of a Roma movement within a post-communist setting. The
movement consisted of informal elements, like communal-based protests or personal networks
among activists. But from the early 1990s onwards there was also an upsurge of various sorts of
formal movement elements. These included not only organisations that directly mobilised their
constituency for collective action, but also a broad assortment of supportive organisations (like
human rights organisations), ‘self-help’ organisations that addressed certain direct needs of the
constituency, and even Roma political parties. A number of Roma politicians also tried to
achieve political representation through their involvement in mainstream political parties.
However, throughout the 1990s the Roma movement has continuously struggled with
obstacles hindering mass mobilisation. Especially in the isolated settlements in Eastern
Slovakia, but also in other areas it proved difficult to find movement supporters and ethnic
voters. After the elections of 1992, when the anticommunist alliance had splintered, Roma
political representation on national level disappeared almost completely5
. Roma elites became
increasingly articulate, but the gap between them and their constituencies in many cases proved
to be unbridgeable. The elites were simply not known among local communities or their
legitimacy as representatives was severely contested.
The Czech and Slovak Roma elites have also grappled with the reluctance of many
Roma to identify themselves as Roma in the public sphere. This is well illustrated by the
discussion surrounding the 1991 census. The official 1991 census figure for the Roma
population was 80,627 (1.5 per cent) in the Slovak and 32,903 (0.3 per cent) in the Czech part –
this being the result of the first census in which the Roma of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic
(ČSFR) obtained the right to proclaim themselves as a distinct national minority. However,
both the Czech and Slovak government have admitted that the actual rate of people who
identify themselves as Roma in daily life must be substantially higher (Vláda ČR 1999a; Slovak
Government 1999). Independent researchers and Roma organisations claim that the Roma in
fact account for around 7 to 8 per cent (up to 500,000) of the Slovak citizens and around 3 per
cent (up to 250,000) of the Czech citizens (Liégeois 1994: 34; Druker 1997: 22-23; Kenrick
1998: 187).
Low official rates of Roma identification do not necessarily indicate, as some authors
have suggested, a ‘low level of ethnic awareness’ among Roma (Plichtová 1993:17). Other
authors for example, have explained this by referring to bureaucratic irregularities during the
official registration (Druker 1998) or the lack of will on the part of the Roma to register as
‘Roma’ in fear of some kind of reprisal (Clarck 1998). Guy (1998: 35) has also pointed out the
possible impact of historical experience. Administrators in communist times were prone to
describe the Roma as a social rather than an ethnic group as this gave them a freer hand with implementing policies of assimilation. As a consequence of the historical tendency of the
authorities to avoid the word ‘gypsy’ and to deny Roma nationality, it is plausible that
administrators during the first census implicitly discouraged people to identify themselves
officially as Roma. Although it is difficult to establish the definitive influence of all these
factors, the discussion at least points to a potential problem surrounding the public ‘image’ of
Roma identity.
In the context of these phenomena, both countries provide interesting cases for studying
the formation of Roma identity in relation to the political environment. One wonders, for
instance, how the Roma elite has reacted to the problem of public identification and what
effects their reaction has had for the formation of Roma identity. Furthermore, a comparison of
the two countries will allow to explore differences of political context that could account for
identity differentiation within the group.
Ethnic identity and collective mobilisation: a conceptual bridge
Before embarking on a more detailed exploration of Roma identity politics in the Czech and
Slovak Republics, it is no doubt necessary to consider some conceptual underpinnings of this
study. When examining Roma identity formation from a constructivist angle, one may assume a
correspondence between the production of Roma ethnic identity and the current political
mobilisation of the Roma. How can this correspondence be described?
In general, the close relationship between identity and collective mobilisation has been
discussed by many scholars engaged in social movement research. Della Porta and Diani, for
example, state that ‘[c]ollective action cannot occur in the absence of a ‘we’ characterized by
common traits and a specific solidarity’ (della Porta and Diani 1999: 87). Many scholars agree
that there is a two-way relationship between social identification and collective action. Identity
construction not simply precedes collective action. The formation of identity is a process that is
shaped through collective action. Della Porta and Diani (1999: 87-91) describe three important
mechanisms through which this happens: collective action defines and redefines the boundaries
between actors in a conflict, it engenders networks of relationships of trust, and it offers a
continuing sense of belonging. Similar considerations can easily apply to the production ethnic
identity. Even in the case where there are seemingly ‘objective’ historical and cultural
foundations of identity, as is the case with ethnic identity, the boundaries of this identity are
continuously reconstituted in the light of the present circumstances. An ethnic minority is thus
not simply a group of people differing from the rest of society in terms of language and
tradition, but rather the result of a process in which such differences are perceived as socially
and politically meaningful.
When studying the mutual relationship between ethnic identity formation and collective
mobilisation, it will be useful to concentrate on the following three aspects of this relationship.
First, it is useful to see ethnic mobilisation as a form of cognitive praxis. The latter term has
been used by Eyerman and Jamison (1991) to describe the creative process of knowledge
production in which any social movement is engaged. The authors contend that precisely the
cognitive aspect of collective action defines the identity of a social movement. This also applies
to ethnic movements: they produce and promote new understandings and interpretations of
perceived reality (in casu markers of ethnic difference). In other words: ethnic movement actors
are ‘signifying agents’ (Benford and Snow 2000: 613) who attempt to promote new
understandings and interpretations of their ethnic identity. Precisely these understandings and
interpretations are crucial to the study of ethnic identity formation.
Second, ethnic identity can be seen as a semantic category that is realised through
articulation. Thus, not the ethnic group as an entity is central to my understanding of the
phenomenon of ethnic politics, but the way ethnic identity is constructed in language. This
discourse approach is based on the view that ‘language events’ are in fact the symbolic
constructs that we use to understand and actualise reality (Donati 1992 : 138). This means that
in this research I will concentrate on the discursive aspect of ethnic mobilisation: the way
movement actors describe Roma identity in their public discourse. Ethnic identity, in this sense,
serves as a semantic category that is constantly subjected to the manoeuvres of actors who are
trying to persuade others to see their identity as they understand it is.
Third, the construction of identity is not merely the result of a ‘rhetoric’ promulgated by
ethnic movement actors. It is also a process that is conditioned by factors belonging to the
historical and political environment. In other words, one can assume that the presence, salience
and meaning of ethnic identity is affected by a number of factors that are not deliberately
crafted by movement actors in their strategic action. These are less controllable factors resulting
from the context, such as the way ‘common knowledge’ or ‘traditional knowledge’ about ethnic
identity is treated and reproduced in media and politics. In the this paper the area of political
discourse is considered of great interest. This can be seen as an expression of the structure of
power relations surrounding the movement.
A concept suited to examine the production of ethnic identity which pays attention to
cognitive, strategic and contextual aspects, is offered in contemporary social movement
research in the notion of ‘framing’. Framing has been described by Benford and Snow (2000:
626) as the generation and diffusion by movement actors of mobilising and countermobilising
ideas and meanings. The concept of framing, however, also recognises that this process is not
taking place in a vacuum. It is sensitive to the fact that it is to a certain degree shaped by the
complex, multi-organisational, multi-institutional arenas in which it takes place. It is
acknowledged that the resonance of framing is affected by the cultural and political
environment, ‘including the framing/counterframings of the institutional elites’.
One way of researching the signifying struggle in which Roma actors are involved
would be to look at the media (as a mirror of public opinion). Media has no doubt a profound
influence on the resonance of the collective action frames of the Roma movement. But the study
of media framing does not offer us a view on how Roma activists themselves attempt to
conceptualise their movement identity. For this reason, this research will concentrate on
framing processes triggered by the elite. I will prefer to concentrate on formulations of Roma
ethnic identity by the actors themselves and how they are developing in relation to conceptions
of Roma identity constructed by agencies in power. These aspects are interesting because they
have not been frequently studied. Such an approach may also offer us a better understanding of
how factors of power and domination have influenced this process.
I concentrate on the political elite because I assume that it has an important role to play
in shaping the categorisation of ethnic groups. Conover and Hicks (1998: 25) have argued that
political elites can produce either a more destructive and a more constructive social and
political environment by ‘substantially altering the understanding and saliency of these groups’.
The process of social construction of ethnicity takes place in various informal and formal
contexts of which that of politics is no doubt a very important one. Politics provides a platform
for the mass mobilisation of ethnicity and can directly influence public rhetoric, legislative and
administrative acts or the distribution of resources. For this reason, this research focuses on the framing of Roma identity by the Roma elite and on the framing of Roma identity by the policy
makers.
Roma identity and frame alignment in Roma activist discourse
Scholarship about itinerant populations, gypsies, Roma and other comparable groups has
produced a dubious legacy. In many cases both academic and non-academic attempts to define
these groups have produced and stimulated popular stereotypical thinking about them as
deviants, outcasts or romantic outsiders. These studies more than once contributed to the
categorisation and subsequently the stigmatisation of ‘gypsies’ as a stable and inherently
inferior group. Lucassen, Willems and Cottaar (1998) recognise two dominant paradigms in the
literature – one which defines these groups in terms of social status (criminality, marginality
and poverty), and one which views them as a group with a common exotic, non-European
origin. The latter categorisation seems to be in many ways the result of an ethnographic
tradition of examining ‘gypsies’ (while at the same time defining and constructing the very
category of ‘gypsies’). Willems (1995; 1998) argues that authoritative popular scientific texts
in various time periods have created the dominant essentialist understanding of the ‘gypsies’ as
a stable entity that is foreign to European culture and societies.
Since 1989 a growing body of descriptions of the way Roma were treated in the new
democracies of CE became available to the regional specialist. The question of the production
of Roma identity itself was rarely addressed. However, these descriptions contained different
assumptions about what constitutes Roma identity. Often the Roma in CE were conceptualised
as somewhere between an ‘immigrant minority’ and a ‘national minority’, but neither of the
two types exactly, because it was observed that only a limited number of them had migrated in
recent times and that they did not have a connection to an external homeland. In the large
majority of the descriptions the alleged Indian origin served as a main source for identifying
them.
Given the wide range of conceptualisations of the ‘Roma’ that scholars have come up
with, it is perhaps not at all surprising that activists too have different ways in which they think
about the group they aspire to represent. Exploration of the interviews with Roma activists in
the Czech and Slovak republics and texts produced by Roma interest organisations led to the
observation that in both countries mainly three types of Roma identity frames are used to
describe and warrant Roma collective action and Roma-based claims-making. These frames
can be regarded as the conscious efforts of people who regard themselves as ‘leaders’ or
‘representatives’ to enhance a certain view on Roma identity in order to mobilise protest against
unequal treatment or to buttress their demands on the government for protection of their own
culture. They can be described as more or less bounded sets of arguments that represent a
certain perspective on the position of the Roma and the meaning of Roma-based political
action.
A non-territorial European nation
A first frame which was encountered in activists’ accounts describes the Roma as a
non-territorial European nation. The Roma activists who applied this perspective to talk about
their collective identity emphasised that the Roma all over Europe posses a common history
and, especially, a common origin. They argued that all Roma communities are somehow
connected, not through territory but through blood ties. The apparent fragmentation in terms of
language or culture is in their view related to time periods of aggressive assimilation and
repressive policies implemented by non-Roma authorities. The argument is very much in
keeping with the ideas formulated by Roma linguist and representative of the International
Roma Union (IRU) Ian Hancock:
I have been among the most vocal in insisting that Roma are a people who originated in Asia. I
take the position of the sociolinguist, who sees language as the vehicle of culture. And we indeed
speak a language and maintain a culture whose core of direct retention is directly traceable to
India. The acknowledgement of that position is essential, because the alternative is to create a
fictitious history and to have, again, our identity in the hands of non-Romani policy-makers and
scholars. (Hancock 1997)
Roma activists in the Czech and Slovak Republic who advocated this view also firmly
contended that the position of the Roma should be perceived not simply as that of an Indian
diaspora, but as that of a nation that is deeply rooted in Europe. The problems facing the Roma
were in this perspective attributed mainly to a lack of serious Roma representation in public
bodies on domestic and international levels. In other words, they lobby for special forms of
Roma representation. This frame is dissimilar from many other national liberation movements
because it explicitly excludes territorial ‘liberation’ as a goal. In a radical version of this
argument, Hancock explains that support for their claims can be found in the existence of a
symbolic external homeland:
The arguments for stressing the “Indian connection” seem clear. In these times, when Europe is
divided into nation-states, being identified with an actual homeland brings legitimacy and a
measure of security. Furthermore, it is the Indian factors-linguistic, genetic, and cultural-that
different Romani populations share; it is the more recently acquired non-Indian factors that divide
us. If I want to speak in Romani to a speaker of a dialect different from my own, it is the European
words we must each avoid, not the Indian ones. (Hancock 1997)
The Roma activists who relied on argumentation within this frame emphasised the importance
of transnational networks as mobilising structures. Not unsurprisingly, the Roma activists who
use this frame usually maintained connections to the International Roma Union (IRU) or the
Roma National Congress (RNC).7
It is also comes as no surprise that this frame represents a
useful bridge between activists in the domestic arena and the international political
environment. Direct lobbying toward international organisations like the Council of Europe and
the OSCE has proven its worth: both organisations have established special institutions to raise
the level of awareness concerning the problems facing the Roma within the respective member
states. Indirectly this strategy has contributed to higher levels of external pressure and scrutiny
on both the Czech and Slovak Republic. For this reason Roma activists have formulated their
criticism often in a language referring to international moral standards like human rights. One
could perhaps argue that this strategy to some extent reflects the experience of what Soysal
(1996) has called ‘postnational citizenship’, a practice of citizenship that is increasingly defined according to entitlements emerging from the transnational discourse and the practice of
international human rights protection. Arguably, the growing attention during the last decade of
human rights organisations for the position of the Roma in both countries has stimulated the
development of this strategy. Dimitrina Petrova, director of one of the most articulate human
rights organisations focusing on Roma, the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), wrote
recently in one of the organisations newsletters:
(...) for the Roma of Europe, Human Rights seems to be a uniting principle, a universally
acknowledged tool for positive change. Contrary to this, in our day-to-day work, we are often
confronted by Roma who are not happy about ERRC having chosen to work with certain other
Roma, on the vague but bitter grounds that they are not legitimate as Roma. I personally believe
that the Roma struggle is often weakened by the abysmal question, ‘Who is real Rom?’ The
struggle over identity at this stage does not unite the Roma in Europe. (Petrova 1999)
This immediately demonstrates that the frame ‘Roma as a non-territorial European nation’
brings a number of problems with it and was consequently criticised by many of the
interviewed activists. The essence of their criticism was that Indian origin and transborder
co-operation are very academic notions and thus poor tools for effective mobilisation in both
the Czech and Slovak context. The frame was in many cases seen as purely symbolic. As one
Czech Roma activist stated:
We are a national minority. If you want to call it a nation… okay… but that doesn’t change much.
The fact that the Roma are a world-wide and a European nation is only important to stress towards
other countries where the Roma are not yet acknowledged as a national minority
Furthermore, the idea of being a ‘transborder nation’ only seems to become concrete when
activists have the opportunity to take part in international Roma conferences. International
organisations, however, have become increasingly interested in these meetings. Thus they
appear regularly, attract more participants and have opened up new opportunities for finding
financial support.
.....
